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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This report documents the research of one of the EDGaR research projects, namely ‘The Big Picture’. 
This project was developed by the project partners Gasunie (in collaboration with DNV GL), 
Rijksuniversiteit Groningen (RuG) and Hanze University Groningen (HUG). 
The outlook for the energy market in general and more specifically the position of gas is difficult to 
foresee. Gas market parties and stakeholders do not have a clear and shared view of the future 'big 
picture' regarding the developments in energy markets and potential energy transition end states. This 
hampers a consistent and effective approach to long- term decision making. This raises the question 
whether the existing and potentially discovered gas reserves will be used efficiently and effectively, and 
how it is possible for gas to play a role in a sustainable and secure energy supply, as well as how this 
role will develop over time. 
This project identifies and categorizes possible end states after the energy transition from literature and 
derives implications from these end states in terms of technical, economic and socio-political factors. The 
aim of this research is to provide the gas market parties and stakeholders with a view on the long- term 
'big picture' of potential end states after the energy transition with the focus on the role of gas. Such 
view would create a solid base for making substantiated and business wise decisions in the context of 
energy transition. The main research question of this report is as follows:  
“What are potential robust energy end states after the transition and what will be the role and share of 
both renewable energy and in particular natural gas in Europe?” 
In order to understand the dynamics behind the forming of energy end states this research firstly 
introduces drivers of change impacting the energy environment. A plethora of drivers of change will 
shape energy systems of the future. This report discusses the relevant drivers of change and their 
possible influence on the future energy systems. The five areas are: Politics, Social factors, Economies, 
Resources and the environment, Energy systems and technology. A key finding is that the international 
political and economic order is becoming more multipolar than three decades ago, and that drivers of 
change can have a different effect in different parts of the world. Also, the role of social and political 
actors on energy systems is likely to be more prominent. In Europe, this will be noticeable at the local, 
national and international level. At the local level, high-impact social ideas like green consumerism and 
limited acceptance of energy systems that result in major trade-offs, could be important drivers of 
change. Nationally, the empowerment of individuals and communities relative to the state and as 
producers of some forms of energy and the politicization of energy-related issues will be key drivers of 
change. Internationally, energy issues will at least remain important or become even more so in the 
foreign and security policies of countries and the geopolitics of non-state actors.  
To derive at potential robust end states this report explores numerous energy scenarios to distil three 
energy transition end states. These end states are scrutinized by examining their implications and 
potential limitations. The end states that emerged from the analysis are: 
1. Renewables (RES) - Somewhat stabilizing energy demand and strong increased share in 
renewable energy. 
2. Business as Usual (BAU) - Increasing energy demand supplied by a balanced mix of energy 
sources.  
3. High Gas (GAS) - More than doubling energy demand and satisfied by a large share of natural 
gas. 
The end states were derived using primarily quantitative analysis, but they are also characterised by the 
principal factors of the PESTE framework (Political, Economic, Social, Technological, and Environmental). 
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Although the end states differ in their final energy mix and absolute amount of energy consumption, 
there are several similar factors. From an economic perspective, all three end states assume an increase 
in global population and GDP. Similarly, CO2 prices and energy efficiency are expected to increase as well 
and there’s a continued support for renewable energy sources under all three end states, albeit to 
various degrees.  
On the other side though, there are differences as well. While emissions are expected to decrease in the 
RES end state, they are set to moderately increase under BAU and GAS. Also, unconventional fossil fuels 
are projected to play an important part under BAU and GAS, whereas, unsurprisingly, renewable energy 
technologies are projected to mature under the RES end state. 
A more detailed look into the GAS end state shows that it is connected to an increase in energy 
consumption and corresponding increase in CO2 emissions. Furthermore, in contrast to what is normally 
assumed, natural gas is projected to play a significant role primarily when climate awareness is lower on 
the agenda; in contrast to the RES and BAU end states. Also, natural gas seems to play an important 
role when policy makers are more concerned about energy security than climate change, when no clear 
choices are made regarding favourable technologies and when limited international coordination takes 
place.  
To describe the role and share of both renewable energy and in particular natural gas in Europe this 
report describes the implications for each of the three end states, including possible investment 
requirements in gas and renewable infrastructure.  
A model has been developed that allows for a translation of the final energy demand mix into primary 
energy requirements by adapting the underlying energy system. As may be expected, the RES end state 
has the largest implications, in terms of end-users requirements and land use. First of all, electrification, 
as a result of the choices made in this end state, is reflected mainly in the transportation sector as 
electric vehicles, as well as electric space heating in the residential and tertiary sectors become essential 
for the realization of this end state. Furthermore, energy use is shifted to land use which is a 
consequence of the implementation of large amounts of renewable sources. This is especially the case 
for biomass under the RES end state, in which about 50% of the agricultural land in the European Union 
is needed for growing energy crops. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that in all three end state, the 
industrial sector does not change much. Therefore, there are no major changes in the production 
structure and activities. 
Specifically zooming in on the existing gas infrastructure, analysis showed that it is well equipped to 
support the realization of the RES and BAU end state. Evidently, this is directly related to the decline or 
stabilizing gas demand in Europe under these two end states. However, the gas infrastructure is also 
well-suited to support the increasing gas demand in the GAS end state. Although it would be required to 
build additional importing pipelines, the analysis shows that the internal gas network as presently 
available in Europe is capable to satisfy this increase in demand. From this respect, no considerable 
limitations are expected from the availability of the gas infrastructure.  
Focusing on the role of renewable energy technologies, analysis revealed that different decentralized 
renewable energy technologies have different grid implication dynamics relative to varying demand 
scales. Part of those differences can be explained through differences in weather dependency.  
Energy futures involving large shares of decentralized renewable power in the energy mix are likely to 
involve substantial grid implications. However, part of the power generated on a decentralized platform 
is consumed locally. Only the part that is not consumed locally/directly accounts towards grid 
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implications. Grid implications for larger shares of decentralized renewables may thus be less than what 
could be assumed from the gross total of generated power. 
In order to fulfil the need for practical examples and analysis of applicable technologies this report 
discusses the case of power-to-gas, biomass and the local North Netherlands situation.  
Innovation of technology trajectory: Power-to-gas 
The energy system has to adapt to intermittent energy sources, such as wind power and solar energy, 
which provide energy in a fluctuating manner. Energy storage is one of the possible solutions. Power-to-
Gas is a technology that offers this storage option. The analysis shows that the position of power-to-gas 
in the future energy system depends on the wind and solar ambitions, power-to-gas technological 
progress and the development of a regulatory framework for both gas quality standards and investment 
conditions.  
Limitations of biomass availability 
Since it is expected that biomass technologies, especially biomass digestion, will contribute considerably 
to the required volume of renewables in the future energy mix, this report assesses the limitations of 
large scale biomass use in Europe. For a densely populated country (such as the Netherlands) it is 
impossible to produce the biomass fuels to supply their own system. This is further complicated by the 
competition between food and energy. Not only the food and fuel discussion, but also due to competition 
between feedstock for other applications (e.g. bio plastics).  
Local energy system dynamics: Energy Valley 
When talking about ‘energy systems’ this analysis takes a broader perspective and looks at ‘energy’ as 
being embedded in social, economic, and political systems and that such a system could be a district, 
region, country, or a regional block such as the EU. The analysis looks at ‘energy’ as being located in a 
specific location with a defined boundary. This research examines Energy Valley as an energy system 
embedded in a larger energy system. The analysis shows that the future of gas in the energy mix in 
Energy Valley has become polarized between the local and national economic interests and therefore 
new ‘coping strategies’ need to be considered where citizen acceptance and national interests need to be 
balanced (such as the recent man-induced earthquakes). 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 About the EDGaR research program 
The Energy Delta Gas Research (EDGaR) program is set up by a Dutch research consortium of ten 
enterprises and research institutes. It coordinates the realization of scientific, applied and technological 
researches on gas and sustainability. Participants to the consortium come from the industry — Gasunie, 
GasTerra, Kiwa, Enexis, Liander and Stedin — and scientific institutions — ECN, University of Groningen, 
Delft University of Technology and Hanze University of Applied Sciences. Since its beginning on 1 
January 2010, EDGaR has subsidized 29 original multidisciplinary projects in the domains of natural 
science, engineering and social sciences. 
EDGaR’s goal is to make out a case for the energy future of the Netherlands, with respect to the use of 
sustainable energy sources. Moreover, EDGaR’s research program attempts to give the Dutch gas 
industry a better position in the world and, more particularly, in Europe. It supports its research teams in 
a spirit of cooperation and exchange of knowledge among them. 
This report documents the research of one of the EDGaR research projects, namely ‘The Big Picture’. 
This project was developed by the project partners Gasunie (research performed by DNV GL), 
Rijksuniversiteit Groningen (RuG) and Hanze University Groningen (HUG). 
1.2 Background 
The European energy market is undergoing structural changes in many areas, which affect both the 
market as a whole and the individual industry players. The environmental concerns and the climate 
change mitigation drive are high on the political and social agenda. The European Union and the 
individual member states introduce increasingly demanding requirements in relation to the use of 
renewable energy sources in the fuel mix, energy efficiency and CO2 emissions reductions. However 
there is also another side of the coin: increasing standards of living across the globe, increasing 
competition for energy resources due to the wealth accumulation by the developing countries, as well as 
public discussions about the energy poverty and food versus energy, are putting pressure on the global 
availability of energy (both fossil and renewable). In the light of these developments the availability of 
significant reserves of both gas (conventional and unconventional) and alternative energy sources gain 
importance.  
Gas still remains the cleanest of the fossil fuels, and it is and will be an important source of flexibility, 
crucial for developing the renewable energy sources and incorporating them in the energy mix. Moreover, 
in most cases the production price of the gas reserves is still less than that of the renewables, with an 
additional downward pressure on the price being exercised by the development of significant volumes of 
unconventional gas at a competitive cost. This raises the question whether the existing and potentially 
discovered gas reserves will be used efficiently and effectively, and how it is possible for gas to play a 
role in the sustainable security of energy supply, as well as how this role will develop over time. 
All these developments, occurring in parallel, make the future outlook for the energy market in general 
and more specifically the position of gas in the market difficult to foresee. Gas market parties and 
stakeholders do not have a clear and shared view of the future 'big picture' regarding the developments 
in the energy markets and the potential energy transition end states. This hampers a consistent and 
effective approach to long- term decision making.  
The central research question therefore is “what are potential robust energy end states after the 
transition and what will be the role and share of both renewable energy and in particular natural gas?” 
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Against this background the project partners developed the EDGaR-project 'The Big Picture'. In short, 
this project identifies and categorizes possible end states after the energy transition from literature and 
derives implications from these end states in terms of technical, economic and socio-political implications. 
The aim of this research is to provide the gas market parties and stakeholders with a view on the long- 
term 'big picture' of potential end states after the energy transition with the focus on the role of gas. 
Such view would create a solid base for making substantiated and business wise decisions in the context 
of energy transition. 
1.3 Project approach 
 
The shifts in the patterns of both energy supply and consumption can develop in a number of ways, each 
of them having specific consequences for the energy market as a whole, and for the gas market in 
particular. The focus of this project is not on building scenarios and deriving end states ourselves. The 
first step in our methodology is to select a number of potential stable end states of the energy transition 
from well-known literature sources. End states from well-known and accepted literature will be the 
starting point for this research.  
The project is organized in three individual work streams. These three work streams are set-up in order 
to address different aspects of the research question from a multidisciplinary perspective. The three 
work streams are based on the same set of assumptions, and have as a starting point the energy 
transition end states. Selecting literature input for the three end states of scenarios mentioned above will 
be a joint activity prior to starting the individual work streams. The approach towards selecting and 
specifying these end states will be elaborated in the description of work package 0 below. After 
specifying the end states the three work streams will be developed as a synergy, with rich cross- 
fertilization ambition. Namely, the intermediate results of the work streams will often be used as input 
for other work streams. Moreover, the conclusions of the each individual work stream will be 
incorporated in a joint assessment of the end states. 
The three individual work streams are depicted schematically in the figure below, followed by an 
elaboration of the detailed approach and methodology for each work stream separately and how these 
work streams contribute to the overall research question. 
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Figure 1: Schematic representation of the work streams 
 
Work package 0 - Describing three possible End States (Combined effort) 
As already mentioned, the focus of this research is not to identify and quantify three potential end states 
of the energy transition ourselves, but rather on the limitations and consequences of such end states for 
the energy market in general, and the gas market in particular. In order to arrive at a common starting 
point for the work streams 1, 2 and 3 the project partners will jointly detail the end states for the project 
based on literature. 
 
Work stream 1- Security of Demand (Gasunie/DNV GL) 
The long-term availability of energy is rapidly gaining weight and priority on the global agenda, 
especially in the light of depleting fossil reserves, climate change concerns and increasing demand for 
energy. Numerous studies and energy outlooks focus on the security of supply, assessing if there will be 
enough supply to satisfy the overall energy consumption. The demand side of the analysis is often less 
pronounced, however not less important. This research will investigate the demand for energy and will 
focus on the type of energy carriers and the energy carriers that are utilized downstream by consumers 
(households, commercials, industry and power plants) in potential end states of the energy transition. 
 
Work stream 2- Security of Sustainable Supply (University of Groningen) 
The current energy use patterns put pressure on the environmental systems and cycles that may result 
in an unacceptable global (climate) change. Potential depletion of the fossil resources and lack of 
security of fossil supply because of geo-political reasons are the worries related to the current energy 
use patterns. However the security of supply concerns will also remain on the agenda in the context of 
the energy transition. 
Workstream 3
Innovation of Technology Trajectory
HUG
Workstream 2
Security of Sustainable Supply
RUG
Limitations Analysis:
• Technical limitations
• Technological limitations
• Physical resources limitations
• Social limitations
• Economic limitations
Workstream 1
Security of Demand
Gasunie/ KEMA
Consequences Analysis:
• Energy mix consequences
• Gas market consequences
Limitations Analysis:
• Scale limitations
• Security limitations
• Social/ economic acceptability
limitations
Consequences Analysis:
• Gas market consequences
Consequences Analysis:
. Gas marktet consequences
. Green gas market consequences
Success factors & barriers:
• Technological
•Institutional
• Social
•Economic
•Resources
What is the ‘big picture’ outlook on the future role of gas in each of the energy transition end states?
Work package 0
Describing three possible End 
States after energy transition
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Therefore the focus of this work stream is on answering the question of how robust is the supply system 
in each of the energy transition end states, and to what extent will it comply with the demands of 
sustainability, security and reliability, availability and affordability, when applied on large scale.  
 
Work stream 3- Innovation of Technology (Hanze University Groningen) 
Each end state of the energy transition presumes a considerable degree of technological innovation on a 
large scale in order to be achieved. This work stream will focus on identifying the trajectory which in 
particular biomass digestion has to follow from the current situation until large scale implementation. 
The success factors (‘drivers’) which make it possible for biomass digestion to leave the early stages of 
development behind and become an incumbent technology will be identified, as well as the potential 
factors which can hamper such a process (‘spoilers’).  
1.4 Structure of this report 
This report is structured into ten chapters. Chapter 1 (this chapter) describes the introduction to this 
research. Chapter 2 provides an overview of the drivers of change impacting global energy systems. In 
Chapter 3 the energy end states, which serve as the basis of further analysis, are derived and presented. 
Chapter 4 assesses the bottom-up implications of the energy end states in Europe for the year 2050. In 
Chapter 5 the impact of the energy end states on the European gas infrastructure is assessed. Chapter 6 
presents a case study on the availability of biomass for the production of bio CNG for the use as a 
transportation fuel in Europe. The grid implication of decentralised renewable energy generation is 
assessed in Chapter 7. In Chapter 8 the technological innovation system of power-to-gas is set apart. 
Finally Chapter 9 dives into the contextual and systemic forces of the Energy Valley region. Chapter 10 
presents the integrated key findings of this combined effort and draws conclusions on the future role of 
gas.  
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2 DRIVERS OF CHANGE IN ENERGY SYSTEMS UNTIL 2050 
Author: Dr. H. Matthee – Hanze University Groningen 
2.1 Introduction 
A plethora of drivers of change remain likely or probable in shaping energy systems and futures. Drivers 
of change are defined here as any human- or nature-induced factor that cause changes. In this chapter, 
the drivers discussed could cause changes that would shape energy systems until 2050. Drivers here 
include those that cause change directly or by altering one or more direct drivers. Implicitly, some 
drivers discussed below are endogenous, where decision-makers influence some drivers, and others are 
exogenous, where drivers influence decision-makers. The drivers could have a positive or a negative 
effect at different stages and during different interactions and iterations. 
The World Energy Council’s publication on global energy scenarios until 2050 is based on 116 drivers, 
grouped in five areas.1 This chapter is structured along the WEC framework, using the five interlinked 
areas, but with some changes in formulation, sub-elements and emphasis. The five areas are: 
1. Politics - including international, regional, national, local and group politics and security 
challenges 
2. Social factors - including demographics, consumer behaviour and high-impact ideas and 
institutions 
3. Economies - including roles, cycles, finance and trade;  
4. Resources and the environment 
5. Energy systems and technology 
2.2 Politics 
2.2.1 International politics 
International politics2 will produce several important drivers of change, which could impact on energy 
futures until 2050 in direct and indirect ways. Energy is directly tied to the state security and foreign 
policy concerns of governments in Asia, Russia, the Middle East, North and South America, and Africa. 
The same is the case for European governments, including those of Germany, France, Britain and the 
Netherlands. The global energy sector will remain one of the most-politicized sectors until 2050.3  
This means that issues from outside the energy sector may quickly embroil the sector in unforeseen and 
fast-moving shifts and escalations. This could affect the security of supply, but also change the nature of 
ownership, energy alliances, the relative importance of energy actors and the relative priority of 
developing different forms of energy.  
International politics could also have a significant weakening or strengthening influence, in seemingly 
unrelated economic sectors, with a direct or indirect effect on the energy sector. For example, during the 
current stand-off between the Russian government of Pres. Vladimir Putin, the USA and EU member 
states over the Ukraine and Crimea, Russia’s energy sector has become a key target for Western 
sanctions and also a key means of Russian pressure. Russian counter-actions have resulted in Western 
agricultural and other sectors being directly affected. They have also including the pursuit of a potentially 
stronger Russia-China energy alliance, efforts to strengthen the civilian nuclear sector in South Africa, 
competing with France in this regard, and renewed involvement in the civilian nuclear sector in Iran, 
against the foreign policy aims of most EU member states.  
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The shift of international power from the West to Asia and from an almost unipolar world to a multipolar 
world will be an important driver of change.4 It is expected that China and India specifically will become 
more influential in regional and international politics until 2050. They will also experience a high absolute 
increase in energy demand during this period, which will reinforce the wider impact of developments in 
the energy sector.  
One hundred years ago European actors constituted a much larger component of the world population 
and politically and economically dominated both the larger West and vast parts of the world and 
international energy sector. Today, Europe’s global power has weakened and is weakening. The renewed 
strength of the USA, its focus on the Asia-Pacific, and the rise of Asian and other powers in a multipolar 
world order will reinforce Europe’s weakened position.5  
In individual cases, this could be reflected in the bargaining power of Europe-based actors. It could also 
weaken the commitment of other actors to political transparency, rule of law, protection of property 
rights, climate change, minority group rights and human rights. This could result in more reputational 
and operational dilemmas and risks for Europe-based energy actors in their external interactions, 
projects and partnerships.  
The importance of state-linked corporations or privately-owned national corporate champions outside 
Europe could also act as a driver of change. In many states of Asia, Africa and the Middle East, energy 
remains a key source of government income and/or a key factor in maintaining domestic services and 
socio-political stability. In addition, state or state-linked corporations dominate the energy sector, 
whether in oil, gas or renewable energies. These companies often form part of the government’s foreign 
policy, and operate in accordance with both strategic and economic imperatives. This is the case in China, 
Russia, India, Iran, Algeria, the Gulf Arab monarchies, Nigeria, and Brazil, among other countries. More 
than 80% of the world’s oil and gas reserves are now controlled by national energy companies.6 These 
companies will be competing and sometimes cooperating with EU-based energy companies.  
National policies and their impact on property rights and protectionism will also be an important driver of 
change in the international energy sector. Governments, for political and economic reasons, have a long 
history of interfering with private property. Since 1990, over 75 emerging economy governments have 
nationalized foreign investments or been sued for unlawfully devaluing foreign holdings.7 This approach 
could involve creeping expropriation in the form of regulations, taxation and local content or local 
ownership requirements, as in Iraq, South Africa and Russia, or outright expropriation, as in Russia, 
Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela. The economic failures due to such an approach could result in 
privatization projects, but privatizations carried out in those countries plagued with political instability 
could be renegotiated once a new government with different motivations and interests is installed.8  
New alliances, new roles and new actors that emerge will also be important drivers of change. For many 
years after Western decolonization in the 1950s, Iran played the role of a guardian of Western interests 
in the Middle East. This changed after the Islamic Revolution of 1979. Similarly, Russia’s role in Eastern 
Europe has changed with its actions in the Crimea and eastern Ukraine since early 2014. This state of 
affairs has had major political and economic repercussions, among others a closer energy alliance 
between Russia and China. Similarly, since the Arab Spring of 2011, energy-rich Arab monarchies in the 
Gulf, but also in Morocco and Jordan, have realigned in an effort to stave off the kind of revolts that 
appeared in Egypt, Tunisia and Yemen. Meanwhile, new actors like the south of Sudan’s emergence as a 
state and the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria have changed the effective boundaries of 
authority in these three countries.9 
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2.2.2 Regional politics 
Regional dynamics are likely to have an increased impact on international and national politics, and will 
therefore be an important driver of change. This was especially visible during the so-called Arab Spring 
or Arab Rebellion of 2011, when events in one country had considerable impact on other countries in a 
region. 
The nature and effectiveness of regional governance arrangements will be an important driver of change. 
In principle, such regionalism is closer than international institutions to the sources of the problems to be 
tackled. Neighbouring countries are directly affected by threats stemming from respective regions. 
National leaders may be more familiar with one another in regional institutions, formal and informal. 
Regional instruments may also be mobilized faster than those of larger organisations.  
Regionalism will however be weaker in some regions and sub-regions than others. ASEAN, for example, 
has developed over decades a distinctive style of regional cooperation based on a low level of 
institutionalisation, a non-intrusive agenda, informality, permanent consultation, and aversion to conflict. 
The dynamics between China, the two Koreas and Japan will be especially important for East Asian 
regionalism. 
Brazil would be the only country with the critical mass to strengthen regional cooperation. However, the 
potential for regional fragmentation also remains strong, currently demonstrated by the Bolivarian 
Alliance, which only include a selection of South American countries. 
In the Middle East, Turkey and secondly Iran will be the states with most potential influence in the period 
until 2050. However, it is likely that different sub-regional alliances will persist, of which Israel would 
also form at least an ad hoc part, either formally or informally. Similarly, no African country has 
sufficient influence and resources to steer regional cooperation at the continental level. Instead, 
alignments around Nigeria, South Africa, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt and Ethiopia among 
others, will be important for the future of the continent.10 
Another driver of change will be the decline or re-emergence of Russia as a regional power. If it declines, 
instability may give East European alliances led by Poland the need and the opportunity to adopt a more 
assertive policy to the east. The balance of power in Europe may in time move slightly eastwards, with 
Eastern Europe relying on US support and becoming more important as the demographic weakness of 
Germany and France has effect, while Turkey becomes stronger in the Caucasus, and areas to its 
northwest and south.11 
Neighbouring states to the south and the east of EU are likely to experience considerable internal and 
regional turbulence during the period until 2050, constituting another driver of change. This applies to 
most states in these regions, and also to particular states that are important in European energy supply 
and transit, including Russia and Algeria. While the development of renewables will remain a component 
of EU global energy policies, these policies will focus on institutional, regulatory and investment 
predictability in energy producer and transit states to its east and south, rather than just a free market.  
An interesting exception in this regard is Iran. It is quite possible that Iran, which already experienced 
an early “Persian Spring” of internal upheaval after the 2009 elections, will experience significant internal 
and regional political shifts in the period until 2050. The outcome could lead to the removal of Western 
sanctions against the country. Iran has the second-largest gas reserves in the world and the fourth-
largest oil reserves.12 Thus, such a shift could significantly influence the gas market, at least in Asia, but 
possibly also in Europe. 
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2.2.3 The EU as a region 
The alignment and integration of member states in the EU will be an important driver of change. To 
date, the EU as a regional institution has been shaped and sometimes constrained by several factors. 
Some of them will be drivers of change: the interests of national governments, also in response to 
political shifts among their citizens and in the relationship between different parties; the capabilities of 
the relatively small bureaucracy and executive arms; clashing visions of the EU as enhancing economic 
competitiveness and a free market versus considerations of social cohesion, or of EU supranational 
governance versus responsiveness to national democracies.  
The EU also quickly expanded in the past decade, with wide divergencies and sometimes tensions 
between individual countries and their institutions in the northwest, southeast and south of Europe. 
Some member states could come to diverge considerably from the liberal multiparty models dominant in 
the northwest, as indicated at present by the example of Hungary.13 
Many of the key national governments in the EU, including those of Germany and France, are strongly 
engaged in maintaining or re-gaining national power over the EU. This is especially true for energy policy, 
which remains closely allied to foreign and security policy. In these policy areas, as Giles Merritt, the 
head of the Friends of Europe think-tank recently put it, the EU does not speak with a single voice, 
sometimes not even with a single squeak.14 
Political decision-makers are also sensitive to their constituencies. European Parliamentary elections in 
2014 reinforced a trend of limited participation by citizens of the member states, and saw the rise of EU-
sceptic or –critical opposition parties. In many other parties in the Christian democratic, social 
democratic or market liberal traditions, national considerations largely trump EU ones.  
Both important political decision-makers and their political constituencies thus do not seem primed for 
considerable stronger EU institutions. Strong corporations in the diverse energy sector of national states 
also have diverging interests and ambitions. As a result, national energy policies in Europe are likely to 
pursue several different routes simultaneously.  
The relative resilience, skills and creativity of political elites in Europe will be a driver of change. For 
decades they have enjoined relative stability and prosperity in most of the EU, largely faraway threats, 
the remnants of post-colonial networks and influence in Africa, Asia and the Middle East, and the US-led 
NATO security umbrella in a bipolar and later unipolar world. This will change in the period until 2050, 
while political elites in Asia and other parts of the world, will become relatively more influential. 
The EU’s overall policies reflect the differences between member states and also different parties and 
stakeholders in member states between the competitiveness of markets and corporations, and social 
cohesion; and between supranational governance and regulation, and national democracies responsive 
to their citizens.  
The fragmentation or alignment of EU-wide energy policies will be an important driver of change. Until 
about 2007, there was a consensus driving energy policy primarily with climate change in view, but the 
consensus has become fragile since the start of the economic crisis.15 Internal energy policies in the EU, 
like foreign policies, could remain relatively fragmented until 2050. The capacity of EU institutions is 
limited, and further restrained by current economic conditions in many EU member states. 
By 2010, most EU member states considered moving back into nuclear power. After the Fukushima 
disaster in April 2011, states like Germany, Belgium and Italy backtracked. However, France, the 
second-most powerful EU member state, also remains the most nuclear-dependent country, and 
countries like the Czech republic also remains committed to nuclear energy. To reduce geopolitical 
dependence on energy from unstable regions to the east and the south of Europe, nuclear energy could 
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in future again constitute an attractive option in some European countries. This could in some ways align 
with the expressed aim of several Middle Eastern and Asian states to increase the role of nuclear power. 
To date, the gas and electricity market in the EU are regional markets and also subject to national policy 
instruments. Renewable energies constitute a part of local or national markets. In contrast, oil and coal 
remain embedded in global markets. 
2.2.4 National politics 
The European Commission’s Roadmap for moving to a competitive low-carbon economy in 2050 
suggests that, by 2050, the EU should cut its emissions to 80% below 1990 levels through domestic 
reductions alone. It sets out reductions of the order of 40% by 2030 and 60% by 2040. It also shows 
how the main sectors responsible for Europe's emissions - power generation, industry, transport, 
buildings and construction, as well as agriculture - can make the transition to a low-carbon economy 
most cost-effectively.16 In the EU’s electricity system, the rate of renewable energies of between 13 and 
15% is still far off the current political goals under discussion of 45% for 2030 or 65-86% for 2050.17 
However, national politics in Europe are likely to branch out in several directions simultaneously and 
remain an important driver of change. Even in the US, the shale gas revolution was enabled by support 
from the US Energy Department, the role of gas authorities, and exceptions to the Clean Water Act being 
allowed.18 
The stakeholders and interest groups related to different forms of energy will also be an important driver 
of change. For example, coal production remains an important part of the energy sector in Germany, 
Spain, Poland and others, with a reluctance to reduce state aid. While many states have reduced carbon-
production on their own territories, they have also increased carbon consumption by importing goods 
from carbon-rich producers in China and elsewhere. 
National and corporate policies about the production and transmission of renewable energies will be 
another important driver of change. Many countries in the EU have access to renewable energy sources, 
but some more so than others, and with more efficient harvesting in some countries compared to others. 
Most countries may face a decision between cheaper electricity imports and the security of supply of 
domestic production. Thus, renewable markets are more likely to be buyer’s markets and a view of 
electricity as a commodity, not a strategic good. ‘Concerns about security of demand and supply are not 
expressed in diversification policies and the like, but in a power struggle over the ownership and decision 
rights with regard to control and management of the grid.’19  
Another driver of change would be the greater impact of supply storage and disruptions where renewable 
energies are being used. When renewables form an important source of countries’ energy, geopolitical 
interdependencies may then shrink to the size of the grid that connects producer, transit and consumer 
countries. On the one hand, this would increase the reliance of participating countries in a well-
functioning electricity grid. On the other hand, any cross-border issues regarding energy supply would be 
more acute, because an interruption would directly lead to black-outs, and the difficulty in storing 
electricity would remove the option of strategic reserves. 
One implication would be that countries with certain capacities would become more influential, changing 
the patterns of influence and power in Europe. For example, better-placed countries would be those with 
considerable storage capability, high reserve capacity, the ability to produce renewable electricity at 
times of high demand, or large interconnector capacity that allows the balancing of outputs of different 
areas. 
An important driver of change would then be the role of large business with the experience in building 
and operating large power plants, and, implicitly, the viability or not of smaller alternatives. Most likely, 
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the utilities will play a prominent role, and because of the strategic interests, states too. New roles for 
Distribution System Operators (DOS) in forecasting, local allocation of distributed generation in the 
network, and local balancing of generation and load, will also influence developments. Grid support 
services will become more important to address concerns about operational security and reliability.20  
Access to components of the generators and transmitters of renewable energy will be a driver for change. 
Rare earth minerals are a crucial input for certain wind turbines, solar panels and batteries for electric 
vehicles. China has been active in acquiring control over a large share of the world’s resources. If this 
would become a tool of geopolitical pressures, European energy sectors would be affected.21 
2.2.5 Local/group politics 
The shift to non-state actors as agents or spoilers of cooperation, reinforced by the communications 
revolution, will be an important driver of change. Transnational non-governmental organisations, faith-
based organisations, multinational corporations, interest groups and civil society organisations will 
continue to be effective in reframing issues and mobilising public opinion. Opportunities will exist to 
expand the interaction between state and non-state actors and public-private cooperation. Those with 
hostile political or criminal agendas will be empowered by existing and new technologies and pose 
serious security threats. 
Minority group politics could be an important driver of change in Europe, as well as in parts of Asia, the 
Middle East and Africa.22 In the case of the US, the strong Hispanic minority, with its territorial and 
family links to Mexico and further south, will change the political landscape of the USA. Friedman and 
Huntington23 foresee a strong possibility that the borderland between the US and Mexico, extending far 
into the US could become predominantly Mexican, with the US becoming a bicultural nation with other 
smaller minorities. Different constituencies could eventually influence energy choices at a federal state 
level. 
In some cases, forms of class and generational politics could also combine with or oppose identity 
politics to influence energy policies. In the recent case of the referendum over Scotland’s independence, 
for example, a political dispensation that had been in existence for almost 400 years was almost 
destroyed. The result would have been a new energy dispensation in the United Kingdom, due to the 
location of many of its energy resources close to Scotland. Even though the pro-independence camp lost, 
its substantial growth in support, especially among younger voters, the need felt by British politicians to 
make big concessions regarding devolution indicate that the issue is likely to re-appear on the agenda 
until 2050. In Spain, Belgium and Italy, among others, local and group politics could also strongly 
reshape the political order and local energy policy choices in the period until 2050. 
Another driver of change would be the capacity of countries or even local communities to be able to 
become more self-sufficient in the production, transit and consumption of renewable energy. Where this 
does occur, the geopolitical considerations would reduce significantly compared to the current system, 
with its many dependencies in the supply chain.  
A linked driver of change would be the choice of countries between using centralized, large-scale solar 
farms or wind parks to generate electricity, or using decentralized, small-scale individual solar panels 
and turbines. In the first case, geopolitical issues would largely revolve around communities wanting 
such forms of energy to generate revenue and jobs, or those, for example in part of western and 
southern Germany, who do not want it in their backyard. In the second case, it would be relevant 
whether the renewable energies generated are fed back into the grid, or whether net production would 
evolve into local energy markets and new regulatory frameworks. 
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An important driver of change would be to what degree the incentives of producers and consumers to 
cooperate weaken or overrule the incentives to compete. Producers compete for markets, but they share 
an interest in keeping prices high. Consumers compete for access to resources, but they also share an 
interest in keeping prices low. Producers and consumers rely on each other for revenues and energy, but 
also try to minimize their mutual dependence.24   
2.2.6 Security challenges 
Conflicts in regions that are major producers or consumers, is likely to be a driver of change until 205025. 
This will especially be the case in the context of resource-scarcity. Such areas often become rife with 
corruption and organized crime, also in government institutions, so that the reputational risk and political 
risk to energy companies will remain high. Such conflicts will not only create short-term issues of supply, 
but shape energy security policies and preferences, as well as the operating practices of international 
and national energy companies.  
Failed and failing cities outside Europe will constitute a key driver of change, also reinforcing migrant 
streams to developed countries. There will be an increase in the size and importance of ethnic minorities 
in many countries, also in Europe. A high proportion of young adult men in the Middle East and North 
Africa will reach its peak in the next decade, also in migrant communities in some European cities.26 
Some of them will be well-integrated and/or economically successful, while others may not be, with 
resulting social tensions.  
Technological developments will allow migrants to maintain close links with their home communities and 
to transfer issues from the home country into the host country. Depending on the interests concerned, 
sometimes the energy interests concerned, governments of the host countries will have the impetus to 
intervene in the countries of origin or not.27 
The rise of private security actors will be a key driver of change. In many locales outside Europe, they 
will constitute an important provider of security and enabler of robust operations and resilience during 
instability. Somewhat related, the interaction between asymmetric and symmetric forces and operations 
during conflicts will be an important driver of change.28  
The expansion of alternative currencies will be a driver of change. It may make it easier to transfer and 
retain funds anonymously, harder to freeze the assets of criminals and rogue regimes, and reinforce the 
flexibility of actors and markets linked to forms of energy smuggling.29 
The growing use of nuclear energy raises the possibility of fissile material obtained by non-state actors 
and countries hostile to the existing international order.30 Unmanned energy-using systems will be a 
driver of change, paying an increased role during conflict, perhaps transforming the way battles are 
fought. Dual-use technologies and the military application of available civilian means may also play a 
role in this regard. In addition, there will be an increased reliance on space and cyber technologies, 
creating some vulnerabilities and an increased chance during conflicts of disruptive attacks with an effect 
on the energy sector.31  
2.3 Social factors 
Demographics will be a key driver of change. The global population is expected to increase considerably, 
with numbers including a rise from 7bn in 2011 to 9bn in 2050. Such an increase would result in a huge 
increase in energy demand, according to Shell by as much as 80% by 2060.32  
Due to the huge increase in demand, investment in infrastructure will also be a key driver of change. An 
estimated two-thirds of demand will be in non-OECD countries, which are expected to outperform OECD 
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economies by 2030. Increased access to energy sources and clean water, and affordable, safe and 
convenient mobility choices will be challenges. Managing pollution and traffic will be too.  
The impact of demographic decline on Europe’s working-age population is different. A lower potential 
growth rate is implied, and a lower-investment-to-GDP ratio is needed to keep the capital/output ratio 
constant. In some countries of Europe, higher investment may only lead to higher captal-output ratios 
and imply lower returns on capital.33 
Income inequality will be an important driver at regional and local levels outside the OECD countries, and 
may shape the preferences of potential consumers.34 The growth of a ‘new middle class’ will put pressure 
on prices, as a result of the increased demand. The middle class in many societies will also increase in 
influence. Estimates are that an additional 2.6bn people will attain at least middle income levels by 
2050. Individuals also tend to consume most in their lifetime between the age of 16 and 40, and before 
consumers really begin saving for retirement.35 
Government incentives and social activism to stimulate consumer demand for green goods and services, 
and public perception and corporate social responsibility as competitive differentiators could also be 
drivers of change in consumption, especially in some European countries.36  
However, the acceptance of consumers or citizens, their willingness to tolerate a technology in their own 
environment, could play a major role when launching new products and manufacturing plants and 
services. The public takes a critical view of extensions to the grid infrastructure and the construction of 
wind farms and pumped-storage power plants in their immediate vicinity. People could use consumer 
pressure groups but also political and administrative opportunities to question decisions after the event, 
hindering both conventional and renewable energy projects and increasing the risk of total or partial 
failure.37  
High-impact ideas will be a key driver of change. However, one cannot foresee all or even most ones in 
future, since many of them will result from complex interactions between people, symbolic systems, 
structures, and as yet-undeveloped technologies. However, at present, there are certain clusters of ideas 
with a probable high impact in future, also on the environment of energy. One idea would be derived 
from individualist and family-oriented traditions, and the formation and lifestyles of individuals, nuclear 
families and extended families. For example, in Indonesia, as people move upward into the middle class, 
they initially focus their spending on improving living conditions for their families rather than 
themselves.38 In India, young consumers are both very competitive and motivated by the desire to make 
their families proud, whereas older Indians also have a family-oriented focus.39 However, even in 
Europe, locational and regional variations play a role in this regard. 
The second high-impact idea, related to individualist and family orientations, would be the position of 
women. Globally, in the labour market and unpaid household work, gendered division is the rule. Women 
are also underrepresented in the energy sector. In many cases, professional access to the energy sector 
is mainly based on a scientific or engineering education, in which women are under-represented, 
sometimes extremely so. The fields of skilled trade relevant to the energy sector such as construction, 
electric installation, plumbing, and installation of energy control or heating systems are dominated by 
males. 40  
Women as consumers may have closer knowledge about the energy services that are needed for 
different members of the family, different energy needs and different ideas about sustainable livelihoods. 
Another important question concerns the influence of women on policy concepts, planning, decision-
making, and implementation, which is limited.  
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Gender, age and communitarian preferences may also shape the preferences and behavior of energy 
consumers. More men than women believe it is important that programs include the latest technologies, 
while more women than men are looking for programs that simplify their lives and are easy for the 
whole family to use.41 Younger respondents prefer programs that use the latest technologies, are fun to 
use and are regarded as trendy. Consumers in emerging markets are also keen on programs that enable 
them to connect with a community.42 
Cultural, religious and even political ideas may also shape production or consumption processes.  
Islamic consumerism, cultural production and lifestyle choices may play a role.43 Techno-nationalism or 
techno identity politics, where research and innovation are driven by sentiments and ambitions to service 
the greater good, are already visible in the civilian nuclear sector of Iran and other countries. It will also 
impact on the willingness to infringe on intellectual property rights and turn to industrial espionage and 
protectionism. 
Themes of human rights, cross-sector partnerships, corporate social responsibility, sustainability and 
inter-generation equity and alternative business models form part of idea clusters that can have a major 
influence on future energy business models. However, it would be myopic to think that such models 
need to be compliant with the current dominant models in Western countries. In Malaysia, models of 
Islamic business governance have emerged. In China, strong sentiments of a social hierarchy, ethical 
structure, and a strong sense of family as the basic unit of production, with its rights of inheritance and 
views of the extended family, still pervade much of Chinese thought. Hinduism and the traditional caste 
system still influence power distance and hierarchical business practices, the concept of time and 
fatalism, and a smaller concept of personal space and group orientation. 44 
The empowerment of individuals vis-à-vis the state will be an important driver of change. Global literacy 
rates have improved from an estimated 73% in 1990 to about 84% in 2010 and an estimated 90% by 
2030. Access to independent media and means of mobilization have enhanced the ability of actors. 
Greater interpersonal transnational flows and many networks connect more people. However, this should 
not result in assuming similarities in outlook or the disappearance of competing visions and ambitions. In 
many European countries, this empowerment is reinforcing dimensions of individualism; in Asia, Africa 
and the Middle East, many social institutions and norms of solidarity retain their influence and shape the 
conduct of empowered individuals.  
Greater individual empowerment without sufficiently strong social institutions will also amplify overload 
and confusion, an unusual intensity in volatility due to the environment, sharp swings in confidence and 
demand and possibly herd behavior.45 
In several ways, the balance of power has been slowly shifting from companies to consumers. Tools 
allow consumers to gain information about products, services and purchases. For example, they see their 
electricity expenditure, compare prices, and track their home energy use. They can make better 
decisions or even automate the decision process based on certain preferences.  
However, several trends have also converged to create a field in which the so-called hyper-individual or 
hyper-consumer would participate. An individual can use skills and the value of freely available 
information to regain control in the market-place. One trend is maximizing behaviour for high-value 
purchases. Another is the rise of websites, apps and services that can mine data. For example, a real-
time online price-monitoring service could suggest the best choice. The third trend is the quantified self, 
who is able to track and quantify many aspects of their lives now, whether through technology or 
legislative prescriptions. People learn and apply new methods of choice, self-monitoring, and 
information-gathering in their everyday lives. Modern lifestyles also pressure people to lead a more 
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streamlined life. The expanding middle class will also expand the number of such consumers in emerging 
markets.46  
A significant finding is that socio-economically and demographically, a person in the middle class of one 
country has more in common with a person in the middle class of another country. However, in terms of 
values and aspirations, people in the middle class or poorer classes in one country have more in common 
than people in the middle class in some regions. In addition, due to its low quality, many have opted out 
of public health and education systems, turning to private options. This has even been the case 
regarding electricity, where purchases of electricity generators have risen with income.47 
2.4 Economics 
Due to the extensive role of the government in most economies of Asia, the Middle East, Russia, Africa 
and South America, international, regional and national politics will remain an important driver of change 
in economies.  
The state of Asian economies in general will be an important driver of change for Europe. However, the 
economic centre of gravity, in terms of the location of economic activity and average GDP, continues to 
move to Asia. China and India will be the most important countries to make the biggest changes to the 
overall energy landscape up to 2050. According to the World Energy Council, the total primary energy 
demand of China is expected to double by 2035, and that of India to increase by almost 150% during 
the same period. 
Economic turmoil in emerging markets may also inhibit the projected growth in Asian countries until 
2050. For example, inflows of capital have currently created substantial credit and real estate bubbles in 
China, Singapore and Hong Kong. The quality of economic growth and economic institutions has not 
always been controlled, in the case of China also due to ambitious local governments. Foreign exchange 
reserves are being reduced, often an indicator of worsening times. The IMF has warned of potentially 
prolonged market turmoil in emerging markets.48  
An important driver of change would be the absence or presence of a second economic slowdown or 
crisis in Western countries, and a concomitant decline in energy demand. A second economic crisis 
cannot be ruled out yet. While governments have taken measures and consumer debt and financial 
sector debt in the US have since the 2008 crisis reduced by about 12% and 19% respectively, Western 
banks still remain too big, too interconnected and too undercapitalized, according to some experts. Some 
of the type of products that contributed to the crisis, like synthetic collateralized debt obligations, have 
re-merged in Wall Street, and federally guaranteed mortgages requiring small deposits are back in the 
USA. Meanwhile, volatility in major emerging markets and in Russia are impacting on the export-
oriented European economies. 49  
Market movers will be a very important driver of change. Market movers include global companies with 
international supply chains; banks who can provide much-needed capital for increasing economy activity, 
venture capitalists who fund breakthrough technological research in order to gain larger shares in 
successful new market entrants, and entrepreneurs who offer new goods and services. The institutional 
rules of the game or incentive systems of global companies and entrepreneurs may be especially 
important for innovation in particular countries.  
Economically interlinked mega-regions will be another driver of change. These include the meta-region 
spanning Amsterdam-Rotterdam, Ruhr-Cologne, Brussels-Antwerp and Lille, the English mega-region 
spanning London, Leeds, Manchester, Liverpool and Birmingham, the German mega-region 
encompassing Stuttgart, Frankfurt and Mannheim, and the Italian mega-region from Milan through Rome 
to Turin.50  
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An important driver of change will be the retention or possible substitution of the petrodollar system by a 
more independent currency system not based on the US dollar. Already, there have been efforts by 
countries ranging from China and Russia to India, Iran and Venezuela to do so. To date, the US political 
and military umbrella over Arab Gulf states combined with the US dollar-based investment fund holdings 
and bilateral trade agreements of these states, have acted as a strong constraint. However, as China’s 
regional and global influence grows, this may not remain the case until 2050. 
Investment to address growing energy demand and gaps in the infrastructure needed for the generation, 
transmission and distribution of electricity will be a key driver of change. It is notable that the new 
European Commission since late 2014 has expressly indicated its ambition to create a more attractive 
environment for foreign and local investment in the EU. In this regard, energy-related infrastructure, 
R&D and renewable energies are specifically mentioned.51 
Infrastructure spending is most expected in Europe from the target set of achieving 20% of the energy 
production from renewable energy. Numerous projects are in the pipeline that range from tidal, solar, 
wind, bio fuel, bio waste, geothermal, and other resources. Carbon Capture and Storage systems will 
both require and be facilitated by a large-scale infrastructure. The choice of public and private financing 
instruments depends on the stage of development of the technologies or projects, but could also be 
shaped by EU CO2 credits, spending priorities and regulatory hurdles.  
Greater economic volatility and cyclicality and more uncertainty and risk will be an important driver of 
change. The recession has also provided governments, anxious to weather the downturn, with 
opportunities to take regulatory measures. Concerns about employment, debt, economic 
competitiveness, energy security and climate change are now being used to justify this. These measures 
are accelerating or delaying energy system change, depending on the political or economic 
circumstances.  
2.5 Resources and environment 
Rare earth elements will be a driver of change. China’s policy of limiting REE exports has resulted in high 
prices, with an impact on the cost structure of the clean-tech industry which uses REE for manufacturing 
magnets and solar PVs. Reopened mines and development of resources will not affect this state of affairs 
in the short term.  
Mining will be an important driver of change regarding the environment.52 
Farmland will become a scarce resource and a driver of change, also because of non-OECD economies 
increasing their consumption of meat and agricultural commodities. As populations continue to grow, 
more pressure will be put on land, water, and forest resources.  
Agriculture is still of major importance in the livelihoods of people in Asian and African countries, and 
more energy-intensive than manufacturing. Major projects of industrialization are also expected in non-
OECD countries, concomitant with the emergence of new middle classes. With an apparent emerging 
stress nexus between water, energy and food53, tightness of supply could feed off each other.  
By 2050 it is expected that there will be an extra 2 billion people to feed worldwide. If they would want 
to consume as much nutrition as today’s developed countries, global food production will have to rise by 
110% over today’s levels in the next 40 years. However, global food demand has been met by an 
increase in productivity and not an increase in the amount of farmland. Already, Middle Eastern countries 
and their sovereign wealth funds have begun to look overseas for growing crops needed for domestic 
consumption. Foreign ownership frameworks may be affected, with some flow-over potential to the 
  
 
Energy Delta Gas Research – The Big Picture  Page 16
 
ownership of foreign energy companies, as currently in South Africa. Demand for fertilisers will also 
increase, influencing the price of oil.54  
Future energy emissions hinge on a patchwork of policy frameworks developing, especially in Asian 
economies. CO2 policies adopted in the OECD over the next decades will be a key driver of change. This 
will slow overall emissions growth.55 However, different countries will develop different strategies for 
decarbonising transport. Some countries will impose carbon taxes, others will develop or join emission 
trading schemes, while others will put in place technology or resource targeted plans. More expensive 
renewables could be favoured with technology developers chasing government subsidies and feed-in 
tariffs. There is a higher level of low-carbon technology transfer into developing nations. 
Energy supply security could surpass environmentally-friendliness as a policy priority in most countries 
of the world. According to the World Energy Council, this is the result of scandals about the reliability of 
the science calling for climate change and failures in reducing emissions, as well as the increasing 
pressure on policy-makers to address economic recessions.56 
As stated by the Word Energy Council, global energy until 2050 will be influenced by three aspects, 
namely growing complexity in energy systems, the high speed of change, and institutional tipping points 
and the failure to deliver of existing institutions.57 Shell already indicated one of the implications in 2008, 
by indicating There are No Ideal Answers (TANIA).58 
2.6 Energy and technologies 
Selective government policies will be a very important driver of change, regarding the energy domain in 
general but also regarding technologies specifically. The energy policies of major powers like China and 
India are going to be of interest, given the shift in both power and economic importance to Asia.  
China is estimated to be home to the most technically-accessible shale gas in the world. 59 At present, 
shale gas exploration has met with limited success. However, these initial setbacks also were the case in 
the US, and shale extraction technologies are developing at a high pace. As in the US, marked shifts 
could be possible in future. As indicated by Shell and BP but also by academic experts, gas, rather than 
oil, will be crucial for China’s push away from coal, currently used for the major part of power 
generation. Gas will be important not only in reducing emissions, but in aligning grids to be more reliable 
when supplying alternative energies.60  
In some scenarios for China, moderate growth could mean a slight decrease in coal, an increase in the 
next decade in the use of gas from 3% to 13%, of wind energy from 4% to 15%, of nuclear energy from 
1% to 7%, of solar energy to 3%. Such a major increase is not foreseen for oil in the case of China 
under conditions of moderate economic growth.61 
India’s energy policy will be important regarding the position of coal in the global energy mix. Coal is the 
mainstay of India's energy sector and accounts for more than 50% of primary commercial energy 
supply, 69% of total primary energy supply (TPES) comes from coal-based thermal power stations and 
import dependency is growing. The new activist and business-oriented government of Narendra Modi in 
India, experiencing popular frustration about uneven energy services, are focusing on drastic measures 
to resolve the situation. Modi, after successes with solar energy in his state Gujerat, has now also 
envisioned solar energy and to a lesser degree wind energy as the most important sectors to address 
energy issues in India. This could be costly, but if so, in the case of India, the development of the 
nuclear energy sector would be the cheapest alternative of all.62  
The global position of coal and nuclear energy, especially the former, are two variables that could rend 
the three end-state scenarios less accurate. According to the World Energy Council, China is expected to 
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overtake the US to become the world's largest economy by 2020, but China itself is likely to be 
overtaken by India by 2050. This could result in a resource crunch between domestic energy resources 
and demand, especially for coal. Demand for coal in South Korea and Japan is also likely to remain 
strong. The global steel sector is also expected to continue to influence the demand for coal.  
The exploration and production of unconventional gas from shale formations will also be an important 
driver of change. Rapid developments in technology have allowed the USA since about 2000 to strongly 
increase the recovery and production of natural gas from shale formations. Unconventional gas is 
relatively clean but will prolong the reliance on fossil fuels. It will reduce the drive toward renewable 
energy in the USA. However, much and expensive investment will be needed. Existing reserves of shale 
gas are often far from existing pipeline infrastructure and refineries designed to process heavier crude oil. 
Shale gas is also produced with fewer additional potential products than orthodox oil, and existing 
reserves in the US at present also seem to have a shorter lifespan.63 
The impact of the US shale gas revolution on European energy policies and prices is another driver of 
change. The success of North America’s shale gas production may inspire responses by other countries in 
the northern and southern hemisphere. Many European countries already have a high motive to redirect 
their energy security away from their current reliance on Russian gas. The current crisis over Ukraine 
and the Crimea, which is impacting on European economies due to a spiral of sanctions and counter-
sanctions, is reinforcing this motive. However, it is likely that the situation will differ per country in 
Europe. In some cases, like Austria, Croatia, Greece, Hungary and Bulgaria, the motive was previously 
lower and mutual gas projects with Russia were supported, even though they could reinforce energy 
dependence. 64  
The aftermath of the shale gas revolution could influence the mix between gas and other energy 
elements in consumer countries, promoting a greater share for gas in these mixtures. At present, gas 
contracts are often linked to long-term high-priced oil contracts. However, rising gas supplies and the 
option of several suppliers may result in many consuming countries becoming less willing than at present 
to contract large volumes of gas over a long period or to link it to oil supply contracts.65  
Competition and sometimes cooperation between and International and National Oil Companies (IOCs & 
NOCs) will be a key driver of change. Trends that will shape their performance will be business models, 
diversification into other forms of energy, joint ventures, the stipulations of negotiated contracts, and 
changing business practices.  
Oil supply and oil prices will be an important driver of change, the latter also in decisions to produce 
shale gas. How OPEC responds to oil prices could influence events. However, the current geopolitical 
divisions between Saudi Arabia and other GCC states on the one hand and Iran, Syria and Iraq on the 
other, could also be reflected in OPEC finding it difficult to respond to a crisis. Just after the shale gas 
revolution in the US, Iran, Venezuela, and some North and Sub-Saharan African producers differed 
strongly from Saudi Arabia and other GCC states in OPEC.66 Likewise, OPEC members’ different interests 
may be difficult to reconcile if some of the above drivers and enablers are active. 
Oil demand will be another important driver of change.67 Oil demand projections by energy majors often 
do not take into account the major impact new government policies could have, also in India and China. 
Other factors could reinforce the effect of oil demand destruction. These would include current economic 
turmoil in key oil markets, political pressures that may make alternative energy sources more attractive, 
the counter-productive effect of high oil prices, and the potential oil substitution impact of renewable 
energies and policies related to them in key markets. 
  
 
Energy Delta Gas Research – The Big Picture  Page 18
 
Oil demand destruction could result in significantly falling oil revenues for states in the Middle East and 
North Africa, affecting available budgets and the ability to provide sufficient services for often growing 
populations. The cost of social stabilization systems and other needed investment as oilfields decline may 
sharply reduce the actual benefit from even high oil prices. This is evident in Saudi Arabia, where the 
estimated cost of the social stabilization has increased from about $50 per barrel of oil in 2002 to $94 
per barrel in 2012 and $98 today.68  
This, in turn, could trigger instability in one or more countries of the region in the next decade, 
reinforcing insecurity on Europe’s southern border. Given the social and demographic situation of the 
region, the soft warning in the IEA’s World Energy Investment Report in 2014 remains relevant. If the oil 
price stabilizes around current levels and increases only moderately to 2035, “governments that have 
become accustomed to burgeoning hydrocarbon revenues could be in for a difficult period of 
adjustment.” 69 
The possibility of oil demand destruction in many ways challenges the accepted wisdom that oil demand 
will continue to grow, especially in Asian countries. However, this is a complex issue involving many 
actors, possible interactions and less visible feedback loops. Unintended consequences and new events 
could result in many quick shifts, as has happened in the energy markets in the past decades and also 
with the shale energy revolution, which was largely unforeseen in the 1990s.  
As indicated by Paul Stevens, higher oil prices and/or oil price volatility could persuade governments to 
turn to alternatives.70 The International Energy Agency has developed several possible scenarios, based 
on governments’ choice for renewable energies. In the so-called 450 Scenario governments introduce 
policies until 2035 to reach the globally accepted aim of not more than a 2 degree Celsius increase in 
global temperatures. Oil demand in such a scenario would drop by 13% compared to today.71 
However, the majority view among analysts still is a tremendous rise in oil demand. Non-OPEC 
conventional crude supply will then also be a driver of change. It has been falling, but the fall could be 
slowed by new discoveries like that in deep water off Brazil and reserves in existing fields being upwardly 
revised with the application of new technologies, viable in higher oil price environments. This decline 
could also be mitigated by supplementary sources like unconventional oil and biofuels. Interactions 
between individual types of energy, their markets and their prices will reinforce complexity, also the 
virtual impossibility of forecasting the future nature and extent of global demand.72 
Drivers in the technology domain have the potential to significantly change the energy sector but also its 
position relative to other sectors, like electricity, transport, construction, and telecommunications. 
Important new developments, the convergence or re-constitution of different domains in production or 
consumption, and disruptive innovations and breakthroughs are assumed until 2050. This is due to the 
current state of technologies, the time period involved, continuous challenges and the current speed and 
scope of new knowledge generation. 
Some areas of potential technological developments or breakthroughs would be continuing engine 
developments with improved efficient combustion, electric vehicles, 'plug-in' hybrids and mass market 
fuel cell hybrid vehicles, oil recovery- horizontal drilling, 4-D seismic, downhole enhancements and shale 
gas technologies. They would have strong implications for improved recovery.  
The outsourcing of R&D to Asia will be an important driver of change. Already increasing, this will include 
the transfer of entire laboratories, subcontracting to Asian research organizations, and through 
collaborative R&D projects. Uncertainties over human resources, fraud, and unclear property rights will 
only have a limited effect on this trend. However, the extent to which innovation is strongly guarded or 
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extensively shared or copied will be important. Such an outsourcing will interact with the extensive focus 
on R&D in the policies of China and other Asian countries.73 
The reversal of an Asian brain drain to some Western countries will be an important driver of change. 
Asian knowledge elites increasingly leave their mark on the world’s top multinationals, high–tech 
companies, and universities. Conditions for research and innovation in Asia still leave much to be 
desired. Whether it is solved by a more open and competitive approach, or a closed and exclusionary 
one, will shape change.  
The speed, lead-time and direction of development for new energy technologies will be an important 
driver of change. New energy technologies must be demonstrated at commercial scale and require thirty 
years of sustained double-digit growth to build industrial capacity and grow sufficiently to feature at even 
1-2% of the energy system. The policies in place in the next five years shape investment for the next 
ten years, which largely shape the global energy picture out to 2050.  
Energy efficiency will be a very important driver of change in most corporations and economies.74 In 
several countries, the potential gains in this regard are still substantial. The relevant technologies and 
learning curves could change quickly. 
2.7 Key findings 
This chapter identified multiple drivers of change in energy systems until 2050. They would cause 
change directly or by altering one or more direct drivers or recombining in diverse ways. Drivers could 
influence decision-makers, and in some cases decision-makers could influence drivers. The drivers could 
have a positive or a negative effect at different stages and during different interactions and iterations. 
They could shape but also be shaped by energy systems in complex ways.  
A key finding is that the international political and economic order is becoming more multipolar than 
three decades ago, and that drivers of change can have a different effect in different parts of the world. 
If one looks at the world as a whole, components of end state 2 (Business as Usual) and end state 3 
(Gas) seem more plausible than those of end state 1 (Renewables).  
Given the policies and strategies in the EU, the EU may differ from the world as a whole in this regard, 
with components of end state 1 also being plausible there. Internal energy path dependencies, forces 
and interactions in the EU are not aligned, and not likely to be aligned well soon. There is a significant 
chance that end state 1 could at least partially emerge in some member states or regions of the EU only, 
rather than in the whole of the EU. In this regard, it is also relevant that renewable energies constitute a 
part of local or national markets, whereas oil and coal, for example, remain embedded in global markets. 
It cannot be excluded that at least parts of Europe would reach a significantly different end state 
compared to major parts of the world by 2050. 
The role of social and political actors on energy systems is likely to be more prominent, based on global 
trends. In Europe, this will be noticeable at the local, national and international level. At the local level, 
high-impact social ideas like green consumerism and limited acceptance of energy systems that result in 
major trade-offs, could be important drivers of change. Nationally, the empowerment of individuals and 
communities relative to the state and as producers of some forms of energy and the politicization of 
energy-related issues will be key drivers of change. Internationally, energy issues will at least remain 
important or become even more so in the foreign and security policies of countries and the geopolitics of 
non-state actors.  
What does this mean in practice for European energy planners and policy-makers? The variable impact 
of drivers of change, but also of path dependencies, diverse frameworks of global and EU-level actors, 
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and the increased potential for self-organization, means that the scope and impact of known unknowns, 
unknown knowns and unknown unknowns in energy systems until 2050 can be potentially vast.  
The identified drivers of change and the complex ways in which they can interact and reshape futures 
confirm that lock-in effects remain among the greatest risks. In EU member states, flexibility and 
modularity, rather than energy platforms only focused on one end-state, would be highly advisable. 
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3 ENERGY TRANSITION END STATES 
Authors: Gideon Laugs – Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, Maurice Vos – DNV GL, Jan Willem Turkstra – DNV 
GL, Ferry Lounis – DNV GL 
3.1 Introduction 
Numerous long term energy scenarios have been published by many different industry players, 
governments, lobbying organizations, and research institutes. As a starting point for the project, these 
different long term projections, which are publicly available, were surveyed. The aim was to identify and 
categorizes possible end states after the energy transition from literature. The end states form the 
starting point for the subsequent implications and limitation analysis as discussed in the following 
chapters. 
3.2 General approach 
The identification of the energy transition end states was performed in the following steps: 
 Establishing the definition of the ‘energy transition end state’ 
In order to identify what the energy transition end states are, one should have a clear 
understanding of what exactly is meant with the words ‘end state’. Several definitions of an ‘end 
state’ are available from the academic literature. 
 Establishing the basis for the end states’ identification 
As previously mentioned, the focus of this project is not on building scenarios and deriving end 
states: it is rather on identifying a number of potential energy transition end states based on the 
analysis of the existing scenarios produced by various authors from different backgrounds.  
The topic of energy transition is high on the social, political and academic agenda, which 
catalyses a significant number of publications and views on the topic. Such publications range 
from visionary documents with different time focus (e.g. Europe 2020 - A strategy for 
competitive, sustainable and secure energy) to studies which elaborate the development 
scenarios (e.g. Roadmap for moving to low- carbon economy in 2050). Making a sample 
overview of the available publications and the assessment of their relevance to the gas sector in 
particular is an essential step of this research. 
 Defining criteria for selecting the scenarios to be analysed 
Due to the many scenarios produced on the energy transition, it is impossible to analyse all of 
them. It is therefore necessary to establish valid criteria for the selection of the scenarios to be 
further analysed.  
 Establishing a methodology for the analysis of the scenarios and the identification of the end 
states 
No suitable methodology appeared to exist to compare scenarios with each other in the way this 
research intends. The existing studies1,2,3 which engage into scenario comparison do not provide 
a uniform approach, neither do they justify and explain their approach to the process of 
comparative analysis of the scenario. Therefore, a methodology for making a comparative 
analysis of the scenarios was developed. This methodology is elaborated in Section 3.5. 
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 Applying this methodology to the selected scenarios and analysing the results obtained 
As the developed methodology has not previously been validated, it was applied to the selected 
scenarios in an explorative manner: some aspects of the methodology proved not to provide 
sufficiently conclusive results, whereas other aspects proved effective. This exploratory path will 
be further elaborated upon in Section 3.5.2 and onward. The results obtained on the basis of the 
comparative analysis methodology’s effective aspects were further analysed with the view of 
identifying the energy transition end states. 
 Identifying the end states, based on the results of the analysis 
On the basis of comparative analysis, three energy transition end states have been identified. 
These end states are discussed in detail in Section 3.6. 
Below each of the steps are described in detail. 
3.3 Definition of and ‘end state of the energy transition’ 
In order to define an end state of the energy transition, it is necessary to first focus on the phenomenon 
of the energy transition as such. There is no uniform definition of an energy transition:  
Fouquet distinguishes minor, intermediate and major energy transitions.4 The shift from coal to gas in 
heating is considered a minor transition. The adoption of electricity or the switch from a horse to a car 
for transportation is considered an intermediate transition. Major energy transitions are the invention of 
fire, the development of agriculture and the Industrial Revolution.  
Grubler identifies two grand energy transitions in modern history.5 The first is the steam engine powered 
by coal which was a radical technological end use innovation at that time. The second transition was the 
greatly increased diversification of both energy use technologies and energy supply sources (wood, coal, 
oil, gas, nuclear, hydro etc.).  
Meadowcroft makes yet another distinction of energy transitions6:  
a) a movement from a fossil fuel based (or dominated) energy system to a non-fossil fuel based (or 
dominated) energy system 
b) a shift from a carbon emitting energy system to a carbon neutral (or low carbon) energy system 
c) a transition from a non-renewable energy system to a renewable energy system 
d) a movement from an insecure (vulnerable) energy system to a secure (robust) energy system  
e) a change from centralized energy provision to a decentralized energy system 
As can be seen above, Fouquet focuses on the scale of a transition with a historical view, Grubler on 
technology, and Meadowcroft is describing options where the society can go from here.  
Today humanity is at a point in history where many believe that the current energy system based on 
fossil fuel has come to an end, or at least should come to an end because of climate change and security 
of supply concerns. 
Most of the demand for fossil fuels comes from technologies that have been in use for several decades or 
even a century, such as the steam turbine and the combustion engine. One could argue that today 
humanity is not inventing new branches of technologies (electricity, heating, road and air transport, 
chemical industry, plastics) for fossil fuels that could significantly increase or alter the consumption of 
fossil fuels or change the ways we use it as it did with the combustion engine for example. A possible 
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element of a definition of an end state could thus be an energy system or energy mix where no new 
applications are introduced in the market that significantly alter the ways of consumption of a specific 
energy source or change the ways we use it. The current state of affairs is then perceived as extending 
or prolonging the use of fossil fuels for existing applications. 
The existing literature sources on energy systems often refer to the term carbon lock-in.7 Unruh writes 
that “industrial economies have been locked into fossil fuel-based technological systems through a path-
dependent process driven by technological and institutional increasing returns to scale.”8 Unruh 
continues by explaining that large technological systems such as electricity production and consumption 
cannot be understood as independent technological artefacts but have to be seen as complex systems of 
technologies embedded in a powerful conditioning of social context of public private institutions. Once 
certain systems are locked-in they can have the effect of locking-out alternatives. The Oak Ridge 
National Laboratory mentions that incumbent technologies are locked-in into systems of positive 
feedback between government, financial institutions, suppliers, and existing infrastructure support and 
sustain status-quo technologies even in the face of superior attributes.9  
The concept of lock-in is often used to explain the difficulties to replace a fossil-fuel based energy system 
with a renewable based energy system. The concept could also be useful for establishing a working 
definition of an energy transition end state. Locked-in energy sources/infrastructure makes that system 
more inflexible, stable or robust. This research is looking exactly for robust end states. Any energy 
transition end state in the future will have, to a certain extent, the lock-in of the dominant energy 
sources in that end state to make that specific end state robust. 
The above elements say nothing specifically about changes in demand for specific energy sources. 
Personal car use exists for about a century. In Europe gasoline consumption for cars will most likely not 
increase significantly and could decrease due to increasing efficiency. In emerging countries such as 
China and India, gasoline consumption could increase a lot due to economic development. This suggests 
that gasoline consumption is in an end state in Europe while still on a growth trajectory in other regions 
of the world. Another element of a definition of an end state therefore could be a situation where (on a 
regional scale) the use of dominant energy sources in existing applications will most likely not increase 
or will begin to phase out and lose its dominance in the energy mix.  
A radical end state could of course happen in case of physical depletion of a specific resource. Most 
scenarios from the existing literature are built to model the energy mix up to around 2050 and a physical 
depletion of any of the fossil fuels is not likely before 2050, therefore this definition might not be 
relevant for this study. However, lack of confidence in resource availability (in the perception of the 
public) could be a driving factor in energy transitions. Today the general public is concerned about peak 
oil and security of supply. Those concerns put a pressure on politics to strive for an energy transition 
making this specific end state less robust (even when it appears robust in terms of technology and 
economics). Another element of an end state definition could thus be when there is broad public 
consensus that we have reached a new end state or status quo. This definition is of course not 
quantifiable, however, it could still be of importance. 
This study identifies future changes in the energy infrastructure. The identified end states should not 
only quantify the future energy mix, but also to clearly state how a certain energy source is used. For 
example, two end states differ in the amount of gas consumption in the Netherlands between, say, 50-
80 bcm/year. This gives us no information on how the gas infrastructure will look in the future. Will gas 
be used as flexible back-up generation to compensate for renewable intermittency, will there be large 
increases of biogas injected in the low-pressure grid, or will it be more or less business as usual? An end 
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state thus requires a qualitative description of the energy system, combined with quantitative 
information on consumption and production etc. 
Energy markets are always changing, and therefore the end state of the energy transition should not be 
interpreted as a point in the future when all developments in energy markets have come to a halt. 
Synthesizing from the elements above, the end state should be interpreted as a time period in the future 
where humanity has altered the technologies with which it consumes energy, the quantities of energy it 
uses per region/technology, the energy sources it uses, a certain technological lock-in of vital parts of 
the energy system, confidence that the end state is ‘sustainable’ for the time being (be it just a few 
decades or longer) and a public consensus that we have reached a new status quo and no large 
systematic changes are expected from economic and technological perspectives and no more large 
changes are demanded by public opinion and politics (in their respective short term future). This 
definition of the energy transition end state will be used in this study as leading. 
3.4 Basis for identification of end states and criteria for 
selection scenarios 
A manner of validating the energy transition end states is to derive the end states from existing scenario 
publications. Taking into account the global impact of the energy transition issue, it would be correct to 
assume that many different actors in various countries produce studies, opinions, scenarios, etc., related 
to the possible outcomes of the energy transition. Already at the initial step of setting up an inventory of 
existing future energy scenario publications, two boundary conditions need to be acknowledged for 
selecting scenarios to be analysed. One of these conditions is the publication language. The researchers’ 
linguistic range is limited to North-West European languages (English, French, German, and Dutch). 
Therefore publications written in other languages (e.g. Japanese) are outside of the selection process. 
Another condition, perhaps again somewhat obvious, but nevertheless worth mentioning, is linked to the 
fact that the search for the relevant publications is confined by the researchers’ background knowledge 
of the energy sector. For example, in case the researchers are not familiar with a certain academic 
journal, research institution or other party who has published a study, the publication in question has a 
higher chance of being missed simply because the researchers are looking at other academic journals or 
research institutions.  
However, even when applying the above mentioned ‘filters’, a larger number of publications surfaces 
than can possibly be analysed, creating the necessity for a structured approach in further selecting the 
publications suitable for this research. Therefore a ‘publications selection funnel’ is defined, as depicted 
in Figure 2. The publication selection funnel revolves around three selection steps, each subject to 
increasingly stringent criteria in order to compile a representative sample of energy scenario publications.  
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Figure 2: Publication selection funnel 
 
3.4.1 ‘Long list’ of publications 
The aim of making the ‘long list’ of publications is to create a limited pool of scenarios, potentially 
relevant to this study. In order to qualify for the long list, the publications should correspond to the 
criteria listed in Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3: Criteria applied to the selection of publications for the ‘long list‘ 
 
The criteria illustrated in Figure 3 above are chosen with a two aims in mind:  
1. A wide representative sample both from the perspective of author and the perspective of 
geographic scope 
2. Quality of the publications and their relevance for the current study 
In order to achieve a wide representative sample, a ‘filter’ of author/ type of stakeholder is applied to 
avoid only including publications produced by academia, or only produced by the non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) or international organizations. The chart in Figure 4 represents the shares of 
backgrounds of the publications in the long list. Also the ‘filter’ of the country of origin is applied: i.e. 
energy producing countries versus energy consuming countries. 
 
 
 
 
Author / type of stakeholder and country of origin: a wide 
representative sample 
Year of publication: aiming at recent scenarios 
 
Time scope: aiming at 2100 
Geographic scope: world, Europe, Netherlands 
Energy mix vs. energy source: scenarios focusing on energy mix / 
gas  
 1. 
 
 2. 
3. 
 4. 
 5. 
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Figure 4: Publications from the ‘long list’ per author type 
 
As illustrated in the Figure 4 above, more than one third of the publications included in the long list are 
produced by academia. This outcome is due to the fact that the number of publications from academia is 
larger in absolute terms compared to the publications from other types of authors. 30% of the long list 
publications are produced by various non-governmental and inter-governmental organizations. It is 
notable that relatively fewer publications are produced by businesses and consultancies (13% and 9% 
respectively). 
The publication year of the scenarios is taken into account as well: in order to ensure that recent ‘game 
changers’, such as Fukushima, are considered, the energy scenario needs to be relatively recent. The 
compilation of the publication years of the long-list are depicted in Figure 5.  
 
Figure 5: Publication year of the scenarios in the long list 
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As the time scope of the scenarios should fit the research’s time scope, e.g. until 2050/2100, preference 
is given to the scenarios extending as far as possible into the future. Scenarios that cover only a 
relatively small geographical area (such as those focusing on a single country or region) are not 
considered. 
Another important criterion for the long list scenarios’ preliminary selection is the presence of a 
quantified primary or final energy mix, as it this forms the basis for the scenario comparison. Figure 6 
and Figure 7 present the availability of quantified primary or final energy mix in the scenarios included in 
the long list. 
 
 
Figure 6: Availability of a primary energy mix 
 
 
Figure 7: Availability of a final energy mix  
 
As illustrated in the Figure 6 above, 60% of the long list publications contain sufficient information on the 
primary energy mix. However, only 43% of the publications contain sufficient specification of the final 
energy mix (Figure 7).  
3.4.2 Short list of publications 
As previously mentioned, there are two objectives in making a long list of the publications: First of all, 
the sample should be representative both from the perspective of author and the perspective of 
geographic scope. Secondly, the publications should be of sufficient quality and of relevance for the 
current study. Thus, the publications to be included in the long list correspond both to the criteria of wide 
representative sample, and quality and relevance.  
It should also be mentioned that the processes of the selection of publications and that of the 
elaboration of the methodology are done in parallel rather than in a sequential manner. Therefore, the 
elaborated methodology largely shapes the criteria applied to the selection of the scenario publications to 
be analysed. Respectively, the choice of the final selection criteria for the publications’ ‘short list’ is 
motivated by the requirement of applying both a quantitative as a qualitative analysis, and included the 
requirements of Figure 8. 
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Figure 8: Criteria applied to the selection of publications for the short list 
As the above mentioned criteria allow for both quantitative and qualitative analysis, they have been 
made leading in the creation of the short list. So, to arrive at the short list, the publications are further 
analysed using these criteria. It should be noted that many publications in the long list contain more 
than one scenario. In this step of the analysis, individual scenarios are labelled and analysed individually. 
Furthermore, each scenario is concisely described in an Excel sheet and scored accordingly. The score, 
along with final selection criteria, is used as the basis for short-listing the scenarios eligible for further 
investigation.  
In addition to the above criteria, the following characteristics are used for describing the scenarios: 
 Back-casting versus fore-casting: back-casting presumes defining a point in the future (e.g. 80% 
of renewable energy sources in the total energy mix in 2100) and making a prognosis regarding 
how to reach this point; fore-casting presumes making a prognosis on the future, based on the 
development of the current factors; 
 Narrative versus descriptive: narrative scenarios are based on the predefined set of assumptions 
developed by the scenario authors, and these assumptions need not necessarily be based on the 
current facts (e.g. we assume that in 2100 a drastic change in energy consumption patterns will 
occur, even though there are currently no indicators that this will indeed take place); descriptive 
scenarios are based on the set of assumptions based on the current situation and its foreseen 
development; 
 Malthusianist versus techno-optimistic: scenarios which are Malthusianist in nature presume that 
the fossil fuels are a finite resource; in contrast, techno-optimistic scenarios presume that a 
technological breakthrough will take place which will allow the continued exploitation of the fossil 
reserves or will provide for new energy sources. 
A number of important observations are made while performing the analysis of the scenario publications 
in the long list: 
 Numerous scenarios present a forecasted progress of a single energy source, which would 
hamper the comparative analysis. Therefore a detailed numerical overview of the primary or final 
energy mix is deemed essential. However it should be noted that the scenarios lacking a 
sufficient overview of the energy mix, but containing a potentially interesting narrative, are not 
automatically excluded.  
Specification of energy mix  
(non-negotiable) 
Time span / horizon considered  
(sufficiently long) 
Sufficient qualitative body  
(used for qualitative analysis) 
 1. 
 2. 
 3. 
  
 
Energy Delta Gas Research – The Big Picture  Page 33
 
 Another observation worth mentioning is that the scenario publications which are widely 
recognized in the energy world are often produced by established organizations, such as the 
International Energy Agency (IEA), or successful businesses, such as Shell and BP, which 
possess extensive human and financial resources invested in scenario development. This leads to 
a higher recognition of intergovernmental and business energy scenarios than that of the 
academic energy scenarios. 
 Additionally, the majority of the publications in the long-list focuses on political and economic 
aspects of their scenario(s); few address technology and environmental aspects, while even less 
take the social aspects of their scenario into account. Policy scenarios are often narrative and 
regional in nature (e.g. European level) and assume a medium to high policy intervention. 
Narrative scenarios are mostly back-casting. Most scenarios do not predict a technology 
revolution nor a high level of technology penetration, but rather anticipate a medium technology 
penetration level. In addition, a greater number of energy scenarios focus on the supply-side of 
the ‘picture’ than do on the demand side. Finally, most scenarios are Malthusianist (presume that 
the fossil fuels are finite), although they do not explicitly state this.  
Table 1 presents an overview of the publications included in the short list. It should be noted that the 
table below presents an overview per publication: most publications contain more than one scenario, 
which will subsequently be analysed as separate scenarios, thereby increasing the total number of the 
scenarios in the short list. 
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Table 1: Overview of the publications included in the short list 
Nr. Author Title Year Category 
1 Azar, Lindgren & Andersson 
Global energy scenarios meeting stringent 
CO2 constraints - cost-effective fuel choices 
in the transportation sector. 
2003 Academia 
2 BP Energy Outlook 2030 2012 Business 
3 EC - European Commission World Energy Technology Outlook – 2050 2006 
(Inter) 
governmental 
4 EIA International Energy Outlook 2011 2011 (Inter) governmental 
5 ExxonMobil The outlook for energy: a view to 2030 2010 Business 
6 Greenpeace / EREC Energy [R]evolution: A sustainable world energy outlook (3rd ed.) 2010 NGO 
7 IEA Are we entering the golden age of gas? 2011 (Inter) governmental 
8 IEA World Energy Outlook 2011 2011 (Inter) governmental 
9 IPCC Special report on emission scenarios 2001 (Inter) governmental 
10 Krewitt et al. The 2 ̊C scenario - A sustainable world energy perspective 2007 Academia 
11 Leimbach et al. Technological Change and International Trade – Insights from REMIND-R 2010 Academia 
12 OPEC World Oil Outlook 2011 2011 (Inter) governmental 
13 Shell Signals & Signposts 2011 Business 
14 Shell Energy scenarios to 2050 2008 Business 
15 WWF / Ecofys / OMA The energy report: 100% renewable energy by 2050 2011 NGO 
16 EC – European Commission EU Energy trends to 2030 update 2009 2009 
(Inter) 
governmental 
17 ECF Roadmap 2050 2010 NGO 
 
As can be seen in Table 1, the list of publications on the shortlist contains a few “doubles”: multiple 
publications from the same author. For example, Are we entering the golden age of gas? and World 
Energy Outlook 2011 are both published by the IEA. Examination of the scenarios presented in those two 
publications reveals that some overlap in original datasets used and even scenarios developments may 
exist. This suggests an unevenly high impact of the IEA’s ideas and projections on the resulting end 
states. Nevertheless, both publications are deliberately kept on the shortlist for two reasons. First, 
removing one or both of the two publications would suggest selection on the basis of presumed influence 
on the results rather than a priori selection on the basis of availability of required data, and as such 
influence the scientific integrity of the research. Second, despite whatever overlap that may exist 
between the scenarios, both publications revolve around a different perspective and narrative on future 
developments of the global energy system and therefore can be seen as being characteristically different 
to a certain extent. Another “double” is Signals & Signposts and Energy scenarios to 2050, both 
published by Shell. The latter is somewhat of an elaboration on the two scenarios presented in the 
former. Nevertheless, Signals & Signposts offers an extended “business-as-usual” perspective on the 
scenarios from Energy scenarios to 2050 based on actual developments, and as such can be considered 
a distinct scenario of its own. For this reason both publications are kept on the short list, augmenting 
one another. 
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3.5 Methodology for the analysis of the scenarios and the 
identification of end states 
As previously discussed, it is unknown whether there exists an established methodology which allows to 
successfully compare the scenarios with each other. The existing studies1,2,3 which engage into scenario 
comparison do not provide a uniform approach, neither do they justify and explain their approach to the 
process of comparative analysis of the scenario. Therefore, a methodology of the scenario comparative 
analysis was developed. It consists of the following steps: 
 Preparatory analysis of the selected scenarios 
 Quantitative grouping of the scenarios according to a clustering approach 
 Quantitative grouping of the scenarios according to the data dynamics analysis approach 
 Analysis and integration of the obtained results into end states 
 Qualitative analysis of the end states according to the PESTE categories 
The steps of the methodology and their application to the scenario analysis are discussed in detail in the 
subsequent sections. It should be noted that as the developed methodology has not previously been 
validated, it is applied to the selected scenarios in an explorative manner: some aspects of the 
methodology proved not to provide sufficiently conclusive results, whereas other aspects proved 
effective.  
3.5.1 Preparatory analysis of the selected scenarios 
As the elaborated methodology includes both quantitative and qualitative elements, the preparatory 
analysis of the selected scenarios was also performed from both aspects: 
 Preparatory quantitative analysis 
As not all scenarios have the same choice of energy measure units, all energy mixes are 
converted into exajoule (EJ). This allows for a straightforward comparison of the scenarios. For 
most of the scenarios, the energy mix relates to the primary energy mix. However, in cases 
where only production figures are provided, these figures are used for comparison. It should be 
noted though that in general more is produced than consumed, as transmission losses occur 
during transportation.  
After gathering data for all the scenarios’ energy mixes, there are some differences found in 
reporting on the renewable sources. A few authors distinguish renewables per source, such as 
hydro, solar, wind, biomass, geothermal and ocean energy; most authors did distinguish biomass 
from other renewables. All specific renewable sources are brought together and are labelled as 
renewables for the purpose of simplifying the issue. Aggregating renewables as one general 
source allows comparing the energy mixes with each other. 
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 Preparatory qualitative analysis 
For the purposes of the preparatory analysis, the PESTE framework is used to analyse the driving 
forces which exist to keep the practice going and the potential forces which could influence it to 
change.10,11 PESTE stands for Political, Economic, Social, Technological and Environmental: 
Political: Specific policies that are implemented and the degree of political intervention, for 
example restrictions placed by countries on importing energy from a specific country. 
Economic: GDP is an important economic driving force. The cost of transportation, marginal costs 
and the price of a barrel of oil are also important economic driving forces. 
Social: The continuing wave of population growth is perhaps the strongest driving force of our 
time. It suggests a continuing market for energy, especially because people tend to use more 
energy with today's luxury goods. 
Technological: Continuous improvement and innovation in the energy sector may shrink the 
energy use per capita. An example can be efficiency in the transport sector. Technological 
innovations could have a significantly impact on the future (e.g. CCS and efficiency). 
Environmental: The impact of ecological damage on human affairs, and the increasing public 
perception of ecological harm, like carbon tax and CO2 emissions. 
In order to facilitate further qualitative analysis, each short-listed scenario is condensed into a storyline. 
Each storyline contains general information about the scenario (e.g. sub-scenarios, used models), as well 
as the main assumptions of the scenario described on a high level. Thereafter more detailed assumptions 
are divided into the PESTE framework. The PESTE categories are chosen to facilitate comparison of all 
scenarios. In each storyline a division between scenario assumptions and results is made, when possible. 
Furthermore, a distinction between the world, Europe and the Netherlands is made as well and it is 
noted whether the scenario addresses Europe or European Union.  
3.5.2 Quantitative grouping of scenarios 
Data quality 
Within the process of data extraction the focus years are set at 2010, 2030/2035, 2050, 2100. The finest 
grain of 5 years is applied. Coarsest grain is determined by data availability of the scenario in question. 
Data between available data points is estimated through interpolation. The time series available from the 
scenarios analysed are essentially snapshots of data in various years, with some scenarios providing 
data over a longer time frame or with finer grain than others. In the construction of the multitude of 
graphs representing a continuous visualization of these time series, data for points in time for which no 
data is provided are estimated using simple interpolation. Data are not extrapolated into the future. 
Notice that not all scenario lines pass through the same point for years that are already part of history, 
i.e. 2005, 2010. This is due to differences in the publication dates of the literature. Whereas for 
publications later than 2005, data on for instance global total primary energy consumption of the year 
2005 was known, for publication from before 2005 the final figures would have been part of the future 
scenarios and had therefore been estimated. Regardless of the short-term nature of these predictions, 
some deviation in the expected figures is unavoidable. 
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General methodology 
A crucial step in processing the scenarios before deriving and defining end-states is restructuring the 
scenarios into three clusters. Each of these clusters would stand to represent an end-state. Adding to the 
complexity of this step is that no clustering algorithm exists that would provide results compatible with 
the project’s intentions. Scenario comparisons and analyses in peer-reviewed publications usually 
revolve around a small set of scenarios, relying largely on descriptive reporting.1,2,3 For this project, the 
process is more oriented on the dynamics involved with the quantitative aspects of the scenarios.  
Considering data clustering from a purely mathematical perspective, a handful of algorithms exist.12 
However, these methods consider nothing but the static numbers - dynamics, interrelations and 
semantics are ignored. To compensate for this limitation, a two-pronged approach is used involving 
mathematics-based clustering algorithms on one hand, and clustering through inspection of data 
dynamics and qualitative aspects of the scenarios on the other hand. The latter method is devised and 
designed in an iterative process, tailored specifically to the needs of this project. The combination of 
these two methods should provide an acceptable balance between mathematical objectivity and the 
subjectivity of human judgment. Integration of the intermediate results of these two approaches would 
then lead to the final clustering and the foundation for the three end-states. 
Quantitative grouping of the scenarios according to a clustering approach 
The field of statistics provides for a number of clustering methods, each with its own specific applications 
and limitations. Agglomerative hierarchical clustering was found the most conclusive method. This 
method uses a bottom-up approach, where each ‘observation’ is a single cluster. In each iteration the 
closest pair of clusters is merged by satisfying similar criteria. The visibility of the levels within the 
clustering and an appropriate number of data led to the choice of this specific method for statistical 
verification. The choice of a distance measurement will influence the shape of the clusters, as some 
elements may be close to one another according to one distance and farther away according to another. 
The Manhattan and Euclidian distance measure methods are applied to the relative data of the year 2050. 
Using the relative energy mix keeps a level playing field for all scenarios more than using the absolute 
energy mix would. 
Analysis of the results reveals that the Euclidian distance measure, which measures distance in the way 
a ruler would, displays the most logical clusters. However, the majority of the scenarios do not pass the 
2030/2035 mark leading to a relatively limited dataset of 2050. By focusing on the year 2030, an 
optimal balance between looking far ahead into the future and keeping high data density is maintained. 
Therefore the relative data of 2030 is used as input for the agglomerative hierarchal clustering, applying 
the Euclidian distance measure and using the following distance measures: Single, Complete, Average, 
Centroid and Ward.  
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Observations: 
 The Euclidian/Single clustering does not add any value, as it contains four categories of one 
scenario and one category of 27 scenarios. This clustering method is therefore excluded for 
further analysis/comparisons.  
 The results of the Euclidian/Average and Euclidian/Centroid dendrograms are quite similar, 
showing two groups and three individually grouped scenarios. The difference between the results 
of these clustering methods is marginal; in the Euclidian/Average cluster, scenario 13. Azar 
Lindgren Andersson is grouped, whereas individually grouped in Euclidian/Centroid. In the 
Euclidian/Average cluster scenario 12. IPCC – B2 MESSAGE is grouped individually, whereas it is 
placed in a group in the Euclidian/Centroid dendrogram.  
 On first sight, the Euclidian/Ward dendrogram appeared to be most useful since it presents 
relatively even groups compared with the other methods. Further analysis confirms this suspicion. 
When comparing the results with the groups that the snapshots provide, a remarkable overlap of 
90% exists. The scenarios IPCC-B1-IMAGE and Shell-Scramble are the only exemptions.  
 The 7. Leimbach – Reference scenario is consequently grouped individually in the results for the 
2030/2035 and 2050 energy mix snapshots as well as all clustering methods. 
 The 6. Krewitt - 2C scenario is grouped individually through clustering in the Euclidian/Complete, 
Euclidian/Single, Euclidian/Average and Euclidian/Centroid dendrograms.  
All dendrogram methods, with the exception of Euclidian/Ward, do not provide any significant 
contributions towards the compilation of the end states. However, when cross-referencing the outcomes 
with the groups the snapshot provides, the dendrograms do confirm of the grouping specific scenarios: 
 Group 1: Leimbach – 400 ppm, Greenpeace – Energy [R]evolution, Greenpeace – Advanced 
Energy [R]evolution, WWF – 100% Renewable and IEA WEO 2011 – 450 Policies.  
 Group 2: EC – Reference, EC – Hydrogen, EC – Carbon restraints, ExxonMobil, IPCC – A2-ASF, 
IPCC-B1-Image and EIA – Low oil price.  
 Individual grouping of the Leimbach – Reference scenario.  
 
Quantitative grouping of the scenarios according to the data dynamics analysis approach 
The statistical clustering method (as explained above) uses a snapshot of the time-series data as input. 
As a consequence, the resulting clustering does not reflect any temporal dynamics of the energy mix 
that may be present. To compensate for this limitation, an alternative clustering approach is devised that 
incorporates as much of the temporal dynamics of energy use as possible without compromising the 
integrity of the data in the time-series or the objectivity of the analysis thereof beyond acceptable limits. 
Only by plotting the (estimated, interpolated) lines between given data points, the general dynamics of a 
scenario’s future energy mix prospects become visible. Still, the differences between various scenarios 
using these visualizations remain subtle at best. To better quantify and illustrate the dynamics of the 
presented future energy mixes, converting the given figures to annual growth rates proves elementary. 
Growth rates capture the direction of trends and amplify subtle changes therein. Moreover, data for 
absolute and relative energy mixes alike can be recalculated into average annual growth rates. It 
thereby reduces different data bandwidths between and within scenarios to a single uniform standard, 
thus allowing for more reliable comparison. Visually analysing growth rates provides the additional 
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advantage of not having to stick to a specific year for which the data density is best. Instead, all 
scenarios can be analysed together over their entire time span or any desired subset thereof. 
Nevertheless, only a handful of scenarios provide data beyond the year 2050 so the focus will be on the 
time frame between 2010 and 2050. 
The data provided in the scenarios are recalculated to uniform growth rates using the compound annual 
growth rate (CAGR) method: 
 CAGR(t1,t2)=(Vt2/Vt1)^(1/(t2-t1))-1 
Where  t1=starting year of time frame 
  t2=end year of time frame 
  Vt1=data value for the starting year of the time frame 
  Vt2=data value for the end year of the time frame 
The compound annual growth rate method results in a growth percentage that is constant for every year 
in the time frame. Start and end years of a time frame are chosen such that the resulting time frame 
spans exactly the period between two available data points. For example, if the total absolute energy use 
data available for a certain scenario is limited to 500EJ in 2010, 600EJ in 2020 and 900 EJ in 2050, two 
growth rate figures remain after recalculation: one for the time frame between 2010 and 2020, and one 
for the time frame between 2020 and 2050. The compound annual growth rate between 2010 and 2020 
would be (600/500)^(1/(2020-2010))-1=0.018, or 1.8%. Between 2020 and 2050, the compound 
annual growth rate would be (900/600)^(1/(2050-2020))-1=0.014, or 1.4%.  
  
 
Figure 9: Three-level top-down clustering criteria 
 
The method to cluster the scenarios based on similarity of behaviour of the compound annual growth 
rate over the time span of the scenario is designed as a three-level procedure, classifying the scenarios 
according to a different criterion on each level. As visualized in the image of Figure 9, with each level, 
the focus turns to more deeper lying aspects of the energy mix, so as to mimic a top-down approach. 
From the first to the third level, the procedure uses absolute total energy use, the ratio of energy from 
fossil and renewable sources and absolute gas supply, respectively, as the classification criteria. Total 
energy use represents the broadest and most general aspect of future energy scenarios. The ratio 
between energy from fossil and renewable sources adds a qualitative perspective, incorporating two 
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types of energy sources in one quantifiable unit without explicitly singling out a specific primary energy 
source. Using absolute gas supply as the final criterion does single out a specific primary energy source, 
providing a meaningful qualitative approach to future energy mixes. These criteria and the sequential 
order thereof were chosen to reflect the intentions of the project, i.e. a broad perspective on energy 
futures while allowing special attention for the role of natural gas. 
At each of the three levels (or, for each of the criteria), the complete group of scenarios is initially 
classified into three classes of similar behaviour: roughly low, medium and high depending on the most 
prominent general direction of a scenario’s growth rate between the years 2010 and 2030/2050. Some 
scenario’s growth rate behaviour would be erratic up to the point of potentially fitting in more than one 
class. As a solution to that problem, a scenario could also be labelled with a secondary and tertiary class. 
The weighted average of the three classification strengths would then deliver the final classification to be 
used in the remaining part of the procedure. 
The final step in the data dynamics clustering approach is the integration of the three levels from the 
procedure as described above into a combined cluster structure. This integration is realized through 
aligning the weighted average classification of each of the three levels. As noted above, the classification 
into three distinct classes results in an uneven distribution of the scenarios over those classes at each of 
the three classification criteria. Combining the first two classes of each selection criterion resolves this 
problem and allows for a more straightforward integration of the three criteria. This leaves two classes 
for each selection criteria, “low” and “high”. For the total energy use growth rate criterion the “low” and 
“high” classes refer to growth rates below 1% or above 1%, respectively. The “low” and “high” classes 
for the fossil-renewables ratio criterion are defined by growth rates below or above -2%. The total 
natural gas supply criterion’s “low” and “high” classes are differentiated by growth rates below or above 
1%. 
Aligning the results of the consecutive operations and abstractions performed for each of the 
classification levels yields a 31x3-sized colour-coded matrix, as shown in Table 2. This matrix consists of 
one row for every scenario and one column for each of the classification levels. The columns from left to 
right represent the classification for the criteria total energy use, ratio of energy from fossil and 
renewable sources and gas supply, respectively. Added to the right of the matrix is the identification of 
the associated combined scenario cluster. 
In Table 2, the list of scenarios is sorted by their associated three-level classification. Three similar-sized 
groups of scenarios can be identified: one group of scenarios (the first nine) in which all are classified 
with the “low” label for all three criteria, another group of scenarios (the middle 12) which show a 
combination of “low” and “high” classification for different criteria, and a third group of scenarios (the 
last ten) which are classified in the “high” category for all three criteria. In Table 2, dashed horizontal 
black separation lines help to identify the groups and thus the clustering within the set of scenarios 
resulting from the data dynamics approach. 
The classification of the scenarios in the first cluster characterizes this group along the lines of advocates 
of energy from renewable sources, efficiency improvement, clean energy use etc. The scenarios in this 
cluster suggest small long-term growth of absolute energy use, if not even decline thereof. Also, energy 
from fossil sources is expected to lose ground in favour of energy from renewable sources relatively 
rapidly, and natural gas supply may see decline or only small to moderate growth. Such characteristics 
justify naming cluster 1 “High Renewables”. 
The composition of the second cluster is best described as heterogeneous, the combined picture of the 
included scenarios not displaying clear and distinct overarching themes or directions other than a 
continuation of the current situation. The scenarios in this cluster suggest a moderate to strong long-
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term increase of absolute energy use. There is no consensus about whether fossil fuels gradually make 
way for renewables or not and the pace with which that would happen. The expected growth of natural 
gas supply ranges from moderate to high. As such, it seems appropriate to name cluster 2 “Business as 
Usual”. 
The third cluster is composed of scenarios that are classified with “high” labels for all three criteria, and 
primarily distinguishes itself from the second cluster through consistent prediction of a growing role for 
natural gas. In this cluster, the scenarios are all on the same line expecting total primary energy supply 
to see high growth, renewables to gain ground on fossil fuels only comparatively slowly, and natural gas 
supply to enter a period of strong growth. On the basis of those characteristics, cluster 3 is named “High 
Gas”. 
 
Table 2: Overview of three-level classification of scenarios 
Classification level // criterion  
cl
u
st
er
 
1 // total energy use CAGR: 12 <1%  3 >1%  
 2 // fossil-renewables ratio CAGR: 12 <-2% 3 >-
2% 
 
  3 // total natural gas supply CAGR: 12 <1%  3 >1%  
     
    Author // publication // scenario 
1 1 1 
 Greenpeace // Energy [R]evolution - A sustainable world energy outlook // Scenario 2: "Energy 
[R]evolution" 
B
1
: 
H
ig
h 
R
en
ew
ab
le
s 
1 1 1 
 Greenpeace // Energy [R]evolution - A sustainable world energy outlook // Scenario 3: 
"Advanced Energy [R]evolution" 
1 2 1  WWF // 100% renewable 
1 2 1  Krewitt et al. // The 2 ̊C scenario - A sustainable world energy perspective // Scenario 2: "2 ̊C" 
2 1 1  Leimbach et al. // Technological Change and International Trade // Scenario 2: "400 ppm" 
2 2 2  Azar et al. // Global energy scenarios meeting stringent CO2 constraints 
2 2 2  IEA // World Energy Outlook 2011 // Scenario 3: "450 policies" 
2 2 2  Leimbach et al. // Technological Change and International Trade // Scenario 1: "Reference" 
2 2 1  Shell // Energy Scenarios to 2050 // Scenario 3: "Blueprints" 
2 3 3  EIA // International Energy Outlook 2011 // Scenario 3: "Low Oil Price" 
B
2
: 
B
us
in
es
s 
as
 U
su
al
 2 3 2  IPCC // Special Report on Emission Scenarios // Scenario 3: "B1-IMAGE" 
2 3 3 
 Greenpeace // Energy [R]evolution - A sustainable world energy outlook // Scenario 1: 
"Reference" 
3 2 1  Shell // Energy Scenarios to 2050 // Scenario 2: "Scramble" 
3 2 3  BP // Energy outlook 2030 // Consumption 
3 2 3  BP // Energy outlook 2030 // Production 
3 2 3  IPCC // Special Report on Emission Scenarios // Scenario 1: "A1B-AIM" 
3 2 3  IPCC // Special Report on Emission Scenarios // Scenario 2: "A2-ASF" 
3 2 3  OPEC // World Oil Outlook 2035 
3 3 2  EC // World Energy Technology Outlook - 2050 // Scenario 2: "Carbon constraints" 
3 3 2  EC // World Energy Technology Outlook - 2050 // Scenario 3: "Hydrogen" 
3 3 2  EC // World Energy Technology Outlook - 2050 // Scenario 1: "Reference" 
3 3 3  IEA // World Energy Outlook 2011 // Scenario 1: "New policies" 
B
3
: 
H
ig
h 
G
as
 
3 3 3  Shell // Energy Scenarios to 2050 // Scenario 1: "Business-as-Usual" 
3 3 3  ExxonMobil // The outlook for energy: a view to 2040 
3 3 3  EIA // International Energy Outlook 2011 // Scenario 1: "Reference" 
3 3 3  EIA // International Energy Outlook 2011 // Scenario 2: "High Oil Price" 
3 3 3  IPCC // Special Report on Emission Scenarios // Scenario 4: "B2-MESSAGE" 
3 3 3  IEA // WEO2011 - Golden Age of Gas? // Scenario 1: "New Policies Scenario WEO 2010" 
3 3 3  IEA // WEO2011 - Golden Age of Gas? // Scenario 2: "Gas Scenario" 
3 3 3  IEA // World Energy Outlook 2011 // Scenario 2: "Current policies" 
3 3 3 
 Krewitt et al. // The 2 ̊C scenario - A sustainable world energy perspective // Scenario 1: 
"Reference" 
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3.5.3 Analysis and integration of the obtained results into end states 
Above, two different approaches to clustering the scenarios were outlined. The first method (A) involved 
clustering based on a statistical approach, using an agglomerative hierarchical clustering algorithm. The 
second method (B) aimed to cluster the scenarios on the basis of dynamics of the energy mix, using the 
strength of growth or decline of different aspects of the energy mix as clustering criteria. The next and 
last step is integrating the results from both methods to arrive at a final, combined clustering suitable as 
a foundation for the definition of potential long-term end-states. 
The first step in integrating the clustering results from method A and B is assessing the degree of 
overlap that exists between the sets of clusters. This can work two ways: using the results from method 
A as the basis to compare the results of method B against, or vice versa. The overlap between the sets 
of clusters resulting from methods A and B changes significantly depending on the direction of 
comparison, or which set of clusters serves as the basis to compare the other set against. The final 
combined scenario clusters are the foundation of the definition of three distinct end-states – a rather 
semantic process. Therefore the dynamic characterization and qualitative nature of the clusters and 
scenarios therein outweigh the logic and correctness of a mathematical snapshot-based clustering. As 
such, the clustering suggestion resulting from method B is best suited to serve as the basis for further 
integration. 
The first combined cluster of scenarios is rather well defined and easily distinguished from the rest: 
clusters A1 and A2 combined show an almost perfect match with cluster B1. Together, these clusters 
encompass scenarios that present revolutionary (some more than others) energy mix dynamics, 
involving increasing use of energy from renewable sources and improving energy efficiency. Of the nine 
scenarios that could potentially be included in the resulting combined cluster, only whether to include 
Shell’s Blueprint scenario is open for discussion. Indeed, Shell’s Blueprint scenario is the only scenario 
that changes position depending on the direction of assessing overlap between the clustering results 
from method A and B. However, the Blueprints scenario describes a world in which the role of energy 
from non-fossil sources gains importance. Therefore the scenario fits in the first combined cluster. 
Moreover, also the notion that a best-case final combined clustering output would yield three clusters of 
identical size dictates it to be included. As such, the first final, combined cluster C1 (“Renewables”) is 
composed out of nine scenarios, as listed in Table 3. 
 
Table 3: Composition of scenario-cluster C1 “Renewables” 
Final 
cluster 
 Orig. 
clusters 
 
Author // publication // scenario 
      
C
1
: 
H
ig
h 
R
en
ew
ab
le
s 
 
B1 A1 
 Greenpeace // Energy [R]evolution - A sustainable world energy outlook // Scenario 2: "Energy 
[R]evolution" 
 
B1 A1 
 Greenpeace // Energy [R]evolution - A sustainable world energy outlook // Scenario 3: 
"Advanced Energy [R]evolution" 
 B1 A1  WWF // 100% renewable 
 B1 A1  Krewitt et al. // The 2 ̊C scenario - A sustainable world energy perspective // Scenario 2: "2 ̊C" 
 
B1 A1 
 Leimbach et al. // Technological Change and International Trade – Insights from REMIND-R // 
Scenario 2: "400 ppm" 
 B1 A1  Azar et al. // Global energy scenarios meeting stringent CO2 constraints 
 B1 A1  IEA // World Energy Outlook 2011 // Scenario 3: "450 policies" 
 
B1 A2 
 Leimbach et al. // Technological Change and International Trade – Insights from REMIND-R // 
Scenario 1: "Reference" 
 B1 A3  Shell // Energy Scenarios to 2050 // Scenario 3: "Blueprints" 
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Combining the remainder of the sets of clusters poses a bit more of a challenge, resulting from the 
variation in the scenarios included in clustering suggestions resulting from method A and B. Clusters B2 
and B3 were characterized along the lines of business as usual and gas advocacy, respectively. 
Extending along those lines the next step is to assess what changes and shifts may occur in the 
clustering composition based on the suggestion from method A.  
The most obvious shift occurs for the gas-cluster: because of its characterization, cluster A4 (“Golden 
age of gas”) should be included completely in C3. This effectively means shifting IPCC’s A1B-AIM 
scenario. Another shifting scenario is EC’s Reference scenario. Although initially included in the business-
as-usual clusters A5 and B2, the trajectory of the role of gas in the energy mix allows it to be included in 
gas-cluster C3. Based on similar general characteristics of the dynamics of the energy mix, two other 
scenarios are shifted across the threshold in the opposite direction: ExxonMobil’s Outlook and IEA’s New 
Policies. As initially suggested in the clustering suggestion resulting from method A, both scenarios may 
belong in a business as usual cluster C2 rather than in gas cluster C3. With these shifts, the remaining 
two final combined clusters C2 (“Business as usual”) and C3 (“Gas”) are complete, the former 
encompassing 12 scenarios, the latter ten. The details of both scenarios’ composition are outlined in 
Table 4 and Table 5 below. 
 
Table 4: Composition of scenario-cluster C2 “Business As Usual” 
Final 
cluster 
 Orig. 
clusters 
 
Author // publication // scenario 
      
C
2
: 
B
us
in
es
s 
as
 U
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al
 
 
B2 A3 
 Greenpeace // Energy [R]evolution - A sustainable world energy outlook // Scenario 1: 
"Reference" 
 B2 A3  Shell // Energy Scenarios to 2050 // Scenario 2: "Scramble" 
 B2 A3  BP // Energy outlook 2030 // Consumption 
 B2 A3  BP // Energy outlook 2030 // Production 
 B2 A5  EIA // International Energy Outlook 2011 // Scenario 3: "Low Oil Price" 
 B2 A5  IPCC // Special Report on Emission Scenarios // Scenario 3: "B1-IMAGE" 
 B2 A5  IPCC // Special Report on Emission Scenarios // Scenario 2: "A2-ASF" 
 B2 A5  EC // World Energy Technology Outlook - 2050 // Scenario 2: "Carbon constraints" 
 B2 A5  EC // World Energy Technology Outlook - 2050 // Scenario 3: "Hydrogen" 
 B2 A1  OPEC // World Oil Outlook 2039 //  
 B3 A5  IEA // World Energy Outlook 2011 // Scenario 1: "New policies" 
 B3 A5  ExxonMobil // The outlook for energy: a view to 2040 //  
 
 
Table 5: Composition of scenario-cluster C3 “Gas” 
Final 
cluster 
 Orig. 
clusters 
 
Author // publication // scenario 
      
C
3
: 
H
ig
h 
G
as
 
 B2 A5  EC // World Energy Technology Outlook - 2050 // Scenario 1: "Reference" 
 B2 A4  IPCC // Special Report on Emission Scenarios // Scenario 1: "A1B-AIM" 
 B3 A3  Shell // Energy Scenarios to 2050 // Scenario 1: "Business-as-Usual" 
 B3 A3  IEA // WEO2011 - Golden Age of Gas? // Scenario 1: "New Policies Scenario WEO 2010" 
 B3 A3  IEA // WEO2011 - Golden Age of Gas? // Scenario 2: "Gas Scenario" 
 B3 A5  EIA // International Energy Outlook 2011 // Scenario 1: "Reference" 
 B3 A5  EIA // International Energy Outlook 2011 // Scenario 2: "High Oil Price" 
 B3 A5  IPCC // Special Report on Emission Scenarios // Scenario 4: "B2-MESSAGE" 
 B3 A5  IEA // World Energy Outlook 2011 // Scenario 2: "Current policies" 
 
B3 A4 
 Krewitt et al. // The 2 ̊C scenario - A sustainable world energy perspective // Scenario 1: 
"Reference" 
An interesting observation from the composition of the scenario clusters listed in Table 4 and Table 5 is 
that not all scenarios end up in the cluster one could expect them to end up in. Specifically, this applies 
to two scenarios published by the IEA: Current Policies and New Policies. The former ends up in cluster 
C3 (“gas“) whereas one would expect that it would fit more in a business-as-usual-cluster. The latter 
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appears in cluster C2 (“business-as-usual“) although one would intuitively not characterize that scenario 
as fitting the business-as-usual description. This observation underlines the necessity of investigating a 
scenario’s actual behaviour over time rather than assuming certain characteristics on the basis of just 
their title, narrative and/or description. 
3.5.4 Quantitative analysis of the end states: energy mix data 
Each of the three clusters of future energy scenarios defined in the previous sections has a different 
average energy mix resulting of the variety of scenarios the clusters are comprised of. Moreover, the 
type and characteristics of the scenarios included in a cluster by and large affect the shape of the 
average future energy mix development pathway represented by that cluster. The average future energy 
mix of each cluster was calculated by separately averaging the data reported for each element of the 
energy mix, using the original scenario data. The average energy mix composition for each timestamp is 
the cumulative of the averages of each element of the energy mix. The development of each cluster’s 
average future energy mix is illustrated in Figure 10. 
From the average energy mixes shown in Figure 10 it shows that the average energy mix of the 
‘Renewables’ cluster looks markedly different from the average energy mixes of the ‘Business-as-usual’ 
and ‘Gas’ clusters. Moreover, the differences between the ‘Business-as-usual’ and ‘Gas’ clusters are 
subtle variations rather than distinct differences. 
The distinct characteristic of the ‘Renewables’ cluster is that the absolute total average primary energy 
supply shows signs of gradually levelling out. By the year 2030, the most prominent increases have 
dwindled, leaving the total energy supply to increase only very moderately from about 550 EJ in 2030 to 
just under 600 EJ by 2050. This stabilization is largely the result of the combination between dwindling 
supplies of fossil energy and increasing supplies of energy from renewable sources. The reduction of 
fossil energy is strongest for oil and gas. From the year 2020 onwards, coal appears to provide a steady 
supply without showing strong signs of either growth or decline. From a relative perspective, the average 
energy mix of the ‘Renewables’ cluster clearly shows the substitution of non-renewables by energy from 
renewable sources. By 2050, the share of renewables is suggested to have increased to 40%, over 
double the share in the energy mix around the period 2010-2020. The loss of share in the energy mix is 
the strongest for oil, coming down from about 30% in the 2010-2020 period to less than 20% by 2050. 
The relative share of gas in the energy mix remains relatively stable at around 20% until about 2035, 
after which a slight decline is suggested. 
The ‘Business-as-usual’ cluster shows a continuously increasing total energy supply, growing from 
around 500 EJ in 2010 to almost 900 EJ in 2050. This growth is reflected in growth for all elements in 
the energy mix. Growth for non-carbon based energy sources (renewables and nuclear) is remarkably 
strong, growth is moderate for coal and gas, and growth is least for oil. From a relative perspective, 
small absolute growth for oil combined with a growing total energy supply translates to a declining share 
of oil in the overall total energy mix. The shares of coal and gas remain largely constant at around 20% 
and 25%, respectively. The most prominent relative growth is for nuclear and renewable energy. Overall, 
the share of carbon-based energy sources decreases from about 80% in the 2010-2020 period to less 
than 70% in 2050, substituted by non-carbon based energy sources. 
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Figure 10: Average energy mixes of the three identified clusters of future energy scenarios. 
 
In Figure 10 the upper graphs represent the average absolute contributions of the different energy 
sources to the energy mix. The lower graphs provide an impression of the average energy mix in relative 
terms. 
The average energy mix of the ‘Gas’ cluster shows composition development that is only slightly different 
from the ‘Business-as-usual’ cluster. The most notable difference is the total energy supply increase that 
is even stronger than the increase in the ‘Business-as-usual’ cluster, and largely correlates to increasing 
gas supply. In absolute terms, the total energy supply increases to over 1000 EJ, about double the total 
global average energy supply in the period 2010-2020. All components of the energy mix increase, apart 
from coal. The most notable increase in this cluster is for gas, the supply of which doubles between 2010 
and 2050 to over 300 EJ. The increase in gas supply is also clearly reflected in the relative composition 
of the average energy mix of this cluster. The shares of natural gas, renewables and nuclear all increase 
between 2010 and 2050, at the expense of coal and oil. 
Renewables increase in all clusters, both in absolute and in relative terms, albeit more strongly in the 
‘Renewables’ cluster than in the ‘Business-as-usual’ and ‘Gas’ clusters. Increasing shares of renewables 
imply declining shares of non-renewable energy sources, sometimes offset to some extent by 
developments for nuclear energy. The relative shares of oil and coal decline in the average energy mixes 
of all clusters. For gas, the relative share in the energy mix only increases in the cluster that 
encompasses scenarios that foresee a special role for gas. Despite absolute increases, the other clusters 
suggest a declining relative share of gas in the energy mix. 
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Figure 11: Standard deviations for the average energy mixes of the three identified clusters 
for the years 2010, 2030 and 2050.  
 
In the figure above the upper graphs represent the absolute standard deviations calculated over the 
original scenario data. The lower graphs show the same standard deviations, but normalized to a 
percentage of the corresponding average. 
Each cluster consists of a number of scenarios, each of which suggests different future energy 
development pathways. The average energy mixes discussed above represent certain quantitative 
ranges. We illustrate those ranges, or variance of possible energy system development pathways, by 
means of standard deviations calculated for every element of a cluster’s energy mix. To facilitate 
comparisons within and between energy mixes of different clusters, we also normalized the absolute 
standard deviations as percentages of the corresponding averages. Figure 11 provides a visual 
representation of the absolute standard deviations associated with each cluster’s energy mix, and the 
normalized standard deviations. 
First and foremost, the variance for each energy mix element in each cluster increases substantially for 
longer time horizons. The variance in 2030 is larger than that of 2010, and the variance of 2050, in turn, 
is larger than that of 2030. The increasing variance reflects the long-term divergence of energy system 
development pathways suggested in the scenarios that are included in the clusters. Moreover, the 
increasing variance also reflects and confirms intrinsic energy system inertia: changes in the composition 
or behaviour of the system are obscured by the unchanged rest, and only over time may manifest 
themselves in high-level, abstract indicators. These notions are indicative of the difficulty and 
uncertainty associated with long-term future energy scenarios. 
Between the three clusters, it can be seen that in terms of variance, the ‘Renewables’ cluster also stands 
apart from the other two clusters because of a markedly larger overall variance, both in absolute terms 
as in relative terms of normalized standard deviations. The variance indicators in the ‘Business-as-usual’ 
and ‘Gas’ clusters show similar fingerprints. These differences and similarities may be general indicators 
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of uncertainty or agreement between future energy scenarios with different characteristics, backgrounds 
or themes. Apparently, scenarios suggesting somewhat substantial departures from existing energy 
trends, such as the scenarios typical to the ‘Renewables’ cluster, can be associated with much larger 
variance or uncertainty, and thus a wider bandwidth of future energy development pathways, than their 
more conservative counterparts as typically found in the ‘Business-as-usual’ cluster or, in a pinch, the 
‘Gas’ cluster. 
On a lower level, the contribution of energy from renewable sources seems to be associated with a 
reversed subdivision of larger and smaller variance. In the ‘Renewables’ cluster, the variance for 
renewable energy is smaller both in absolute as in normalized terms than it is for the other two clusters. 
Moreover, in the ‘Business-as-usual’ and ‘Gas’ clusters, the variance for renewable energy is among the 
largest of all elements of the energy mix, especially for longer time horizons. This may be indicative of a 
trade-off of variance and (un)certainty with regard to the energy sources that matter in the long term 
future, depending on the contexts of different scenarios. Renewable energy oriented scenarios appear to 
take a certain amount of renewables as guaranteed and vary the non-renewable energy padding 
necessary to meet energy demand. For scenarios not explicitly focused on renewable energy, it is the 
contribution of non-renewable energy that forms the foundation of the future energy mix, supplemented 
by varying amounts of renewable energy to complete the scenario’s outlook on the future energy supply. 
In the ‘Renewables’ cluster, the variance for coal and nuclear energy are the largest. This implies that 
scenarios with a focus on more sustainable future energy systems agree least on the roles of coal and 
nuclear energy. The variances, and implied agreement, on natural gas and oil increase moderately over 
time and on the long run occupy a position between the relative agreement of renewable energy and the 
large uncertainty associated with coal and oil. In the ‘Business-as-usual’ and ‘Gas’ clusters, the variance 
for oil remains notable small, indicative of certainty and agreement on the future role of oil in the energy 
mix. The other elements of the energy mix in both clusters all show similar variance growth patterns 
over time. The variance of natural gas is the exception: as much as the absolute contribution of natural 
gas in the average future energy mix of the ‘Gas’ cluster is highest, so is the associated variance. In fact, 
the variance of gas in the ‘Gas’ cluster is sufficiently large to partially overlap the bandwidth of pathways 
suggested in the ‘Business-as-usual’ cluster. 
3.5.5 Quantitative analysis of the end states according to the PESTE 
categories 
The three final clusters, identified on the basis of the quantitative analysis, are further analysed on the 
basis of the PESTE categories in order to identify commonalities and discrepancies. Since the numerical 
grouping already provided robust groups, the contextual grouping involves an analysis of the common 
variables within the groups. The qualitative analysis of the end states is performed on the basis of the 
storylines, as elaborated in the preliminary analysis phase (see Section 3.5.1).The storylines provide 
insight into the driving forces behind the energy mix and offer a structured approach in qualitatively 
analysing the scenario groups. 
Preliminary comparison of the contextual aspects per group reveals a highly dispersed level of available 
information. Therefore seven contextual aspects have been identified, which are deemed important and 
generally available: GDP, Population, Carbon tax, applying CCS, Efficiency, Electrification and CO2 
emissions. The results can be seen in Table 6 below. 
 
  
 
Energy Delta Gas Research – The Big Picture  Page 48
 
Table 6: Seven important driving factors of the end state C3: Gas 
# Author 
Scenario 
name GDP 
Population 
growth 
Carbo
n tax CCS Efficiency 
Electri
ficatio
n  
CO2 
emissio
ns 
1 EC 
Scenario 1: 
"Reference" 
Quadrupl
e by 
2050 
8,9 billion by 
2050 
30 €/t 
in 
2050 N/a N/a Yes Double 
2 IPCC 
Scenario 1: 
"A1B-AIM" 
2,9% 
p.a. 
9 billion by 
2050 N/a N/a 
Yes, Technology 
improvement and 
efficiency N/a N/a 
3 Shell  
Scenario 1: 
"Business-as-
Usual" N/a 
9 billion by 
2050 N/a N/a N/a N/a N/a 
4 IEA 
Scenario 1: 
"New Policies 
Scenario WEO 
2010" 
3,2% 
p.a. 
8,5 billion by 
2035 
$50/t 
in 
2035 Yes 
Yes, Technology 
improvement and 
efficiency N/a 
35,4 Gt 
by 2035. 
0,7% 
p.a. 
5 IEA 
Scenario 2: 
"Gas Scenario" 
3,4% 
p.a. 
8,5 billion by 
2035 
$50/t 
in 
2035 Yes 
Yes, Technology 
efficiency N/a 
35 Gt by 
2035 
6 EIA 
Scenario 1: 
"Reference" 2,6% 
8,4 billion by 
2035 No N/a 
Capacity utilization 
nuclear, 
unconventional and 
conventional recovery.  
Yes, 
moder
ately 1,3%/a 
7 EIA 
Scenario 2: 
"High Oil Price" 4,0% 
8,4 billion by 
2035 No N/a N/a No 1,8%/a 
8 IPCC 
Scenario 4: 
"B2-MESSAGE" 2,2% 
9,4 billion by 
2050 n/a N/a 
Less than A1 & B1, 
higher than A2.  N/a N/a 
9 IEA 
Scenario 2: 
"Current 
policies" 3,6% 
8,6 billion by 
2035 
$45/t 
in 
2035 Yes 
End-use, energy 
production & supply. 
Supply more cost-
efficient, leading to 
new & cleaner 
production/supply.  Yes 0,9%/a 
10 
Krewitt 
et al. 
Scenario 1: 
"Reference" N/a N/a N/a N/a N/a N/a N/a 
 
Additionally, an overview of all scenarios per PESTE category is created, enabling comparison of other 
variables than addressed above. The observations of the contextual grouping are described per end state 
in the following chapter. 
3.6 End states 
Based on the quantitative analysis of the energy mix available in the scenarios, the scenarios are 
grouped into three end states. These end states are further analysed from a qualitative aspect, in order 
to identify the commonalities and discrepancies. The end states, as resulted from both quantitative and 
qualitative analysis, are described below. 
3.6.1 End state: Renewables 
The end state ‘Renewables’ (RES) is characterized by the following factors: 
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 Political: Most effective policies and measures to promote RES, long term perspective, stringent 
regulations and in increasing cost of CO2. 
 Economic: Global population and GDP increases, investment in infrastructure increases. 
 Social: Climate change awareness shift, increasing tensions between rural and urban 
communities. 
 Technological: Significant development and maturity of the existing technologies, efficiency 
increase, modal shift in transport, increased R&D expenditure and innovation. 
 Environmental: Significant emissions reduction after 2020. 
 
Figure 12: Evolution of the Energy Mix in End State C1: Renewables 
The energy mix of the ‘Renewables’ end state is described in Figure 12 above. In this end state the world 
energy demand is presumed to be significantly lower than in other two end states. Renewables play an 
increasingly important part, becoming the major source in both absolute and relative terms by 2050. 
In the ‘Renewables’ end state it is assumed that the level of political and/or policy intervention will be 
high. Governments take action to steer the energy system away from fossil fuels towards more 
renewables with a variety of policy measures. Especially the scenarios from environmental NGOs assume 
strong national and international policy actions, such as a forced phase-out of coal and an international 
framework for investing in climate change mitigation. It is assumed that governments invest heavily in 
infrastructure to facilitate renewables and in R&D to improve renewable technology. Most scenarios in 
this end state assume either a global or a regional CO2 pricing system. The US loses its dominant 
position in the geopolitical system: it shares political dominance with China. 
Most scenarios assume steady global economic growth, largely coming from developing countries. GDP 
growth is exogenous to the scenarios. More global economic integration with a decoupling of between 
economic growth and fossil fuels is assumed. It is expected that eventually economic growth will 
decouple from energy demand growth. An increasing price of CO2 leaves no room for investments in 
fossil power generation. 
All scenarios expect an increasing world population, reaching about 9 billion in 2050. The growth in 
population is mostly from the developing regions. Awareness shift by the public pushes for more political 
action to reduce emissions. Fear of climate change creates political turbulence with tensions between 
rural and urban communities, especially in countries with poor governance. Some scenarios assume a 
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change in behaviour by the public in order to decrease energy consumption: such as reducing meat 
consumption or reducing mobility needs. 
The environmental NGOs assume, besides a phase-out of fossil fuels, a phase-out of nuclear energy. 
Significant improvements in the efficiency and costs of renewable technologies are assumed due to 
heavy public R&D expenditures. The environmental NGOs assume almost a complete phase-out of fossil 
power generation. Other scenarios assume the implementation of CCS to reduce emissions. Some 
improvements are expected in utilizing hydrogen as an energy carrier, but no other fundamental 
breakthroughs are expected within the scope of the end state. Due to the increasing global integration, 
innovation spreads quickly between countries, increasing the use of more efficient technology and 
renewable technology. Information technologies stimulate the use of more demand side management 
solutions. Biomass plays a big role in most of the scenarios. Furthermore, wind and solar are mentioned 
as promising renewables.  
Global carbon emissions peak around 2020 and begin to decline after that as an effect of international 
efforts to reduce emissions. One scenario assumes a growth in emissions because coal will increasingly 
be used when oil and gas reserves become depleted. 
3.6.2 End state: Business as usual 
The end state ‘Business as usual’ (BAU) is characterized by the following factors: 
 Political: Focus on short term national security, developed countries assume more responsibility 
for climate change, RES support continues, increased CO2 price. 
 Economic: Global population and GDP increase and drive energy demand (especially in 
developing countries); energy efficiency grows in developed countries. 
 Social: Income redistribution affects energy efficiency in developing countries, increased 
environmental consciousness. 
 Technological: Increased energy efficiency, progress in CCS, hydrogen, and unconventional 
fossils. 
 Environmental: Moderate emissions constraints. 
 
 
Figure 13: Evolution of the Energy Mix in End State C2: Business as Usual 
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The energy mix of the ‘BAU’ end state is described in Figure 13 above. In this end state the world energy 
demand is presumed to be significantly higher than in ‘Renewables’ end state, but still lower than in ‘Gas’ 
end state. Fossil fuels maintain their dominant position, regardless of both absolute and relative growth 
of renewables. 
This end state is based on an extrapolation of current trends without major events that change the 
current path to increasing the use of all energy sources. 
Developed countries assume a higher responsibility for preventing or mitigating climate change. There 
are policies in place to promote renewables (but on a smaller scale than in the renewables end state). In 
some regions in the world there is a CO2 pricing system in place, but it is not assumed to be a global 
system. The political focus is more on short term national energy security. Major producers see their 
power increasing on the international arena. One scenario uses only policies that are already in place, 
another mentions a cautious implementation of recently announced commitments. 
Global GDP increases around 3% per year, but energy intensity of GDP decreases gradually due to 
efficiency and high energy prices. GDP growth is assumed to be the main driver behind energy demand. 
Efficiency improvement is identified as a strong factor in reducing energy demand growth. The increase 
in demand for energy is due to the developing countries. OECD has a slightly lower demand due to 
efficiency. 
World population is expected to rise to 9 billion in 2050. Income redistribution in developing countries 
could adversely affect energy efficiency and have a major impact on world markets. 
The technological outlook in this end state varies between the scenarios. One scenario sees a large role 
for CCS in the future. Another explores the possibilities of hydrogen as energy carrier. Improved engine 
efficiency reduces energy demand in developing countries. Technologies in unconventional gas 
production help to increase supply. Due to less global economic integration as compared to the 
renewables end state, innovation spreads slower.  
All scenarios assume an increase in carbon emissions. There are some efforts to reduce emissions, such 
as a carbon price or CCS in some regions. However, these do not off-set the increase in use of fossil 
fuels. On a local or regional level there is attention for pollution, environmental damage, however there 
is no international climate agreement. 
3.6.3 End state: Gas 
The end state ‘Gas’ is characterized by the following factors: 
 Political: Focus on short term national security, RES support continues, increased CO2 price.  
 Economic: Global population and GDP increase, developing countries catch up in economic 
growth, high commodity prices.  
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 Social: Concerns about energy security. 
 Technological: Progress in unconventional fossils’ recovery, energy efficiency, CCS, no dominant 
technology. 
 Environmental: Global emissions increase, no significant international agreements to reduce 
emissions in place. 
 
Figure 14: Evolution of the Energy Mix in End State C3: Gas 
 
The energy mix of the ‘Gas’ end state is described in Figure 14 above. This end state has the largest 
increase in energy demand up to 2050 (compared to other end states). Comparable to the ‘BAU’ end 
state, fossil fuels maintain their dominant position, regardless of the growth of renewables. Notable for 
this state is the role played by gas: it becomes the main energy source in both absolute and relative 
terms by 2050. 
Just as in the ‘BAU’ end state there is no international climate agreement in this end state. Some 
scenarios assume a CO2 pricing system to be in place in OECD countries. Environmental policy is focused 
on the national or local level. The scenarios diverge on the political support for nuclear energy: some 
assume an extension of the lifetime of current nuclear power generation, and other scenarios assume a 
gradual phase-out. 
Most of the scenarios assume a global GDP growth of over 3% per year. Europe experiences the slowest 
economic growth of all regions. Non-OECD countries have the highest GDP growth rates and also the 
highest increase in demand for energy. Due to the increasing demand for energy, energy prices are also 
gradually increasing. Oil prices are expected to increase faster than gas prices, therefore contributing to 
the competitiveness of gas. Lower gas prices are a result of growth in unconventional gas production. 
World population increases to around 9 billion in 2050, with most growth coming from non-OECD 
countries. One scenario mentions the possibility of local social unrest due to resource scarcity and/or 
environmental damage. 
Technological improvements increase the lifetime of fossil fuels. Oil and gas reserves and their recovery 
rates are increased. Improvements are realized in shale gas, coal bed methane, tight gas, underground 
coal gasification, CCS technologies and further developments of LNG markets. Some scenarios mention 
the adoption of electric vehicles, while another scenario assumes near-zero advances in transport 
technology. Most scenarios do assume some level of efficiency gains in energy use. The global share of 
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gas in the energy mix increases with 33% in 2050, while the share of coal and oil declines. Furthermore, 
because some scenarios explicitly mention developments in gas technologies this end state is labelled 
the ‘Gas’ end state.  
Global emissions increase significantly, however the increase is not equal between the regions. 
Emissions increase mostly in non-OECD countries. In Europe they decrease due to efficiency and the use 
of cleaner technologies. 
3.7 Conclusions 
This chapter identified three post-energy transition end states representing dominant views on energy 
futures in published literature. The end states are the result of analysis and grouping of various energy 
development scenarios, and are used as reference futures in subsequent chapters of this report. The end 
states are: 
 Renewables: The Renewables end state is characterized by a high share of renewable energy 
sources in the world-wide energy mix alongside a sharp decline in energy demand growth 
towards the future. 
 Business As Usual (BAU): In the BAU end states, the future (relative) energy mix is roughly the 
same as the present energy mix. However, a higher absolute energy demand is envisaged. 
 Gas: The Gas end state assumes a significant portion of the energy demand to be fulfilled by 
natural gas. Furthermore, energy demand is expected to rise steeply towards the future. 
The end states are based on an analysis and subsequent grouping of pre-existing scenarios describing 
various energy futures. These scenarios were aggregated through an extensive literature research and 
subsequent selection process. To compensate for the apparent unavailability of suitable pre-existing 
methodologies, an explorative approach was used to devise a methodology to analyse and group the 
relevant scenarios as per the intentions of this research. This approach was presented and explained in 
this chapter. 
During this explorative process, several ways for comparing and grouping scenarios were investigated, 
both qualitative and quantitative. The two most promising means, a hierarchical clustering method and 
grouping method based on analysing and comparing growth rates, resulted in a fairly similar grouping 
whereby only a few scenarios were grouped differently. This process led to the eventual identification of 
the three aforementioned end states. 
For each of the three identified end states, the average energy mix and the variability therein were 
assessed. From the average energy mixes it appears that the quantitative difference in future energy 
development between the ‘Business-as-usual’ end state and the ‘Gas’ end state is somewhat subtle, and 
mainly found in the role of natural gas in the future energy mix. Between these end states and the 
‘Renewables” end state, the difference is more substantial. There, differences include a stabilizing overall 
energy demand in the long-term for the ‘Renewables’ end state, and a marked decline in the role of non-
renewable energy sources relative to a strong increase in the role of renewable energy. The variability is 
highest in the ‘Renewables’ end state. This higher variability may indicate that there are various ways to 
achieve an end state based on renewable energy sources and as such no clear or single pathway exists. 
As a consequence these different pathways may introduce more uncertainty about the way to reach such 
an end state. Also, this may imply that the lack of a clear vision and direction, and decisions may result 
in a more ‘middle of the road’ outcome instead of the envisaged or desired end states based on 
renewable energy sources.  
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Key findings: 
 Using a tailor-made methodology, a large number of previously published future energy 
scenarios from a wide variety of backgrounds has been reviewed, analysed and grouped 
according to similarities in suggested energy futures to form three clusters: ‘Renewables’, 
‘Business-as-usual’ and ‘Gas’. Each of these clusters represents a differently characterized 
potential energy future, and post-energy transition end-state. Moreover, the three end states 
represent the dominant views on energy futures in recent future energy scenario literature. 
 All three end states suggest a more important role for renewable energy in the energy mix, 
albeit in the ‘Renewables’ end state the suggested growth of renewable energy is stronger than 
in the other two end states. Conversely, the relative share of non-renewable energy in the 
energy mix declines in all three end-states. 
 The contribution of natural gas in the future energy mix only increases in the ‘Gas’ end state. In 
the ‘Business-as-usual’ end state, the role of natural gas stabilizes in the long-term. Natural gas 
sees a decline in both the absolute and relative contribution to the energy mix in the ‘renewables’ 
cluster. 
 Variance and uncertainty with respect to the average energy mixes are distinguishing 
characteristics between the ‘Renewables’ end state and the other two end states. The larger 
general variance associated with the ‘Renewables’ end state may be indicative of greater 
uncertainty and disagreement on the precise details of future energy pathways that involve a 
larger share of renewable energy. 
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4 BOTTOM-UP IMPLICATIONS OF ENERGY END STATES IN EU IN 
2050 
Author: Dr. René Benders – Rijksuniversiteit Groningen 
4.1 Introduction 
The methodology to determine the 3 end states as described in Section 3.5 can be classified as top down. 
The consequences as a result of the choices made, are hard to see with this approach. However, it is of 
crucial importance to get a better idea of the impact of this top down scenario. The following aspects are 
deemed important:  
 The impact on the system as a whole 
 The impact on the inter-relations between sectors and energy conversion (e.g. micro CHP) 
 A view on a more detailed level in the defined sectors 
 A check on the validity and/or the bottlenecks like land use for biomass production, which may 
arise 
To realize this reality check, an energy flow model was developed which will be discussed briefly in this 
section (see Appendix A for a more detailed discussion). The model is referred to as the ‘Big Picture’ 
model. 
Figure 15 shows how calculations are carried out in the Big Picture model. First, the energy demand per 
sector in a certain year is given as a starting point of the calculations. Per sector the demand for energy 
carriers is determined by the ratio of used technologies (Agriculture, Transport, Households, and 
Commercial & Services) or simply by sub-sectors and energy demand (Industry). The format of these 
data is mainly obtained from the IEA Energy balances. All calculations are done on an hourly basis. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15: Calculation sequence Big Picture energy flow model 
To convert carriers out of sources several conversion options are available. Besides the power sector, in 
which multiple conversion technologies exist, other energy carriers can also have multiple sources. For 
example: 
 Methane can be produced by gasification of biomass and fossil sources or by digestion of 
biomass. 
 Motor fuel can be produced from oil and biomass.  
 Hydrogen can be produced by steam reforming or electrolysis. 
In addition, storage of electricity is also regarded as a conversion. The final outcome of the model is the 
amount of resources needed to fulfil demand. In case of electricity, the production from intermittent 
sources are handled is a special way. When there is a surplus of electricity, the electricity is stored first if 
possible and otherwise if allowed converted to hydrogen using Power-to-Gas technology. This hydrogen 
can be used directly in for example fuel cell cars, as feedstock or for the production of methane. If, after 
all these options, still a surplus exists, the remaining electricity will be dumped. In case an extra amount 
Sectors Sources Conversion Carriers 
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of hydrogen (e.g. more methane from renewable sources) is needed, extra intermittent renewable 
sources can be placed to produce the needed electricity. 
4.2 End states description 
 
In this section, three end states are described that are derived in Section 3.5. These end states are 
worked out in more detail here and are used to do an infrastructure analysis in Chapter 5. 
4.2.1 General assumptions 
The end states described here cover all EU-27 countries (thus, without Norway and Switzerland). As 
described in Appendix A, the format of the IEA balances is used as a basis. This means that there are 
five sectors: (1) industry, (2) agriculture/forestry, (3) transport, (4) residential and (5) commercial & 
public services. Fishing is added to the agricultural sector. Moreover, the industrial sector is divided into 
13 sub-sectors. The relative contribution of these sub-sectors and their fuel use are kept mainly constant. 
Therefore, all increase or decreases (in terms of percentage) are compared with 2010 data. Since the 
RES and BAU end states, as based on the EU Road Map 2050, only differentiate the sectors industry, 
transport, and residential & tertiary, the agricultural sector is added to the industrial sector. The 
commercial & public services sector from the IEA tables is similar to the tertiary sector as in the EU road 
map.  
A surplus of intermittent electricity can be stored in Pump Hydro Storage (PHS) plants. The installed 
capacity is obtained from Gutiérrez et al.1. 
4.2.2 RES end state 2050 
This end state is characterized by high penetration of Renewable Energy Sources (RES) and based on the 
High RES scenario in the EC roadmap for 20502. Energy reduction strategies lead to a decrease in final 
energy demand of 31%. The primary energy savings are even a bit higher: 38% (see Figure 16). 
Nuclear and fossil sources are all reduced strongly, respectively by 81% and 70%. These energy sources 
are mainly replaced by electricity from wind, solar and biomass (see Figure 17). Biomass is either used 
directly or to produce biofuels and bio-methane. The share of renewable sources in the primary 
consumption increases from 9% to 60%. 
 
Figure 16: Final energy demand per sector (left) and primary consumption by fuel (right) for 
the RES end state. 
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Comparing the different sectors shows that mainly the residential and the tertiary sector show a large 
decrease, respectively 38% and 42%. This is predominantly due to insulation programs and the 
introduction of heat pumps and micro-CHP. Final demand in the transport sector is strongly reduced as 
well by 36%. This is mainly caused by efficiency programs and the introduction of electric vehicles (EV). 
 
Figure 17: Electricity production by source for the RES end state. 
Since the RES end state has the largest impact on the energy system some additional analyses are made. 
All three end states are calculated for the EU-27 as a whole, but for the RES end state all 27 countries 
are calculated separately. This gives some results worthwhile to elaborate on in the context of this 
research.  
 
Figure 18: Intermittent sources for electricity production. CSP is assumed to be intermittent 
which is not necessarily the case. 
Figure 18 shows the absolute generated electricity by intermittent sources per country. In percentage 
terms, the share of intermittent sources in the total electricity production varies between 15.5 % for 
Luxembourg and 81.0% for Greece. 
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Figure 19: Surplus of electricity for five EU countries with the highest surplus. ‘EU summed’ is 
the surplus of the other 22 EU countries. ‘EU total’ is the surplus if the EU is calculated as one 
region. 
Figure 19 shows the difference between the effect of calculating the surplus of electricity for the EU as a 
whole or for the separate countries. The surplus for the EU as a whole is negligible (0.14 PJ, only for the 
days 273..279), while the cumulative surplus for all separate countries it is about 340 PJ. The absolute 
values in Figure 19 are not automatically an indication of an unbalanced grid. Therefore, the relative 
surplus is more important (surplus/total electricity). The values differ between 0 (e.g. Austria and Spain) 
and 1.05 for Estonia. The countries with a low surplus/total electricity ratio are countries with a low 
and/or balanced set of intermittent sources. The best example here is Spain which has 66% fraction of 
intermittent sources in the total electricity generation but has still no surplus. The large amount of PHS 
capacity available in Spain was not used. The intermittent sources in Spain are about one-third wind 
energy, one-third solar PV and one-third CSP. Countries like Estonia rely fully on wind and have no PHS 
for buffering. 
4.2.3 BAU end state 2050 
This end state is based on the reference scenario in the EC roadmap for 20502. It is characterized by a 
small growth (4.7%) of the final energy demand, while a small decrease (1.0%) in primary energy 
consumption is projected. Only the demand in the residential sector decreases while the others increase 
(see Figure 20). The increase in electricity generation is much larger: 44.6%. To match this increase, 
nuclear power increases with 40.7%, thermal power generation with only 1.5% and renewables sources 
(excl. biomass) more than triples. The share of renewable sources in the primary consumption increases 
from 9% to 20% as shown in Figure 21. In the left graph, the final demand per sector for the BAU end 
state is given. The primary consumption by fuel is shown in the right graph  
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Figure 20: BAU end state primary consumption by fuel and the final demand per sector 
A more detailed look to some sectors shows that the transport sector does not change significantly and 
thus stays mainly oil-based. The built environment (i.e. households and the tertiary sector) made a 
switch to more district heating, micro-CHP and heat pumps. However, the reduction in the demand for 
space-heating in households is limited to 17%, while the reduction in the tertiary sector is fully 
compensated by growth in this sector. Figure 21 shows the electricity production by source. In this end 
state, an increase of nuclear energy and wind energy is expected.  
 
Figure 21: Electricity production by source for the BAU end state. 
4.2.1 GAS end state 2050 
The GAS end state is based on the Long-term outlook for gas to 20353. Data for the year 2050 are 
obtained by linear extrapolation of the 2010 to 2035 data. This end state intensifies gas use in the 
residential and tertiary sector at the expense of coal, oil, wood, and electric stoves. On the other hand, 
buildings will be insulated and gas-fired heating equipment will become more efficient. This results in a 
stabilisation of the gas demand in this sector. The same goes for the industrial sector (see Figure 22). 
The power sector shows an absolute increase in gas demand. These gas-fired power plants are used to 
balance the electricity grid in countries with high percentage of intermittent sources. In addition, these 
plants reduce the CO2 emissions since they replace coal-fired power plants (see Figure 23). 
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Figure 22: Final consumption by sector (left) and primary consumption by fuel (right) for the 
GAS end state. 
 
Figure 23: Electricity production by source for the GAS end state. 
4.2.1 Three end states compared 
When the three end states are compared, the differences become clear. The energy reduction strategies 
in the RES end state and the high penetration of renewable results in a substantial lower CO2 emission of 
909 Mton compared with 2574 Mton in the BAU end state (see Figure 24). 
 
0
2500
5000
7500
10000
12500
15000
17500
20000
In
du
st
ry
R
es
id
en
tia
l
Te
rti
ar
y
Tr
an
sp
or
t
PJ
2010
2050
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
S
ol
id
s
O
il
N
at
ur
al
 g
as
N
uc
le
ar
R
E
S
PJ
2010
2050
0
500
1000
1500
N
uc
le
ar
S
ol
id
s
O
il
G
as
Bi
om
as
s
H
yd
ro
W
in
d 
O
ns
h.
W
in
d 
O
ffs
h.
So
la
r P
V
C
S
P
O
th
er
 R
E
S
TW
h
2010
2050
  
 
Energy Delta Gas Research – The Big Picture  Page 61
 
 
Figure 24: Comparison between the 2010 situation, the BAU, the RES, and the GAS end states 
on four indicators. The CO2 emission is linked to the right axis. 
Figure 25 shows the surface (on land or sea) needed for the renewable energy sources. Some remarks 
have to be made here. Solar PVs are for a large part installed on roofs. In the RES scenario however 
suitable roofs become scarcer so part of this land use is additional and cannot be used for other 
purposes. Wind onshore land use is the surface of the land that will be covered by wind turbines. The 
land beyond these turbines however can be used for other purposes like agriculture or solar PV farms. 
The land use for biomass is more complex. For first generation energy crops, like rape seed and sugar 
beets, average yields are used. For co-digestion, only 50% of the land use is attributed since often a 
part of the co-digestion materials come from agricultural residues. For energy crops used for gasification 
and as co-combustion in electric power plants, it is assumed that these crops are produced in an 
extensive way. This means that artificial fertilizer and pesticides are not used. The GAS scenario uses 
almost exclusively natural gas which explains the lowest land use for biomass. 
From Figure 25 it becomes clear that biomass has by far the largest impact on land use. The land use of 
onshore wind is about 200 times smaller. The total land use for biomass is about 50% of the agricultural 
area in the EU-27 countries. Thus, from an energy security point of view, this is not a desirable solution. 
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
4500
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
60000
70000
80000
90000
2010 BAU High RES High GAS
M
to
n 
C
O
2
PJ
Primary demand
Final demand
Total RES
CO2
  
 
Energy Delta Gas Research – The Big Picture  Page 62
 
 
Figure 25: Land and sea surface use for five renewable energy sources. The biomass land use 
is linked to the right axis. 
Key findings 
 Shifting energy use to land use is a consequence of the implementation of large amounts of 
renewable sources. This especially the case for biomass (see also Chapter 6)  
 The RES end state has the largest impact on end users. Electrification, as a result of the choices 
made in this end state, is reflected mainly in the transport (EV’s) and the residential and tertiary 
sectors (space heating).  
 On the RES and GAS end state, the industrial sector does not change much compared with the 
BAU end state. There are no major changes in the production structure and activities (which is a 
limitation).  
4.3 References 
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5 IMPLICATIONS ANALSYSIS GAS INFRASTRUCTURE 
Authors: Maurice Vos, Ivan Wapstra, Huub Roeterink – DNV GL 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter the results of analysis on the suitability of the existing European gas infrastructure to 
support the gas supply and demand situation under each of the three end states are presented. The 
analysis is conducted by means of a European gas infrastructure model. This model is explained in the 
next section. Afterwards, the assumptions regarding gas demand and supply are presented. The chapter 
ends by presenting and discussing the results of the analysis.  
5.2 The ENIGMA model 
5.2.1 Modelling approach 
For this project, the DNV GL gas model ENIGMA1 is used. The model is an aggregated representation of 
the existing European gas value chain. The model optimizes the dispatch of each infrastructure element 
in the gas value chain on a daily basis by minimizing the total cost while assuring that supply and 
demand are matched. The model can be used to test whether existing cross-border capacities and 
storage capacities are sufficient. Therefore, it includes actual cross-border capacities to represent the 
current pipeline system and all relevant European gas storages and LNG terminals. For the analysis of 
the end states, it also includes those projects, pipeline, LNG terminals and storages for which a final 
investment decision (FID) has been taken. Figure 26 illustrates the modelling approach used.  
 
Figure 26: Modelling approach 
Input for the model is gas demand and supply at a given year. By combining both the total demand per 
country and the actual profile per day for three consumer segments, gas flows can be assessed on a 
daily basis and bottlenecks in the European gas infrastructure system identified. Below the selected 
                                              
1 ENIGMA stands for the European Network Infrastructure and Gas Market Analysis Model. 
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consumer segments and profiles are discussed as well as the way they have been used as input for the 
analysis. 
5.2.2 Model topology 
The European gas infrastructure network is represented by an aggregated structure as it is too complex 
to fully include all details. The chosen structure aligns with the way the EU gas market is commercially 
set up: all market areas, i.e. the so-called entry-exit systems, have been included in the model. In each 
market area, gas storages, production facilities, LNG regasification terminals and interconnection 
capacities are aggregated into single elements. This topology is used for both years, i.e. 2012 and 2050, 
although in the latter additional gas infrastructure is included.  
 
Figure 27: Model Topology 
Figure 27 shows an example of the different elements included in the model for two market areas: 
domestic production, LNG production and regasification, piped imports, demand and storage. It also 
shows the interconnection capacity between the two market areas. All these elements are discussed in 
more detail in the next section. 
Each individual country is represented by a region. In total, the model spans 31 European countries 
which have gas demand. Also, major natural gas producing countries (e.g. Russia and Norway) are 
included but without demand (i.e. net exporters). In addition, the model contains a single LNG 
production region representing global LNG supply as an additional supply source. 
In most cases a region corresponds directly to a market area. This is the area where natural gas can be 
traded; market areas can include gas production, storage, LNG terminals and pipeline capacities to other 
Market
Area 2 
Domestic
Production
LNG re-gas
(incl. storage)
Piped 
imports
Storage
(Cavern, aquifer, 
depleted field)
Demand
(Daily profile 
by sector)
Interconnector 
(Forward / Backhaul)
Market 
Area 1
LNG
Production
LNG re-gas 
(incl. storage)
Piped 
imports
Storage
(Cavern, aquifer, 
depleted field)
Demand
(Daily profile 
by sector)
Domestic
Production
Connection to other 
market areas
Connection to other 
market areas
LNG
Production
  
 
Energy Delta Gas Research – The Big Picture  Page 65
 
market areas. In the model, market areas are represented by a single node in which gas is demand is 
centred and to which all gas infrastructure elements are connected. This representation is in line with the 
commercial set-up of (most) gas markets in the EU which usually have a single market area. Exceptions 
are France and Germany, which consists of more market areas (2 and 3 respectively) as shown in Figure 
28 below. 
 
 
Figure 28: Market areas per country – Germany & France 
5.2.3 Gas infrastructure 
ENIGMA contains the gas infrastructure as was in place in 2012. Furthermore, for the year 2050, it 
contains the gas infrastructure likely to be in place in 2050. Those projects for which an FID has already 
been taken are included. As discussed above, not all European pipelines are included in the model; the 
model is limited to interconnection capacities between market areas only. Below the included 
infrastructure elements are discussed.  
Gas transmission pipelines: Gas transmission pipelines are represented by interconnection points 
between market areas. Virtually all separate entry and exit points are included. In the model a 
distinction is made between three types: 
 Inter-region (Cross Border Lines): The inter-region pipelines reflect the capacities between 
regions. This type of pipeline is mostly used. 
 Intra-region: For those regions with more than one market area, the intra-region line connects 
the internal market areas.  
 Imports: Import pipelines represent the interconnection lines from major producing countries to 
a market area, are unidirectional and in general have a large capacity.  
Gas fields: In each region, all gas fields are aggregated to a single element with natural gas production. 
However, gas production in the Netherlands was split into two gas fields: the Groningen gas field and 
other smaller fields. This was done due to the fact that the Netherlands is an important European natural 
gas producer and the clear distinctive properties of the Groningen field compared to other gas fields (i.e. 
highly flexible). 
Underground gas storages: Underground gas storages are also aggregated in each market area. Each 
storage facility in the model is modelled with injection, withdrawal and volume capacities that match the 
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sum of the individual storages in the respective market areas. For Germany and France, gas storage 
facilities are first assigned to market areas and then aggregated into a single facility. 
LNG Terminals: Also, in case of multiple LNG regasification terminals, LNG terminals are aggregated 
into a single element for each market area. Further, LNG terminals are positioned on a separate node to 
clearly distinguish between liquefied natural gas and natural gas in gaseous state. This dedicated LNG 
node contains the LNG regasification terminal, its storage tanks and the interconnection with the market 
area node. Furthermore, this node is also connected to the global LNG market by means of an ‘import 
pipeline’. 
5.3 Model input 
This section discusses the input to the model. First, assumptions regarding gas supply are discussed. 
Secondly, gas demand is discussed. 
5.3.1 Gas supply 
With respect to gas supply, a distinction is made between pipeline imports and LNG imports. Under 
pipeline imports, gas from major producing countries and gas produced domestically in the EU is meant. 
LNG imports refer to gas imported by LNG terminals. 
Pipeline imports 
For all relevant gas producing countries connected by pipeline to or in Europe, the total maximum annual 
gas supply in the reference year 2012 and for the scenarios in 2050 are established. Each gas field 
receives the following four properties to take into account the physical/technical properties and the 
typical arrangements in gas production: 
1 Maximum annual volume: the maximum amount of natural gas that can be produced by the 
country 
2 Minimum daily volume: the minimum daily volume of natural gas that needs to be produced by 
the country 
3 Maximum daily volume: the upper limited of the daily volume that can be produced by the 
country 
4 Gas price: estimation of the price for gas 
LNG imports 
For LNG production a separate ‘gas field’ is modelled. This field is connected to all LNG terminals in the 
model. The LNG gas field has the similar properties as the gas fields mentioned above. In Table 7 below, 
the gas supply sources which are included are shown.  
Table 7: Gas supply sources 
Major Gas Producing Countries Domestic European Production 
Azerbaijan Austria 
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Major Gas Producing Countries Domestic European Production 
Algeria Bulgaria 
Libya Czech Republic 
Norway Germany 
Russia Denmark 
 Croatia 
Global LNG Ireland 
 Italy 
 Netherlands 
 Poland 
 Romania 
 Slovakia 
 United Kingdom 
 
5.3.2 Gas Demand 
The analysis of the European gas demand covers 31 countries, summarized in the table below.  
Table 8: Countries in the model with gas demand 
Country and Country code     
AT Austria EL Greece LT Lithuania RO Romania 
BE Belgium ES Spain LU Luxembourg SB Serbia 
BG Bulgaria FI Finland LV Latvia SE Sweden 
CH Switzerland FR France MK Macedonia SI Slovenia 
CZ Czech Republic HR Croatia NL Netherlands SK Slovakia 
DE Germany HU Hungary NO Norway TR Turkey 
DK Denmark IE Ireland PL Poland UK United Kingdom 
EE Estonia IT Italy PT Portugal   
 
A country’s total gas demand is split across three end-user segments: 
1 Gas distribution networks: These include the residential – commercial/tertiary customers. 
2 Industry: High energy intensive industry, with a direct connection to the gas transmission 
network. 
3 Power generation: Gas-fired power generation stations, with a direct connection to the gas 
transmission network. 
For 2012 this is based on the actual division of gas demand between the segments, for 2050 this is 
based on the scenario data.  
The daily demand profiles for each of these segments are combined to create an aggregated daily gas 
demand profile per market area. In this way, infrastructure utilization and gas flows behaviour can be 
analysed on a daily basis. 
5.4 Validation 
In order to validate the ENIGMA model, the model is run for the reference year 2012. The resulting gas 
flows are compared with the actual 2012 gas flows. The analysis is based on the total gas demand 
figures in 2012 (Eurostat) and a thorough analysis of gas profiles per segment, as described above. The 
reference year 2012 has been chosen on the basis of the availability of data. In the input side gas 
demand, supply and infrastructure are taken, while on the output side information on gas flows, prices 
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and usage of LNG and storages are examined. In order to validate the model, the output of the model 
should show a realistic behaviour of gas flows, prices, storages and LNG use.  
5.4.1 Gas demand 2012 
As described above, the total gas demand serves as one of the inputs to the model to assess the 
sufficiency of the existing capacities of the European gas infrastructure and resulting flows under 
different scenarios. Figure 29 below shows the total gas demand and its division across the various 
segments for the year 2012. Later in the report the results of the simulation of the year 2012 are 
compared with the results of the simulations as done for the three end states in the year 2050.  
 
 
Figure 29: Gas demand 2012 – gross inland consumption per country – in TWh 
It becomes instantly apparent that a few countries are responsible for the majority of the gas demand in 
Europe. These countries are Germany, Spain, France, Italy, Netherlands, Turkey and the United Kingdom. 
In order to gain a better understanding of the relative difference in demand by end-user segment the 
following figure is presented. 
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Figure 30: Gas Consumption 2012, per end-user segment – in % 
Gas demand profiles for each segment are input to the model. Therefore the actual daily gas profiles of 
several countries in 2012 have been reviewed and used to calibrate the way these profiles are derived in 
the model. This has been done in order to mimic the actual gas profiles of 2012. Furthermore, the gas 
profiles of 2012 form the foundation for those used for the year 2050. Below, the three different 
segments and their profiles are discussed in more detail. 
Gas Distribution Networks: Gas demand for distribution networks (residential & commercial 
customers) is predominantly based on the demand for heating. In order to describe the relationship 
between the gas demand for heating and the outside temperature, input data is based on a temperature 
formula as derived by the University of Munich1. This formula describes the relationship between 
residential & commercial gas demand and temperature. The analysis of historical gas demand for five 
European countries (in relation to actual temperatures) shows that the formula is applicable for all 
countries. Actual gas profiles (provided on the websites of several TSOs) have been compared with the 
temperature formula in order to determine the accuracy and applicability across regions in Europe. The 
formula’s parameters have been adjusted to better reflect the actual gas demand as observed in each 
country. 
Industry: The industry profiles for Italy, France and the Netherlands are examined. These three 
countries are chosen because of data availability from the national transmission operators regarding exit 
volumes to the industry. Gas demand between week and weekend days range between 20% less in Italy 
and 7.5% less during the weekend in France. An example of the average profile for the industry for is 
shown below for a 14 days period. For the industry segment an 85 – 15% week – weekend profile for all 
European countries is chosen.  
 
Figure 31: Example week-weekend industry profile – period 2 weeks 
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Power Generation: Gas demand for power generation is seen as quite influential on the required 
capacities of gas infrastructure. Gas fired power generation is viewed as the flexibility fuel to balance the 
increasing supply of renewable electricity generation. Based on the data from several national gas 
transmission operators a general profile for the year 2012 is deducted and several analyses on the 
generation profile are performed. It has been assumed that the power generation profile is directly 
correlated with temperature and that it might differ per region in Europe (North and South). For example, 
demand spikes are expected during winter in northern Europe and during summer in Southern European 
countries due to the use of air conditioning. A week-weekend profile is, just like the industry segment, 
could reasonably capture the overall profile for the power generation sector in 2012. This simplified 
profile is only used for the 2012 situation and is shown in the figure below. For the analysis of the end 
states, the results of simulations conducted with an electricity market model are used as input. 
 
 
Figure 32: Example week-weekend Power Generation Profile – period 2 weeks 
5.4.2 Model 2012 outputs 
The model provides a number of outcomes. For the validation of the base year, the behaviour of the gas 
flows and storages are analysed specifically. 
Gas flows: Gas flow behaviour can be represented in graphs showing the gas flow through a pipeline for 
one year. This so called ‘flow profile’ is characterized by two indicators: (1) the load factor and (2) the 
transported volume. The load factor is a utilization indicator and expresses the use of the pipeline 
compared to the maximum flow. The transported volume indicates the amount of gas that is actually 
transported through the pipeline during the year under consideration.  
In the graph below the results of the simulations for the year 2012 are shown using the two indicators. 
The colour of the arrow corresponds to the load factor whereas the thickness correspondents to the 
transported volume. Although there are deviations in the individual pipeline gas flow indicators compared 
to the actual situation of 2012, the European gas network flow pattern is perceived as logical and 
representative by the researchers. 
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Figure 33: Model results for gas flows for the year 2012 
Storage: Use of gas storage can be represented in graphs showing the storage level over a certain 
period. The ENIGMA model provides the daily storage level over a period of one year. This so called 
‘storage profile’ is characterized by two indicators providing quantitative information on the utilization 
level:  
 Buffer capacity use: The buffer capacity use indicates which part of the maximum buffer volume 
is actually used during a certain period.  
 Buffer frequency use: The buffer frequency use indicates how many times an equal amount to 
the maximum buffer volume is sent out during the same period. 
Formulas and examples of these two indicators are provided in the box below. 
Formulas for ‘buffer capacity use’ and ‘buffer frequency use’ 
 
  ܾݑ݂݂݁ݎ	ܿܽ݌ܽܿ݅ݐݕ	ݑݏ݁ ൌ 	 ௏್ೠ೑೑೐ೝି௏೘೔೙௏್ೠ೑೑೐ೝ ݔ100% 
  ܾݑ݂݂݁ݎ	݂ݎ݁ݍݑ݁݊ܿݕ	ݑݏ݁ ൌ ௏ೞ೐೙೟	೚ೠ೟௏್ೠ೑೑೐ೝ ݔ
ଵ
∆௧ 
  ௕ܸ௨௙௙௘௥ ൌ 	ܾݑ݂݂݁ݎ	ܿܽ݌ܽܿ݅ݐݕ	ሾ݉ܿ݉ሿ 
  ௠ܸ௜௡ 	ൌ ݉݅݊݅݉ݑ݉	ܾݑ݂݂݁ݎ	ݒ݋݈ݑ݉݁	ሾ݉ܿ݉ሿ 
  ௦ܸ௘௡௧	௢௨௧ 	ൌ ݐ݋ݐ݈ܽ	ݏ݁݊ݐ	݋ݑݐ	ݒ݋݈ݑ݉݁	݋ݒ݁ݎ	ܽ	ݐ݅݉݁	݌݁ݎ݅݋݀	∆ݐ	ሾ݉ܿ݉ሿ 
  ∆ݐ ൌ ݐ݅݉݁	݌݁ݎ݅݋݀	ሾݕݎሿ	 
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To illustrate the gas storage behaviour with these indicators, four examples are provided. 
 
 
 
 
In the graph below, the resulting storage behaviour according to ENIGMA for the year 2012 is shown. 
The colour of the doughnut corresponds to buffer frequency use (blue = low, red = high) whereas the 
number correspondents to buffer capacity use. Storage behaviour could not be validated for the majority 
of storages in 2012 due to the lack of data. However, the resulting behaviour of gas storages is 
perceived by the researches as typical. 
  
 
Energy Delta Gas Research – The Big Picture  Page 73
 
 
Figure 34: Model results for storage use for the year 2012 
5.5 Description of three end states as input to ENIGMA 
In this section, the conversion of the thee end states such that they can be used as input for the ENIGMA 
model is treated. First, the scenarios that are used as a basis for quantifying the end states are 
discussed. Secondly, each end state is discussed in more detail separately. 
5.5.1 Selection of scenarios 
In order to demonstrate the ‘big picture of the European gas infrastructure in 2050’ three energy 
scenarios for 2050 are chosen to assess the impact on the European gas infrastructure in 2050. The 
scenarios are a practical implementation of each of the three identified end states. The results of model 
runs for these three scenarios offer insights into the possible gas flows and capacities matching supply 
and demand in 2050 under the identified end states. As the scenarios correspond to the end states, they 
have been named in a similar way: 
 (high) renewable energy scenario (RES) 
 business as usual scenario (BAU) 
 (high) gas scenario (GAS) 
The first two scenarios are based on the energy scenarios developed for the European Commission by 
the University of Athens. They have used their PRIMES (Price-Induced Market Equilibrium System) 
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model2 to develop a range of scenarios; of these scenarios the ones most typical for the RES and BAU 
end states are selected for the purposes of this study. 
The third scenario is chosen to represent a situation in which gas demand is higher than present levels 
as is the case in the GAS end state. Such a scenario is not part of the scenarios that have been 
developed for the EC. However, Eurogas has created a gas favourite scenario for Europe and this 
scenario is used to represent the GAS end state.  
 
Table 9: Scenario selection 
Scenario Gas demand 
compared to 2012 
Expected impact 
on infrastructure 
and utilization 
 Source 
High Renewable  Significantly Lower High  EC – PRIMES 
Business as Usual Comparable Low  EC – PRIMES 
High Gas Significantly Higher High  Eurogas 
 
5.5.2 Basics characteristics demand 2050 
For each of the three scenarios, the total gas demand and its division over the three end-user segments 
are shown in the graph below. Furthermore, total gas demand and its division for the year 2012 are 
shown as well to offer a comparison between each scenario and the 2012 situation.  
 
Figure 35: Total Gas Demand 2012 – 2050 scenarios comparison - Bcm 
The total gas demand for each of the 31 countries under the three scenarios and the 2012 situation is 
provided in the next figure. 
                                              
2 PRIMES provides detailed projections of energy demand, supply, prices and investment to the future, covering the entire energy system 
including emissions for each individual European country and for Europe-wide trade of energy commodities. 
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
142
(31%)
Actual 2012
494
141
(29%)
196
(40%)
156
(32%) 89
(37%)
BAU 2050
145
(32%)
689
170
(37%)
+40%
239
-52%
457-8%
HG 2050
313
(45%)
193
(28%)
183
(26%)
RES 2050
76
(32%)
74
(31%)
Industry
Distribution Networks
Power Generation
  
 
Energy Delta Gas Research – The Big Picture  Page 75
 
 
 
Figure 36: Total Gas Demand 2012 – 2050 scenarios country comparison – Bcm 
5.5.3 Gas supply 2050 
For each of the scenarios considered, gas supply needs to align with gas demand. For 2050, it is 
assumed that most indigenous resources in the EU have been depleted and that the majority of gas 
supplies should be imported. Imports from Norway, Algeria, Libya, Azerbaijan and Iran are capped. 
Therefore, the combination of Russian gas and LNG is pivotal. The following has been assumed for each 
end state. 
 RES 
Under the RES end state, LNG supplies are pegged at the presently (low) levels. It is assumed 
that gas demand will drop over the years and that volumes supplied by LNG will increase nor 
drop as compared to present levels, where present levels are at an historic low. This assumption 
aligns with the observation made in Chapter 2, where it was noted that Europe might be heading 
towards an RES end state whereas the rest of the world is more inclined to move to a BAU or 
GAS end state. As a consequence, it was assumed that LNG is not available for, nor required by, 
Europe to satisfy its declining gas demand. Russian gas supplies are assumed to fill the gap. 
 BAU 
For this end state, it is assumed that Russian supplies match Russian export capacity (by pipeline) 
to Europe as it currently exists. This means that there are no Russian gas volumes available for 
TurkStream. Also, no additional export infrastructure needs to be built in order to ship these 
volumes to Europe. Consequently, the remaining volumes are supplied by LNG. The share of LNG 
compared to the share of Russian gas is significantly larger as compared to that under RES. 
 GAS 
For GAS end state, supplies from LNG and Russia are balanced in such a way that the existing 
infrastructure and projects for which an FID has been taken (i.e. LNG regasification terminals 
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and Russian pipelines to Europe) are optimally used. This also means that, for example, no 
additional LNG terminals are needed when there would be still export potential by pipeline from 
Russia. It is noted though, that the gas demand in 2050 is higher than the combined annual 
throughput of the regasification terminals and existing Russian export pipelines together. 
Therefore, the assumption is made that NordStream 3 and 4 will be built. These are included in 
the model – for this particular end state – as well. 
This results in a break down per supply source as shown in the following figure. 
 
Figure 37: Gas supply 2012 – 2050 scenarios comparison – Bcm  
 
5.5.4 Gas infrastructure 2050 
The changes in the gas infrastructure for 2050 compared to 2012 are based on the Ten Year Network 
Development Plan 2013 from ENTSOG2. Only projects for which an FID has been taken are included.  
 Pipelines:  
South Stream II (Turkey), Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), Ostsee Pipeline AnbindungsLeitung 
(OPAL). 
 Other interconnection capacities between market areas:  
GRT GAZ-Sud and TIGF (VTP), Belgium and GRT GAZ-Nord (Blaregnies), Belgium and 
Netherlands (Zelzate), Bulgaria and Greece (Kula), Germany and Denmark (Ellund), Denmark 
and Sweden (Dragor), France TIGF and Spain (Larrau and Biriatou), Italia and Switzerland 
(Griespass), Italia and Slovenia (Gorizia), Netherlands and Germany NCG (Oude Statenzijl), 
Romania and Bulgaria (Negru Voda and Ruse), Hungaria and Slovakia (Balassagyarmat). 
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 LNG regasification terminals: 
Spain (Bilbao), France (Dunkirk), Lithuania (Klaipeda), Poland (Swinoujscie), Italia (offshore 
Tuscany), Greece (Revythoussa)  
 Storage:  
The Netherlands (Bergermeer), 3x Italy (Bordolano, San Potito e Cotignola, enhancement of 
existing storages), Portugal (Carriço), France (Hauterives), 2x UK (Holford, Stublach), 5x Poland 
(Kosakowo, Mogilno, Brzeznica, Husow, Wierzchowice).  
 
5.5.5 High Renewable Energy Scenario (RES) 
Energy mix: A main source for the description of RES is the report titled “Impact assessment part 2/2 
2011” accompanying the Energy Roadmap 20503. RES is a scenario which strives to fulfil the objective of 
the European Council to attain at least 80% decarbonisation in 2050 compared to 1990. It implicates 85% 
energy related CO2 reductions and 80% reduction of GHG emissions in 2050 (1990 = 100). 
RES incorporates substantial reduction of final energy demand by using energy efficient technologies and 
a high penetration of renewable primary energy sources. In the figure below the projected energy mix 
for RES is shown. 
 
Figure 38: Energy Mix in 2050 for RES  
Gas demand: The next figure shows the gas demand for the three sectors for each of the 31 European 
countries. It has been derived as follows: 
 The total gas demand for EU27 is based on “Impact assessment part 2/2 2011” report on page 
72. 
 The gas demand in each EU27 country is assumed to have the same share (%) in the EU27 total 
gas demand as in the BAU. 
 The gas demand for the other countries is adjusted with an average EU27 demand growing 
factor compared to 2012. 
 The gas demand for each of the three sectors is assumed to have the same sector share (%) as 
in the BAU. 
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Figure 39: Gas Demand 2050 - RES – Gross inland demand per country – in Bcm  
It becomes again instantly apparent that still a few countries are responsible for the majority of the gas 
demand in Europe. These countries are the same as in 2012: Germany, Spain, France, Italy, Netherlands, 
Turkey and the United Kingdom. In order to gain a better understanding of the relative difference in 
demand by end-user segment the following figure is presented. 
 
Figure 40: Gas Consumption 2050 – RES - per end-user segment – in % 
Gas demand profiles 2050 
 Distribution Networks: For the end-user profile of users connected to the distribution networks, 
the same temperature formula as in 2012 was applied. The estimated volumes are based on the 
scenario itself. 
 Industry: For the gas profile for industrial gas demand, it is also decided to use the week-
weekend profile which was derived on the basis of the actual demand profile in 2012. Again the 
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volumes are based on the scenario and as such only the profile has been kept the same. No 
evidence is found that the industry profile would change in our PESTE analysis.  
 Power Generation: The end-user profiles for gas demand for power generation are based on an 
internal DNV GL technical report ‘Electrifying the future’ (2014)4 for the European countries. 
Based on the expected electricity demand for the selected scenarios and the assumed installed 
gas-fired power stations, a country power generation profile for electricity has been developed, 
with corresponding gas demand. 
5.5.6 Business As Usual Scenario (BAU) 
Energy mix: A main source for the description of BAU is the report titled “Trends to 2050, reference 
scenario 2013”. It is a scenario which simulates the energy balances and GHG emissions trends under 
the trends and policies as adopted by the Member States by spring 2012. 
In 2050, perspective emissions continue to decrease primarily driven by developments in power 
generation. This implies 46% energy related CO2 reductions and 44% reduction of GHG emissions in 
2050 (1990 = 100). 
The BAU scenario takes into account the highly volatile energy import prices. The scenario includes the 
2012 legislation promoting energy efficiency. The reduction in final energy demand is marginal compared 
to the 2005 situation. 
 
Figure 41: Energy Mix – BAU -2050 
Gas demand: In the next figure, gas demand per segment for each country under the BAU scenarios is 
presented. These figures have been derived as follows: 
 The total gas demand and the gas demand in the power sector for each of the EU28 countries 
are based on “Trends to 2050, reference scenario 2013”, pages 85-146. 
 The gas demand in the other two sectors for each EU-28 country is assumed to have the same 
ratio as in 2012. 
 The gas demand for the other countries is adjusted with an average EU28 demand growing 
factor compared to 2012. 
 Gas demand in the sectors for the other countries follows the same pattern as in 2012. 
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Figure 42: Gas Demand 2050 - BAU – Gross inland demand per country – in Bcm  
In order to gain a better comparison of the relative difference in demand by end-user segment the 
following figure is presented. 
 
Figure 43: Gas Consumption 2050 – RES - per end-user segment – in % 
 
5.5.7 High Gas Scenario (GAS) 
Energy mix: A main source for the description of the GAS end state is the report titled “Long-Term 
outlook for gas to 2035” from Eurogas 20135. It is a gas markets driven scenario which anticipates a 
rebalancing of the energy mix towards more renewable and slightly less nuclear electricity, together with 
restored economic growth and a high rate of innovation in energy-efficient equipment (rapid 
development of efficient gas appliances in home and office heating). 
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The scenario assumes that the qualities of gas will still lead customers in all sectors to want to keep 
using it. The cleanliness, controllability, low carbon dioxide content and flexibility in use of gas will 
continue to create demand in both difficult and favourable market and policy conditions. 
The contribution of gas in the energy mix in 2050 is assumed by the authors of the report to be the 
same as in 2035. This implies a 30% share of gas in the energy mix. 
 
 
Figure 44: Energy Mix in 2050 for GAS 
Gas demand: The next figure shows the gas demand for the three sectors for each of the 31 countries. 
It has been derived as follows: 
 The total gas demand and the gas demand in the three sectors for the EU27 countries together 
are based on extrapolation of the gas demand in the three sectors from 2035 to 2050. 
 The gas demand for the other countries is adjusted with an average EU27 demand grow factor 
compared to 2012. 
 The gas sector demand per country is adjusted with the grow factor of the total sector demand 
for the 31 countries in 2050. 
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Figure 45: Gas Demand 2050 – Gas – Gross inland demand per country – in Bcm  
In order to gain a better comparison of the relative difference in demand by end-user segment the 
following figure is presented. 
 
Figure 46: Gas Consumption 2050 – Gas - per end-user segment – in % 
5.6 Scenario results 
The results from the analysis will be captured with two main output categories: flows and storages. For 
each scenario the main observations and implications for the European gas infrastructure and its 
utilization is briefly discussed. 
5.6.1 Gas Flows 
In order to show the results of the model, a graphic representation of the European network is used. The 
figure below shows the direction of flows, volumes and the load factor of the interconnectors between 
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the defined market areas in Europe. The market areas are represented by grey circles. The brown circles 
indicate LNG regasification terminals. The arrows show the origin and direction of the gas flows. The 
colour of the arrows denotes the load factor. The thickness of the arrow represents the transported 
yearly volume. 
 
Figure 47: Model results for gas flows for RES 
From the above figure several conclusions can be drawn regarding the gas flows and utilization of 
pipelines in Europe. Below the most noteworthy changes, compared with the modelled 2012 situation, 
are listed: 
1. The most eye catching change is the switch of Russian gas transported to Europe through the 
Ukrainian transmission system and the Yamal pipeline to the North Stream and OPAL pipelines.  
2. This also shows Russian gas being transmitted through Ukraine, Romania and Bulgaria to Turkey. 
In 2050, gas flows in the opposite direction (sourced from Azerbaijan) to Bulgaria and Romania. 
3. A third effect of the smaller volumes through the Ukraine transmission grid is the reverse flow 
that occurs on the TAG pipeline. In 2012, there was a large flow from Austria to Italy; however 
in 2050 under the RES scenario the model predicts a much smaller flow in the opposite direction.  
4. The two new infrastructure projects that have been included for 2050, namely TurkStream and 
TAP, are only limitedly used, although flows through the Ukraine have been drastically lowered. 
This is partly due to the low demand in general compared with 2012 and the alternative large 
capacities to transport Russian gas into Europe. Although volumes imported from Azerbaijan are 
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increasing, most of these volumes are consumed in Turkey, and therefore not transported 
further into Europe by using for example the TAP.  
5. With respect to the situation in North-West Europe the most notable change is the decrease of 
Norwegian gas supplied to Germany and the Netherlands through the Emden receiving terminal. 
Furthermore a decrease in the volume and load factor of the BBL is observed as well as a reverse 
flow compared to 2012 of the IUK. 
6. Looking at the situation in Southern Europe the most notable change is the decrease in load 
factor of the pipeline infrastructure in Iberia.  
In the figure below, the gas flows for BAU are provided. 
 
Figure 48: Model results for gas flows for BAU 
Compared to RES scenario, the switch back from the gas flows though the Ukrainian gas transmission 
system instead of North Stream is most striking. In general, the utilization of infrastructure is higher 
than in RES because of the higher gas demand and therefore gas supply.  
As a consequence of the declined indigenous gas resources, LNG and Russian gas supply to Europe is 
expected to increase substantially compared to the 2012 situation. 
There is no need identified to build additional infrastructure on top of the infrastructure already in place 
and planned in the BAU scenario. 
In the figure below, the gas flows for the GAS end state are provided. 
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Figure 49: Model results for gas flows for HG 
In a similar fashion as the two other end states – RES en BAU – the implications for the European gas 
infrastructure under the GAS end state are assessed. In contrast to the previous two end states, the GAS 
end state has far fetching implications for today’s existing and planned gas infrastructure. This is 
attributed to two main factors: 
1. Strong growth in European gas demand 
2. Declining indigenous gas production leaving the majority of gas supply (>80%) restricted to two 
main sources, namely LNG and Russia 
In order to match demand with supply, several large infrastructure projects need to be developed. Most 
notably are the doubling of Nord Stream to four parallel pipelines, the completion of TurkStream and the 
TAP. As the major gas markets are expected to (still) be in North West Europe, reverse flow possibilities 
in the Italian grid towards Switzerland and even into the Netherlands at the start of the TENP pipeline 
are required. Besides these larger projects, the need for additional interconnection capacity between 
Germany and two neighbouring, smaller gas markets is required as well: both cross-border capacity 
between Germany and Denmark, and Germany and Luxembourg need to be increased. Apart from these 
projects, the analysis shows that no further increase in the European gas infrastructure is required. 
Besides an increase in pipeline capacity, there seems a need for additional LNG import capacity in the UK 
(doubling of present import capacity), the Netherlands (about 1.5 times current capacity) and the south 
of France (about twice as much).  
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5.6.2 Storage 
In this section, the result with respect to storage utilization are presented. Similar to the section on gas 
pipelines, the RES end state is discussed first. After the results of the RES end state are presented, the 
BAU and GAS end states are discussed. 
 
Figure 50: Model results for storage for RES 
From Figure 50 above it is clear that the storage infrastructure in 2050 is sufficient to cover the supply-
demand fluctuations. The gas storage capacity use is highest in North-Western Europe, Scandinavia, 
Poland, Portugal and South-East Europe. The frequency use is by far the highest in Sweden, followed by 
UK, The Netherlands and Turkey. It is striking that the storage use in South and Central Europe is 
relatively low. 
Compared to the 2012 situation, the gas storage use in UK and Portugal is more intensive under the RES 
end state. The storage use in Netherlands, Italy and Balkan is less intensive, whereas the use in South-
East Europe is more intensive, except for Turkey. 
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Figure 51: Model results for storage for BAU 
The storage infrastructure in 2050 is expected to be sufficient to cover the supply-demand fluctuations in 
the BAU scenario. The gas storage capacity use is highest in North-Western Europe, Scandinavia, and 
South-East Europe (Balkan). The frequency use is by far the highest in Sweden, followed by UK, The 
Netherlands and Turkey.  
In general, storage capacity use in BAU is higher than in the RES end state. It is striking that the storage 
use in Portugal, Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania is low compared to the RES scenario. 
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Figure 52: Model results for storage HG 
Storage capacity in the GAS end state is expected to be required to increase in the following countries: 
 Austria will see the need to a slight increase in storage capacity, just as in Bulgaria. The 
additionally required capacity is however fairly limited compared to current storage capacities 
and to the European situation as a whole. 
 In Croatia, the required storage capacity is expected to triple in order to match supply with 
demand. 
 In the UK, storage capacity is expected to double. 
 In Romania and Italy, storage capacity needs to be increased as well, but by far less as in the UK. 
In both countries, the need for storage is expected to be around 40% and 20% higher 
respectively. 
5.7 Conclusions 
The conclusions of the research are presented in this section. Three end states have been selected to 
capture the Big Picture for gas in 2050: Business As Usual (BAU), High Renewable Energy (RES) and 
High Gas (GAS). 
To operationalize the three scenarios, a dedicated model was built. The model has been validated against 
actual 2012 data.  
Below, the main conclusions for the effects on gas infrastructure for the three scenarios are provided. 
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RES 
 The gas infrastructure currently in place and planned is sufficient to match gas demand and 
supply in Europe. Although the gas demand fluctuations in the power generation sector tend to 
increase, the pipeline capacities and the storages are adequate to accommodate these 
fluctuations. 
 The utilization of both gas pipelines and gas storages will decrease in general compared to the 
modelled 2012 situation. However, the utilization of Nord Stream and OPAL are expected to 
increase substantially at the expense of gas transported through Ukraine.  
 Compared to the 2012 modelled situation, gas storage use in UK and Portugal is in RES 2050 
more intensive. The storage use in Netherlands, Italy and Balkan is less intensive, whereas the 
use in South-East Europe is more intensive, except for Turkey. 
BAU  
 The gas infrastructure currently in place and planned is sufficient to match gas demand and 
supply in Europe for this scenario. As a consequence of the declined indigenous gas resources, 
LNG and Russian gas supply to Europe is expected to increase substantially compared to the 
2012 situation. 
 Compared to RES scenario, the switch back from the gas flows though the Ukrainian gas 
transmission system instead of North Stream is most striking. 
 Gas storage use is highest in North-Western Europe, Scandinavia, and South-East Europe 
(Balkan). In general, storage use in BAU is higher than in the RES end state. It is striking that 
the storage use in Portugal, Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania is low compared to the RES. 
GAS  
 In the GAS end state, gas demand is substantially higher than in the other scenarios. The gas 
infrastructure currently in place and planned is not sufficient to match gas demand and supply in 
Europe. LNG and Russian gas supply are by far the dominant gas sources for Europe. 
 In order to match demand with supply, several large infrastructure projects need to be 
developed. Most notably are the doubling of Nord Stream to four parallel pipelines, the 
completion of TurkStream and the TAP.  
 Storage capacity in the GAS end state is expected to be required to substantially increase in the 
UK, moderately increase in Romania and Italy, and slightly increase in Austria, Bulgaria, and 
Croatia.  
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6 CASE STUDY: BIOMASS AVAILABILITY AND BIO CNG AS A 
TRANSPORT FUEL IN EUROPE  
Author: Jan Hessels Miedema– Rijksuniversiteit Groningen 
6.1 Introduction 
In order for Europe to end up in a sustainable energy system the dependency on carbon should be 
reduced and cycles should be closed. Biomass is thought to have large potential to contribute to a 
sustainable energy system. This potential is clearly visible in the end states described in Chapter 3. This 
large potential for biomass is also visible in the renewable energy statistics provided by Eurostat 
(2014a)1, which show that about two-thirds of the current renewable energy supply in Europe originates 
from biomass. This chapter is used to focus on the limitations and implications when it comes to the 
production and use of biomass in Europe. First the shares of biomass are derived from the three energy 
mix end states and converted to a European geographical scale, after which the required domestic (i.e., 
within European borders) production is estimated. A case study was done in order to generate insights in 
the economic and some environmental implications of the production of these biomass quantities. The 
economic part is assessed with a bottom-up approach; the environmental impact is assessed with a top-
down approach. The chapter is finalised with a conclusion and discussion in which the results are put into 
perspective and the limitations and implications for biomass applied for energetic purposes are 
elaborated upon. The discussion is partly used to analyse the economic incentive for farmers and to also 
include biomass originating from other sectors than agriculture. 
6.2 Biomass availability 
Based on the energy mix end states described in Chapter 3 the contribution of biomass over time was 
estimated. This research assumes that 10% of the globally available biomass can be available for 
energetic purposes in Europe, since this is roughly Europe’s share in the global consumption. From the 
three end states the upper and lower boundaries were taken for energy carriers with an organic origin; 
together with the average, this data is displayed in Figure 54 which shows the estimated availability of 
biomass for the EU28 until 2050. Remarkable is that the highest biomass contribution is in the High Gas 
end state. This is due to the assumptions made in Chapter 3 regarding the clustering of the end states 
and the higher estimated energy demand in the gas end state. It does however, match with the idea of 
natural gas as an enabler of the energy transition with a large role for biomass.  
Eurostat (2014b)2 shows that on average, the import dependency of the EU28 as a whole is in the order 
of 55%. Therefore this research assumes that 45% of the biomass should be produced domestically. This 
value is arbitrary, but seems to be the obvious choice, since arguments to increase or decrease the 
assumed value are hard to quantify. For 2020 this assumption would mean an annual production of 2.6 
EJ, when looking at the High Res end state. Assuming an average biomass yield of 8 ton dry matter ha-1 
with an energy density of 18 MJ kg-1, the required area within the EU would be over 18 Mha. This is over 
10% of the agricultural and grassland area currently in use in the EU27. Figure 53 gives an overview of 
the land use in the EU27 in Mha as an illustration. When looking at the data provided by Eurostat it 
appears that the actual consumption of bioenergy was 3.6 EJ in 2012 (Eurostat, 2014c)3. This is 0.4 EJ 
more than the average as estimated in the BAU end state (see figure 39); it is 2.2 EJ and 2.6 EJ less 
than respectively estimated in the RES and GAS end state. It therefore appears that the BAU scenario is 
currently the most realistic one.  
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Figure 53: Land use in the EU27 in Mha 
(Source: Eurostat, 2014d)4 
Case study bioCNG 
When looking at the carbon dependency of different energy consuming sectors, it seems that the largest 
challenge to overcome is the shift to clean transport. Hence, transport fuels require a high energy 
density, which gives the advantage to liquid fuels. Battery driven transport appears to have opportunities, 
but battery weight, cost kWh-1 and charging time are still limiting factors. Liquid biofuels, when produced 
sustainable, therefore offer possibilities to reduce carbon emissions from transport during a transitional 
period towards a sustainable supply system. Therefore, this research zooms in on transport, since the 
economic value of one unit of energy in the form of a liquid transport fuel has more economic value than 
electric power or a natural gas substitute. This challenge is dependent on the design of a biomass supply 
system that is seen as sustainable and on the economic feasibility of such a system. A methane based 
fuel might have opportunities during a transition phase from fossil transport fuels to a carbon neutral 
transport sector. When the methane based fuel has a renewable origin there seems to be an even larger 
opportunity as a transition fuel, since it is part of the short carbon cycle. This chapter therefore aims to 
find the limitations and possibilities for compressed natural gas (CNG) derived from synthetic natural gas 
(SNG) produced through biomass gasification. A chain analysis focussing on energy efficiency is 
undertaken and it is tried to pinpoint the sensitive parts of the supply chain. Subsequently, the 
availability of the required quantities of biomass is assessed. 
6.3 Methodology 
Based on the model displayed in Figure 55 the energy efficiency and energy ratio of two chains are 
determined. Subsequently, the designed model is discussed, followed by the performance indicators, 
scenarios and the boundaries. The difference in these two chains is determined by the biomass 
production system, which can be intensive (scenario 1) or extensive (scenario 2). An intensive system 
requires substantial fossil inputs, mainly from artificial fertiliser and crop protection agents; an extensive 
system does not require such inputs. The result is that an intensive system requires less agricultural 
area and less transport for forwarding the harvested biomass to a central point, but generally has a 
larger environmental impact due to the extra fossil inputs in the system.  
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Figure 54: The estimated biomass availability in the EU28 
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6.4 Model 
In order to find the sensitive parts of the chain a model is used as displayed in Figure 55. This chapter 
focuses on the sensitivity of the biomass production system. This image and the applied method are 
taken from Miedema et al., (2014). In the model applied for this chapter an extra conversion step is 
added to the model where SNG is compressed, before it is further transported to the end user as CNG. 
For compression of SNG an efficiency of 96.6% is applied based on Wang and Huang (2000)5. 
 
Figure 55: Model overview containing the most important steps in the biomass-to-end use-
chain. 
The model calculates the energy used in biomass production, harvesting, forwarding, pre-treatment and 
storage in the upstream part of the chain. The midstream part of the chain takes into account the 
conversion efficiency from biomass to CNG after which the distance that can be driven by the end user 
on one hectare is determined, in the downstream part of the chain. A brief assessment of the availability 
in the EU28 is elaborated upon in the discussion section. 
6.4.1 Scenarios and performance indicators 
In this case study the capacity of the gasification plant is assumed to be constant throughout the 
scenarios at 800 MW. This is a high capacity and therefore the value of 800 MW should be interpreted as 
8 plants of 100 MW. This value is applied in order to make it easily comparable with existing fossil power 
plants. The biomass produced for CNG is poplar. 
This chapter estimates the effect of two biomass production systems; this can be an extensive (scenario 
1) or intensive (scenario 2) system. The choice for the analysis of two production systems is required, 
since literature discussing biomass production efficiency such as Nonhebel (2002)6, does not continue 
after the harvest. Based on these boundaries, she concludes that intensive systems have the highest 
energetic efficiency and therefore have a preference over extensive systems. When considering a system 
with broader boundaries than Nonhebel (2002), as this chapter does the results might change. When 
including the forwarding distance of biomass to a central point and conversion of the biomass, these 
insights might differ. With forwarding this research specifically means the required transport distance to 
a central point where pre-treatment such as drying can take place before the biomass is transported 
over longer distances towards a conversion plant. Hence, an extensive system requires more land due to 
lower yields, resulting in larger forwarding distances compared to an intensive system. Therefore the 
optimal (from an energetic and environmental viewpoint) production system is also dependent on 
whether the supply chain uses centralised or decentralised conversion and the assumed transport 
distance required for forwarding. 
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The energetic performance of the systems is measured by determining the energetic efficiency and the 
energy ratio (see equation 1 and 2).  
ܧܧ	 ൌ ா	௖௡௚ିா	௙௢௦௦௜௟	௜௡௣௨௧ா	௕௜௢௠௔௦௦ 	            (1) 
 
ܧܴ	 ൌ ா	௖௡௚ா	௙௢௦௦௜௟	௜௡௣௨௧                          (2) 
 
Ecng = The energy contained in the SNG delivered to the grid (MJ) 
Efossil input = The amount of fossil energy used in the upstream process (MJ) 
Ebiomass = The energy contained in the biomass at harvest (MJ) 
A third indicator is the distance that can be travelled with the net energy produced on one hectare (km 
ha-1) in the two analysed supply systems. The net energy produced is calculated by taking the gross 
energy produced in the biomass and subtracting the fossil inputs and losses due to conversion from it. 
The fossil input for the forwarding distance of biomass is dependent on the area and given by equation 3 
and based on a biomass production system displayed in Figure 56. The distance travelled per hectare is 
further discussed in Section 6.5.1. 
 
Figure 56: Biomass production system with conversion technology in the centre 
 
ܦ݉ܽݔ ൌ ଵ	ଶ 	√ܣݎ݁ܽ             (3) 
Half of the value of Dmax is the average transport distance; return trips are included and therefore 
Dmax represents the total transport distance. For the extensive system (scenario 2) this chapter 
assumes that the forwarding distance quadruples compared to the intensive system, since return trips 
are included. 
6.4.2 Boundaries 
Both scenarios have the same chain trajectories. They differ in the use of artificial fertilizer and the use 
of pesticides for crop protection. Furthermore, the difference in yield affects the required area for poplar 
production. Poplar is chosen since it has a high energy yield compared to other energy crops. This 
chapter does not take into account the energy used for consumption of water for irrigation, which can be 
a substantial amount (Nonhebel, 2002). Nonhebel (2002) shows that irrigated systems can have a four 
times higher yield, but require six times the input resulting in a lower efficiency. Therefore irrigation is 
not taken into account. When it comes to storage and pre-treatment and conversion, the indirect energy 
for the construction of the facilities is not taken into account. The indirect energy required for 
construction of facilities is assumed to be negligible when taking the total lifetime of storage and 
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conversion facilities into account. Therefore storage only includes loading and unloading movements. 
When it comes to pre-treatment, only direct energy consumed for chipping is taken into account; drying 
is assumed to be done passive in an ambient environment. The midstream part of the chain calculates 
the conversion to SNG and subsequently to CNG. The downstream part of the chain is the same for both 
scenarios, and therefore only the end use (i.e., combustion in a natural gas driven vehicle) is taken into 
account. Therefore the possible difference in local distribution of biogas compared to transmission over 
longer distances for natural gas is not taken into account. The basic line of reasoning is that a 
gasification plant should be located near a natural gas injection point, resulting in a similar downstream 
supply system. Hence, in the end it is of little interest whether a methane molecule with an organic 
origin is actually combusted in a CNG driven vehicle or in another sector, as long as it is allocated to 
transport fuel in statistics. 
6.5 Results 
6.5.1 Land use and forwarding distance 
The required area for biomass production is dependent on the biomass demand and the average poplar 
yield. The demand for biomass is dependent on the capacity of the gasification plant which is in this case 
800 MW. This requires 914 MW of biomass when applying a conversion efficiency from biomass to SNG 
of 70% and an uptime of 80%. The energy density of poplar on a wet basis is taken as 12 MJ kg-1. The 
energy density is 17 MJ kg-1 after drying towards a moisture content of 20%. This results in a demand of 
28.9 106 GJ a-1 with a gasification uptime of 80%. For scenario 1 and 2 this results in the requirement of 
0.1 Mha and 0.48 Mha respectively. This results in a forwarding distance for scenario 1 and 2 of 15.8 km 
and 69.3 km respectively.  
This results in a new insight compared to previous literature in which the importance of the energy 
consumed by the use of artificial fertiliser is often emphasized (Nonhebel, 2002). This is visible in Table 
10, which shows that the EE is roughly the same for both scenarios. This case study shows that the 
increased energy use for forwarding in the extensive (scenario 2) system has such a large effect that the 
extensive system performs worse than the intensive system. The assumed installed capacity determines 
the demand for biomass, resulting in a substantial increase in land requirements in the extensive 
scenario 2. The increase in land requirements results in increased energy consumption for ploughing, 
forwarding, and harvesting, which compensates for the absence of crop protection and artificial fertiliser. 
Indirect energy for harvesting is related to maintenance of the harvesting equipment which is expressed 
in energy input per distance. This means that in an extensive (scenario 2) system, the indirect energy 
for harvesting is larger, since the land requirements also increase. When choosing one hectare as a 
starting point for reasoning, the results might be interpreted differently.  
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Table 10: Results of the model simulations 
  
Results in Table 10 are expressed in total energy input per annum for both systems. 
6.5.2 Performance indicators 
The results from the simulation of the model are given in Table 10. Based on this data the EE and ER for 
both scenarios are estimated. The results show that when the whole supply system is taken into account 
the EE and ER do not represent the difference in land use very well. Despite the fossil input from artificial 
fertilizer being almost 18% of the total fossil input in scenario 1 this gets more than compensated for by 
amongst others, the increase in forwarding distance in scenario 2.  
In order to estimate the distance covered per hectare by a passenger vehicle, this research uses the 
Maruti Suzuki Ertiga as an example. The mileage for CNG is given as 22.8 km kg-1 (Carblogindia, 2013)7. 
Considering CNG consists out of pure methane, the energy density is 55.6 MJ kg-1. Given the net CNG 
yields of 179 and 36.8 GJ ha-1 for scenario 1 and 2 respectively, the Maruti Suzuki Ertiga could cover 1.6 
– 7.6 104 km ha-1. Roughly, 46 107 GJ is consumed in road transport in the Netherlands. The 
contribution from CNG based on 800 MW production capacity would therefore be 4.2% of the annual 
transport fuel consumption. When including the fossil input and therefore calculating the net energy, the 
contribution is 3.9% and 3.8% for the intensive and the extensive system respectively. 
The estimated transport distance per hectare is in the same range as the distances calculated by 
Dijkman and Benders (2010)8. The values are not directly comparable due to different system 
boundaries, but it seems that an intensive biomass production system results in a distance driven on 
CNG which is about 4 times higher than the system from Dijkman and Benders (2010)8 for electric 
driving based on wood. The difference is due to their choice for the average scenario, whilst this research 
analyses a scenario with high intensity. Furthermore, the conversion from wood to electricity is less 
efficient than the conversion of wood to CNG. An electric vehicle is more efficient when it comes to fuel 
use, but the difference in system boundaries combined with the previous arguments seem to be a decent 
explanation for the difference in outcome. 
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The results show that an intensive system is favourable, since the EE gives no clear indication; land use 
is the most important constraint. 
6.5.3 Implications for the end states 
Considering that the consumption of transport fuels is in the order of 30% of the total energy consumed 
in the EU, this research assumes that about 30% of the available biomass is used for the production of 
transport fuels. Based on the high estimates in the renewables end state this would be around 1.5 EJ in 
2020 corresponding to almost 80 gasification plants with 800 MW capacity and a minimum land 
requirement of 8.0 Mha, assuming high yields can be achieved. These land requirements correspond to 
4.5% of the total utilised agricultural area (Eurostat, 2013)9. This suggests that the availability of 
agricultural land is not the main issue. However, this research assumes high yields, which might result in 
the requirement of more land than estimated here. Furthermore, a contribution of 1.5 EJ from 8.0 Mha is 
approximately 10% % of the energy consumed in European transport in 2012. This shows that the 
contribution of 3.8 Mha is required to broadly foresee in the targets set by the European Commission for 
blending of biofuels. Substantial reduction of carbon emissions is however not obvious, since the existing 
biofuel supply chains are not carbon neutral. This means that a 10% reduction in carbon emissions is not 
feasible for the EU by the system described here. 
6.6 Discussion 
To illustrate the limitations and implications of intensive biomass production, the discussion section is 
partly used to describe the trade-offs a farmer has to determine before deciding on which crop he will 
grow. As an example, the province of Flevoland is used, since the soil in Flevoland has the highest 
fertility and thus yields in the Netherlands. CBS Statline (2014)10 shows that 98500 ha are used as 
agricultural land, which is a combination of crop- and grassland. An 800 MW gasifier would therefore 102% 
of this acreage in an intensive system, suggesting that all grassland should be converted. A farmer has 
an economic point of view when it comes to deciding which crop is most suitable to produce. Currently, 
potatoes are mostly grown in this region. According to KWIN-AGV (2012)11, the net profit per hectare is 
in the order of €4,500. In order for a farmer to start producing poplar the profit should be similar. When 
using a high yield of 12 ton ha-1 the farmer should make €0.38 kg-1 dry matter. This means that, without 
taking the inputs into the biomass production system into account and also the cost for biomass 
conversion, let alone added taxes, the cost for SNG would be in the order of €0.8 m-3. This is already 
higher than the current average consumer price for natural gas in the Netherlands. 
The results show that an intensive system is favourable, since land availability is a limiting factor, 
especially within the Netherlands. However, applying the most fertile soils in the Netherlands does not 
appear to be economically feasible as emphasised by the previous paragraph. Hence, the estimated SNG 
price is too high. Therefore a similar analysis is done for sugar beets in the Groningen area where lower 
profits per hectare are observed. The net profit is in the order of €1600 ha-1 for sugar beets on clay soils 
in the Northern part of the Netherlands. A reduction of 20% in yield is assumed based on the difference 
in potato yield for both regions (i.e., Groningen and Flevoland). The price for poplar should then be 
€0.17 kg-1 dry matter, resulting in a price of €0.35 m-3 SNG. This number has, however, the same 
limitations as the €0.8 m-3 estimated before.  
The current price for imported gas is $9.24 MMBtu-1; this corresponds to roughly €0.27 m-3 natural gas. 
This corresponds to roughly €120 per ton dry matter produced. However, the actual turnover will 
probably be half or less, since the fossil inputs and conversion to SNG should also be taken into account. 
This underlines that it is currently economically unfeasible to produce poplar in the Netherlands. It is 
probable that this line of reasoning also holds for other regions in Europe. The Ukraine is often argued to 
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be a country with large potential for biomass production. The crops produced there also end up on the 
world food market where they earn a similar amount of money per unit of mass produced.  
This chapter shows that at least 0.1 Mha is required to foresee in the demand for an 800 MW biomass 
gasification plant. The average field crop producing farm in the EU27 has a size of roughly 43 ha, 
requiring over 2,300 field crop farmers to cooperate in such a project with all their arable land. Miedema 
et al., (2014)12 emphasize the impact of biomass transport on the system performance. These distances 
should be reduced as much as possible, resulting in an organisational challenge when a large group of 
farmers is needed to cooperate in a local setting. 
Panoutsou et al., (2009)13 provide an overview of the biomass supply in the EU27. Besides agriculture, 
they discuss three other sectors namely; forest, industry and waste as biomass resources. The results of 
the extensive review of literature by Panoutsou et al., (2009)13 are presented here in Table 11. 
Table 11: Biomass supply in the EU27, derived from Panoutsou et al., (2009)13 
The data are converted from ktoe to EJ. 
  
 
 
 
When the sum of these figures is taken it roughly corresponds to the total demand in 2020 based on the 
biomass contribution displayed in Figure 54. The data in Table 10 is expressed as primary energy. This 
means that about 30% to 50% of the energy is lost due to conversion. Furthermore, the actual 
availability of biomass from these sectors is disputable. More than half of the forest in Europe is privately 
owned (Schmithüsen et al., 2008)14. According to Eurostat (2011)15 this is about 60%. When focusing on 
size classes of forest ownership there are data available for nine countries (Schmithüsen et al., 2008)14; 
only 1% of the privately owned forest has a size over 50 hectare. This 1% however, owns 41% of the 
private forest area. It is probable that the forests below 50 hectare are not suitable for harvesting 
equipment and therefore, the technical feasibility of harvesting the increment rate from these private 
forests is expected to be rather low. Furthermore, the harvested quantities are often used in the paper, 
pulp and timber industry and therefore not directly available for energetic purposes. 
The value for industry consists for 40% out of black liquor (energy basis), which is a by-product from the 
paper and pulp industry. This black liquor is largely produced, but also consumed in the paper and pulp 
industry. That means it is already applied for energy and thus not freely available. Besides this, the wood 
used for paper and pulp comes from the agricultural or forestry sector, which might result in double 
counting of biomass. Furthermore, industry is focussing more and more on closing cycles. Hence, the 
European Commission emphasises the need for a bio-economy, in which waste is not seen as waste, but 
as a co-product with potential value. Therefore, waste streams are not always seen as waste streams 
anymore, but whenever possible applied as feedstock in other industrial processes. If this becomes a 
trend, one cannot argue that biomass supply equals availability for bioenergy.  
The increase in availability of biodegradable municipal waste suitable for incineration is due to the 
assumption by Panoutsou et al., (2009)13 that “the resource is expected to quadruple in 20 years”. This 
is justified to some extent, since the Landfill directive aims to decrease the amount of landfills. Therefore 
they assume that waste that was available for production of landfill gas becomes available for 
incineration with energy recovery. The decrease in energy from landfills is however, nothing compared to 
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the increase in energy from incineration. When arguing that the European population is rather stable or 
increasing slowly and thus waste constituted by the population is not obviously increasing that much.  
6.7 Conclusions 
This chapter shows that a gasification plant with a large capacity of 800 MW, requires over 0.1 Mha for 
the production of short rotation forestry in an intensive system. On a Dutch scale this contributes with 
four percent to the current quantities of energy consumed in road transport. Furthermore, 0.1 Mha is 
about 5% of the Dutch agricultural area. 
The difference between an extensive and intensive production system is only visible in the land 
requirements and not in the EE or ER. Therefore, in the scenarios analysed in this chapter, it seems that 
the energy consumed by the use of artificial fertiliser in the intensive system is largely compensated by 
increased forwarding distances in the extensive system. 
Even though the developed end states show a relatively large use of biomass for energetic purposes in 
the coming decades, the choice for the produced crop is at the farm. Besides this, the chemical industry 
is probably prepared to pay more for a bio-based product than the energy industry. This underlines that 
a significant increase in price is necessary in order to persuade farmers to start producing energy crops 
by converting grassland or at the cost of food or other valuable crops. Therefore, the biomass has to be 
supplied from other sectors such as: forestry, industry and waste. In a renewable or gas focused energy 
system where the demand for biomass is twice as high as in the business as usual end state (Figure 54) 
the supply from aforementioned sectors is not sufficient. 
The limitations of the use of biomass for energy are therefore in the availability of land, combined with 
the economic feasibility for farmers to produce energy crops. The primary supply from other sectors 
could be sufficient, but the technical and organisational feasibility of harvesting from forests remains 
critical. Industrial streams are often already used and waste streams are not expected to increase as 
much as thought by Panoutsou et al., (2009)13. This underlines why the BAU end state is the closest to 
reality, instead of the more optimistic High Res and Gas end state, when it comes to biomass use for 
energetic purposes. 
Key findings 
When looking at the BAU end state, which seems to be the most obvious when it comes to biomass 
consumption one needs 4.5% of land available in the EU in order to fully supply the transport sector with 
biogas. This could theoretically be accommodated within the BAU end state. However, this would be 
more complicated for the RES and GAS end state with higher demands. This is a clear limitation. There 
will be competition with land use for production of food, when substantial quantities of dedicated 
biomass are required for energetic purposes. 
For a high density populated country (such as the Netherlands) it is impossible to produce the biomass 
fuels to their supply their own system. This is further complicated by the competition between food and 
energy. Not only the food and fuel discussion, but also due to competition between feedstock for other 
applications (e.g. bio plastics). This will trigger increased competition between the use of biomass as 
feedstock. 
Looking at a possible business case for biomass, it is more obvious to work with economic cascading. 
This means that organic streams available for energetic purposes have a degraded quality compared to 
the use of dedicated energy crops. This will result in a challenge when aiming to include substantial 
amounts of green gas in the existing natural gas supply system.  
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7 GRID IMPLICATIONS OF DECENTRALIZED RENEWABLE 
ENERGY GENERATION AT VARIOUS DEMAND SCALES  
Author: Gideon Laugs – Rijksuniversiteit Groningen 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents an analysis of decentralized renewable energy generation: self-consumption 
characteristics of power from solar-photovoltaics (solar-pv), wind and biogas at various demand scales. 
Renewable energy is an essential element in the transition towards a more sustainable energy system. 
Most future energy scenarios suggest significant growth of renewable energy in the energy mix. Large 
shares of renewable energy in the energy mix are often associated with requirements to adapt existing 
energy grids to decentralized generation and potential supply and demand mismatches. The extent of 
grid adaptation requirements depends on the scale and type of renewable energy technology. High-level 
energy scenarios with long temporal and large spatial perspectives in general do not elaborate on the 
extent of grid adaptation requirements implicit from the future energy mix suggested in those scenarios. 
Part of that lack of specification may be explained by the unavailability of suitable tools to make high-
level assessments of the impact of high penetration rates of intermittent renewable energy on existing 
energy infrastructure. 
This research provides a general-purpose tool to aid in the interpretation of shares of intermittent 
renewable energy in future energy scenarios. By highlighting general self-consumption characteristics of 
intermittent renewable energy with regard to various sizes of community-scale household-sector demand 
patterns, this research adds high-level insight into the implications of growing decentralized generation 
on energy infrastructure. Central to this research are two questions: 
 What are typical sizes of consumer bases that can, on average, absorb the energy generated by 
certain intermittent renewable energy generation capacity within their typical demand patterns? 
 How do different intermittent renewable energy sources compare with regard to the penetration 
levels from which additional energy infrastructure is likely to be required to manage imbalances 
between demand and supply? 
 A model-based approach is used to derive abstract illustrations of self-consumption characteristics of 
typical decentralized renewable energy generation technologies in a residential sector context. The 
sections that follow first provide relevant background material, then outline the approach used in this 
study, and thereafter present the results. A discussion on the derived spatial fingerprints concludes this 
research. 
7.2 Decentralized renewables 
The clusters of future energy scenarios outlined in Chapter 3 of this report suggest that even in 
conservative scenarios the share of renewable energy in the energy mix is likely to increase twofold, 
increasing from about 10% in 2010 to about 20% by 2050. More sustainable scenarios suggest that the 
share of renewable energy in the energy mix may even increase as far up as 50% by 2050. The 
renewable energy discussed in most future energy scenarios includes electricity generated using a 
combination of sources that are typically deployed on a decentralized, comparatively small spatial scale, 
such as solar-pv, wind turbines and biogas from anaerobic digestion. By 2050, shares of such 
decentralized energy sources may be in the wide range of roughly 10%-30%, with suggested maximum 
penetration levels of almost 50%. 
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Power from solar-pv and wind turbines is often associated with supply intermittency and/or 
unpredictability, while for biogas the supply is typically stable and continuous. In general, such 
decentralized renewable energy sources relate to difficulties to match energy supply and demand 
(Akhmatov & Knudsen, 2007; Eltawil & Zhao, 2010; Lund, 2005)1,2,3. Resulting surpluses and shortages 
require interaction with peripheral infrastructure such as energy grids or storage facilities to mitigate any 
possible imbalance between energy supply and demand (Wolfe, 2008)4. 
Different sources of renewable energy have different typical generation patterns due to intermittency 
and/or unpredictability, and thus each have their own characteristic issues with regard to energy system 
integration and demand-supply balancing. For solar-pv, power generation is dependent on the amount of 
solar irradiation at the location of the installation. Solar irradiation follows a highly predictable day-night 
sinoid pattern coupled with a seasonal sinoid pattern. Variation and uncertainty with regard to actual 
irradiation relative to theoretical irradiation may be caused by weather irregularities such as cloud cover 
and/or precipitation. For power from solar-pv the balancing issue lies not in its predictability, but in 
scheduling. Solar-pv power production peaks around mid-day when irradiation levels are the highest, 
and drops to negligible levels between sunset and sunrise. Power demand in the residential sector 
generally peaks after sunset, when solar-pv is unable to accommodate that demand. Power from wind 
turbines is theoretically available during both day and night. However, wind turbine power production is 
highly dependent on wind speeds. Predictability of wind speeds is generally limited, as wind speeds may 
vary on very short time bases. The demand-supply mismatch issue of biogas is of a different nature: 
biogas production is typically a continuous process, with only little variation in hourly production patterns. 
Such continuous supply patterns, too, do not match with the generally whimsical nature of residential 
energy demand patterns. 
Another characteristic that distinguishes between solar-pv, wind energy and biogas are their typical 
deployment scales, capacity scalability and type of final energy supply. Solar-pv can be deployed on 
various scales, ranging from micro-installations of only several hundreds of Watts to larger scale solar-
farms of multiple megawatts. Solar-pv is a popular renewable energy source in the residential sector 
because of its scalability, enabling households to set up private installations according to own 
preferences. Typical residential sector rooftop solar-pv installations generate up to 1 or 2 kWe. The 
deployment scale of wind is typically larger. Apart from micro-scale rooftop-mounted turbines with 
generation capacities less than several kW’s, wind turbine capacities generally range from several 
hundred kW’s to several MW’s. Thus, typical wind turbine installation scales are substantially larger than 
single-household. Typical farm-based biogas produced through anaerobic digestion occupies a capacity 
range somewhat similar to wind power: up to between 1 and 2 MWe. The crucial difference between 
biogas and solar-pv or wind energy is that biogas is not limited to supplying power as the final energy 
type. By combustion in a combined heat and power facility (CHP), next to power a substantial amount of 
heat energy can be produced. Typical heat production capacity is generally in the same range as power. 
Several simulation studies have focused on the practical implications of high shares of intermittent 
renewable energy with respect to energy infrastructure (ie. Mason et al., 2010; Connolly et al., 2011; 
Krajacic et al., 2011a; Krajacic et al., 2011b; Elliston et al., 2012)5,6,7,8,9. Those studies typically deploy 
small temporal resolution models to simulate, assess and optimize the integration of intermittent 
renewable energy in country-scale power systems. Research on smart grids and smart energy 
management often highlights the problem of demand and supply mismatch with regard to decentralized 
power generation. Such research generally applies a micro-scale approach to derive situation-specific 
energy balance optimization solutions (ie. Driesen & Belmans, 2006; Driesen & Katiraei, 2008; Mohd et 
al., 2008)10,11,12. Most smart-grid research focuses on issues related to power, although natural gas or 
biogas may have some role to play in smart grids (EU, 2011)13. Optimization options proposed and 
  
 
Energy Delta Gas Research – The Big Picture  Page 105
 
investigated in smart-grid research contexts include (but are not limited to) demand management such 
as load scheduling and energy buffering. Without grid adaptation, additional infrastructure or specific 
energy system management algorithms, up to about a third of typical northwest European household 
energy consumption may be supplied by solar power (Thompson & Infield, 2007; Hashemi et al., 2014) 
14,15. 
Future energy scenarios with a wide spatial perspective and long-term time horizon, such as those 
considered in the context of The Big Picture, are considerably abstract by nature and generally provide 
only limited detail with respect to specific technologies or infrastructure management. Insights from 
applied studies into meso- or micro-grid optimization are only of limited use in the interpretation of 
typical Big Picture scenarios. However, practices from applied studies such as model simulation do 
provide a foundation from which to derive more general and abstract insights into the behaviour of 
different intermittent renewable energy technologies vis-à-vis energy systems.  
7.3 Methodology 
To assess the natural integration scale of intermittent renewables, a slightly modified version is deployed 
of a dynamic material flow model that was constructed in the context of a sister project within EDGaR 
(‘Decentralized gas storage to balance demand and supply’, also known as ‘FlexiStore’). The model is a 
deterministic simulation model designed to assess the effect of decentralized biogas storage on the 
potential to locally consume significant amounts of locally produced renewable energy including biogas, 
solar-pv and wind. The model simulates a local energy system in which demand is fulfilled through 
allocation of various local or non-local, renewable and non-renewable energy sources. Figure 57 provides 
a simplified schematic representation of the model. 
 
 
Figure 57: Schematic representation of the adapted model used to simulate the integration of 
intermittent renewable energy in a residential sector energy system. 
Model simulations represent one full year, calculated on an hourly basis. The input consists of typical 
supply and demand patterns spanning 8760 hours. The input patterns are a mix of actual, historical 
measurement data and generated or synthesized data. Central to both the supply and demand patterns 
are actual climate data. This climate data consist of the hourly weather data gathered at weather station 
Eelde, the Netherlands, between 2001 and 2010 (KNMI, 2013)16, plus an additional ‘typical’ climate year 
(ECN, 2012a)17. The demand and supply patterns are generated from the climate data (ECN, 2012b)18, 
and where necessary, converted to hourly patterns through combination with an alternative dataset 
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(ECN & Benders, 2012)19. Energy demand patterns make a distinction between four different types of 
residences: newly built, renovated houses, apartments and existing, older houses, and between power, 
space heating and water heating. Table 12 lists key figures indicative of the energy demand pattern 
characteristics. For this research, only the renovated house residential demand pattern was used. The 
energy supply patterns include power from solar-pv and wind turbines, and biogas for heat and power. 
Table 13 lists key figures indicative of the energy supply pattern characteristics. The model does not take 
transport energy loss into account, but it does implement a normal distribution spread of demand 
patterns for larger numbers of households. For this research, the modified version of the model excludes 
energy storage options, and excludes the requirement to fulfil demand. Imbalances between energy 
demand and supply during the course of simulations are only registered rather than actively mitigated 
through interaction with peripheral energy infrastructure. 
 
Table 12: Key parameters of model residential energy demand patterns (MJ) 
Element of energy demand Household type: renovated 
Power Annual total 11.7 GJ 
 Average 1.35 MJ/h 
 Standard deviation 0.66 MJ/h 
 Maximum 2.81 MJ/h 
Space heating Annual total 11.0 GJ 
 Average 1.25 MJ/h 
 Standard deviation 1.94 MJ/h 
 Maximum 9.93 MJ/h 
Water heating Annual total 9.0 GJ 
 Average 1.03 MJ/h 
 Standard deviation 1.95 MJ/h 
 Maximum 6.93 MJ/h 
The energy source’s spatial fingerprints are derived from several consecutive model simulations, each 
with an increasing number of consumers for a constant generation capacity. By varying the number of 
consumers we vary energy demand and thus the absorption capacity of the energy generated by the 
intermittent source. In addition, the demand pattern is smoothed for larger numbers of consumers, as a 
result of which the potential mismatches between demand and supply are reduced. The energy demand 
size spans a range that encompasses a typical total amount of annual energy generation for the different 
intermittent energy sources. 
For solar-pv and wind power, the simulations are carried out for each of the available climate year 
datasets to derive an error margin reflecting the influence of yearly weather differences. Since weather 
patterns do not affect biogas output, we varied biogas simulations not by climate year. Instead, we 
simulated only a single biogas utilization profile in which all biogas produced is directly combusted to 
generate power. For each of the simulations, we register the total amount of surplus renewable energy 
generated over the course of the simulation; derive the utility ratio as the share of energy demand that 
was directly supplied through local generation. We answer the two research questions on the basis of 
visualizations of the simulation results. 
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Table 13: Key parameters of model renewable energy supply patterns 
 Solar-pv Wind Biogas 
Installation 40 m2 of 200Wp=8kWp 
South orientation 
45° tilt angle 
100kW, Hub 
height 35m, 
Uptime: 100% 
200.000 
Nm3/year 
CH4-content 60% 
CHPηe: 40% 
Annual total power 23 GJ 753 GJ 1572 GJ 
Average 2.6 MJ/h 86 MJ/h 180 MJ/h 
Standard deviation 4.5 MJ/h 107 MJ/h 0 MJ/h 
Maximum 21.4 MJ/h 360 MJ/h 180 MJ/h 
7.4 Results 
The results show that power generated from solar-pv, wind turbines and biogas each have a distinctly 
different self-consumption fingerprint, as illustrated in Figure 58, Figure 59 and Figure 60, respectively. 
The model-derived self-consumption characteristics of each of the investigated renewable energy 
sources will be discussed separately below. 
Figure 58 shows the self-consumption characteristics of an 8kWp solar power installation. The blue curve 
in Figure 58 shows the self-consumption ratio, or the share of power produced from the applicable solar-
pv installation that could be utilized directly. The red curve in Figure 58 shows the share of directly used 
solar-pv power relative to the overall total power demand of the various demand sizes. The extra dashed 
curves represent the averaged results of the same simulation, but for an installation of 4kWp 
(20m2x200Wp). 
For power from a 8kWp solar-pv installation, the self-consumption potential for a single household is 
fairly minimal. Only about 15% of the annually generated power can be utilized directly, leaving the vast 
majority of power requiring an alternative destination. The intersection point at two households marks 
the demand size at which net energy neutrality may be achieved if suitable temporary storage can be 
deployed for the share of solar energy that cannot be utilized directly. At this point, still only about a 
quarter of the annually generated power can be utilized directly. The self-consumption ratio of this solar-
pv installation reaches 50% for a demand size of five households. At that demand size, the 8kWp solar-
pv installation only provides a fifth of the overall energy demand of those five households. 
The yearly solar-pv production caused by weather pattern variation is rather minimal. Between the 11 
climate years used in the simulation, the self-consumption ratio of this solar-pv installation only varies in 
the single percent range. This is largely in line with notions of relative of solar-pv power production 
certainty as solar irradiation follow rather predictable patterns. 
Figure 59 shows the self-consumption characteristics of a small-scale 100kW wind turbine. The blue 
curve in Figure 59 shows the self-consumption ratio, or the share of power produced from the applicable 
wind turbine that could be utilized directly. The red curve in Figure 59shows the share of directly used 
wind power relative to the overall total power demand of the various demand sizes.  
The self-consumption pattern of power from a 100kW wind turbine reflects its larger generation capacity 
relative to solar-pv. Self-consumption for single numbers of households remains below 10%. 25% self-
consumption can be achieved for a demand size representing about ten households. At 50 households 
drawing power from the same wind turbine, the self-consumption curve intersects the curve representing 
the share in overall total power demand. At the intersection, the self-consumption ratio and the energy 
supply share are both 50%. The self-consumption curve approaches 100% from about 250 households, 
but by then the share of wind power relative to total power demand has dropped below 20%. 
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Weather patterns have a markedly more prominent influence on the self-consumption characteristics of 
wind power than for solar-pv. Between the 11 simulation years, the difference between the best and 
worst self-consumption ratios can be as large as 10%. The influence of weather variation is most 
prominent for demand sizes up to about 200 households, after which the curves representing different 
simulation years start to converge. 
 
 
Figure 58: Self-consumption characteristics of an 8kWp (40m2x200Wp) residential-scale solar 
power installation.  
 
 
  
 
Energy Delta Gas Research – The Big Picture  Page 109
 
 
Figure 59: Self-consumption characteristics of a single small-scale, 100kW wind turbine. 
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Figure 60: Self-consumption characteristics of a biogas-fuelled power generator.  
Figure 60 shows the self-consumption characteristics of a biogas-fuelled power generator. The blue curve 
in Figure 60shows the self-consumption ratio, or the share of power produced by the generator that 
could be utilized directly. The red curve in Figure 60 shows the share of directly used biogas power 
relative to the overall total power demand of the various demand sizes. 
Power production from biogas is arguably weather-independent, and can be modelled as a stable and 
continuous power supply stream that is available during all hours of the day. To some extent, the 
supply-demand balancing characteristics of biogas power are reminiscent of those of wind power. This is 
clearly reflected in the self-consumption curve of biogas power, where the similarity in shape with the 
self-consumption curve of wind power is indicative of similar match and mismatch patterns. For biogas 
power, too, the self-consumption curve passes through the 50% mark for a demand size representative 
of about 70 households. 100% direct utilization of biogas power can be achieved for demand sizes 
representing approximately 300 households and over. The major difference between biogas power and 
wind power is the position of the curve representing the share of biogas power in the total energy supply. 
The continuous supply pattern of biogas power enables full demand coverage, if capacity is sufficient. In 
this case, power from biogas may cover 100% of the power demand for up to 60 households. For larger 
demand sizes the share of biogas power in the energy supply declines following a sigmoid curve. 
The positioning of that curve relatively high on the y-axis means that the self-consumption curve and the 
energy supply share curve intersect at larger demand sizes and at a higher self-consumption ratio. From 
Figure 60 it can be seen that the intersection between the two curves occurs at a demand size 
representing about 150 households, and the associated self-consumption ratio at that point is over 80%. 
Until that intersection, so for demand sizes smaller than 150 households, the modelled biogas-fuelled 
power supply may potentially cover the total aggregated power demand of those households if adequate 
buffering or storage options were available. The high self-consumption ratio at the intersection of the 
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curves indicates that for higher demand sizes full coverage of energy demand can be ensured with 
comparatively little requirements for grid interaction or storage relative to power from solar-pv or wind 
turbines. 
7.5 Discussion 
The results of this research present general model-derived self-consumption fingerprints for power 
produced by solar-pv, wind turbines and biogas. Although the self-consumption characteristics are 
substantially different from one another, they all have in common that high self-consumption ratios are 
only achieved for large demand sizes and large numbers of households. Demand sizes for self-
consumption ratios over 90% are typically several times larger than the typical total annual power 
production. At those demand sizes, the contribution in the overall total energy supply is in general also 
strongly reduced. 
Higher self-consumption ratios correspond to lower impact on the grid the installation is connected to. If 
we assume that the impact on the grid is negligible only at (almost) complete self-consumption and no 
surplus power fed into the net, then this research indicates that in the residential-sector energy mix the 
share of solar power may only remain below 10% and the share of wind power below 20%. Any shares 
higher than that would lead to surplus power fed into the grid and thus affect grid stability. However, 
previous research suggested that power grids may be somewhat resilient to the feed-in of small amounts 
of surplus power (Hashemi et al., 2014)15. To some extent that may explain the difference with non-
impacting solar power penetration levels of 30% (Thompson & Infield, 2007)14 and 34% (Hashemi et al., 
2014)15 reported in literature. Other explanations would have to be sought in methodological differences 
such as demand pattern generation. Thomson & Infield (2007) use a combination of actual measurement 
data and model-generated patterns define diverse demand patterns for a fixed set of 1,262 consumers. 
Hashemi et al. (2014)15 extrapolate actual power consumption data measured at a small number of 
households. This research follows a comparatively more theoretical and abstract approach, using model-
derived demand patterns only, multiplied and stochastically smoothened for larger demand size. Despite 
explicit pattern smoothening, peaks and troughs in pattern become more explicit with larger consumer 
sizes. Actual, real-world demand patterns may show less prominent peaks and troughs. 
This research used data typical for a situation as it may exist in the Netherlands, today. Differences in 
both spatial and temporal parameters of the simulations may lead to different outcomes. From a spatial 
perspective, climate aspects affect both demand and supply patterns. Household-sector power demand 
in the Netherlands typically peaks during evenings, reflecting behavioural patterns of families returning 
home and switching on lights and appliances. Those peaks are generally more pronounced in wintertime, 
when early dusk and darkness increase demand for lightning. Daytime household power demand is 
comparatively little. While the Dutch power demand patterns may be typical for northwester Europe, it 
may not apply for other areas such as, for example, southern Europe (Spain etc.), where different 
climate characteristics may lead to different demand patterns. In southern European countries, daytime 
household power demand may be higher due to different behavioural patterns and the use of different 
appliances (air-conditioning). Moreover, climate conditions in southern European countries may also lead 
to different power supply patterns. Solar irradiation is higher in Spain than in the Netherlands, but power 
generation by wind turbines may be more fruitful in the Netherlands than in Spain. From a temporal 
perspective, it is important to note that the patterns used in this research are relatively recent, and do 
not reflect potential future technology developments. In the household sector, likely developments that 
could affect this research’s results are, for example, improvements in insulation and shifts to more 
efficient lighting and appliances. Such developments may affect both gas (heat) and power demand 
patterns. 
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The shapes of the curves illustrating the self-consumption characteristics as shown in Figure 58, Figure 
59 and Figure 60 may be somewhat different if we’d allow load scheduling and additional (grid) energy 
storage infrastructure. Load scheduling is a form of demand management that can reduce the burden of 
surplus power on the local grid by shifting demand peaks laterally on the timeline (Widen, 2014)20. The 
potential and impact of load scheduling may be different from one household to another, and from one 
area to another, as the extent of the mismatch between energy supply and demand is dependent on the 
type of energy consuming appliances installed and the location of energy sources relative to their natural 
supply streams. Depending on the effect of load scheduling, the graphs illustrating self-consumption 
characteristics derived in this research will look different. In all likelihood, the self-consumption curve 
increases more strongly, whereas the curve representing the share in the overall total energy demand 
will decrease more gradually. 100% self-consumption ratios may be reached for smaller demand sizes, 
but not immediately as it is unlikely that load scheduling is possible for all energy consuming appliances 
in a household. The addition of storage is independent of household characteristics, and may even 
increase self-consumption potential to 100% for minimal demand sizes. Storage works two ways: it 
prevents overvoltage (Hashemi et al., 2014)15 and undersupply (Nijhuis et al., 2014)21, both of which 
may negatively affect grid stability. If the storage capacity is large enough and meets situation-specific 
load and supply criteria, then all supply-demand mismatches may be eradicated. However, 
characteristics of current power storage technology deem it unlikely to be deployed on a scale large 
enough to mitigate all power supply-demand mismatches. Biogas, however, may be stored more easily: 
biogas output can be moderated using the pressurization range of the production facility, but the 
potential is limited and the periodicity is on a multi-day scale (Hartlief, 2015)22. For larger buffers or 
different response times dedicated storage facilities would be required. 
Following the acceptable non-impacting penetration rates derived in this research, we may argue that 
the shares of renewables reported in high-level, long-term future energy scenarios is very likely to 
require grid adaptation. Future energy mixes with up to 50% renewables in the energy mix, and over 30% 
decentralized and/or intermittent renewables such as wind and solar-pv may require significant 
modifications to the grid in order to maintain grid stability in the face of potentially large energy 
surpluses. Nevertheless, the self-consumption fingerprints derived in this research also indicate that at 
such high penetration levels, self-consumption may be relatively high as well. Thus, in order to assess 
the extent of grid adaptation requirements, not the entire amount of power produced in decentralized 
settings needs to be accounted for. For power generated from decentralized wind turbines, for instance, 
penetration rates of 30% correspond to self-consumption potential of over 70%. Such high self-
consumption ratios imply that possibly less than 30% of the produced wind power is fed into the grid. 
Only about a third of the amount of wind power needs to be accounted for in assessments of grid 
adaptation implications, rather than the full amount. Another important notion is that the range of 
possible renewables penetration over the next decades is sufficiently wide to include scenarios for which 
the extent of required grid adaptation could be minimal to negligible. 
7.6 Conclusions 
Solar-pv, wind power and biogas are common renewable energy sources featured in many future energy 
scenarios. These energy sources are typically deployed in decentralized generation contexts. Each of 
these energy sources has a typical minimum deployment scale. In this research a model-based approach 
is deployed to derive a distinct set of self-consumption characteristics for each of these renewable 
energy sources. The self-consumption characteristics are indicative of the implications high penetration 
rates may have on the energy system and as such may help in the interpretation of renewable energy in 
future energy scenarios. 
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Application of these self-consumption characteristics on the post-energy transition end states derived in 
the context of The Big Picture suggests that grid adaptation may be required for high penetration levels 
of decentralized renewables. Nevertheless, as a result of high self-consumption ratios the extent of grid 
adaptation requirements likely depends on only a small portion of the suggested contribution of 
decentralized renewables in the energy mix, rather than the entire contribution. 
Key findings: 
 Different decentralised renewable energy technologies have different grid implication dynamics 
relative to varying demand scales. Part of those differences can be explained through differences 
in weather dependency. 
 For power from solar-photovoltaics (solar-pv), inherent mismatch between typical supply 
patterns and typical power demand patterns imply that only a small share of the energy mix can 
be contributed by power from solar-pv without substantial grid implications. Conversely, larger 
shares of decentralised solar-pv power may be associated with more significant grid implications.  
 Power generated by wind turbines is more strongly affected by variation in weather patterns than 
power from solar-pv, but its daylight-independent supply patterns enables a larger demand-
supply matching potential. Therefore, the share of wind power that can be integrated into the 
energy mix without substantial grid implications is larger than for power from solar-pv. 
 Biogas-based decentralized power supply is fairly constant and predictable. As such, the no-grid-
implications share of biogas power is the largest of all three decentralized renewable power 
sources considered in this research. 
 Energy futures involving large shares of decentralized renewable power in the energy mix are 
likely to involve substantial grid implications. However, part of the power generated on a 
decentralized platform is consumed locally. Only the part that is not consumed locally/directly 
accounts towards grid implications. Grid implications for larger shares of decentralized 
renewables may thus be less than what could be assumed from the gross total of generated 
power. 
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8 CASE STUDY: POWER TO GAS - A TECHNOLOGICAL 
INNOVATION SYSTEM APPROACH 
Author: Bart ter Veer – Hanze University Groningen 
8.1 Introduction 
The three end states presented in Chapter 3 show a considerable share of renewable energy in the 
energy mix as it develops. This corresponds with the European energy policy and plans as they are 
stated in Energy 20201, Energy trends 20302 and the Energy Roadmap 20503. 
The growing share of renewable energy will for a large part be realized with wind, hydroelectric and solar 
power. Besides having both low life cycle carbon emissions, wind and solar power are also intermittent 
energy sources. This increases the need for overall flexibility in the energy system strongly4 5. 
The energy system has to adapt to intermittent energy sources, such as wind power and solar energy, 
which provide energy in a fluctuating manner. Energy storage is the solution. In times of excess 
electricity production the energy has to be stored. Power to Gas is a technology that offers this storage 
option. 
The basic principle of the power-to-gas concept is the bidirectional linking of the existing infrastructure 
units (the electricity grid and the gas grid) with the goal of establishing a new way of managing loads 
and generation, which enables high proportions of fluctuating electricity generation from renewable 
energy sources to be accommodated in the energy system. To date, this link only exists in terms of 
generating electricity from natural gas (gas to power), but not vice versa (power-to-gas)6.  
The power-to-gas principle is shown in Figure 61. Excess electricity is converted into hydrogen using 
electrolysis. The hydrogen can be used in three ways7. In the first place the hydrogen can be injected in 
the gas grid but only up to a limited amount since the gas grid is designed to transport and store natural 
gas and not hydrogen8,9. Secondly the hydrogen can be converted into methane. Methane can be 
injected into the gas grid on a large scale. The CO2 that is needed for methanation can be provided by a 
bio gasification plant10 or through carbon capture storage (CCS). The third option is of course to use the 
hydrogen in industry and transportation and not inject it into the gas grid. 
Figure 61 shows that the natural gas grid can store the excess renewable energy. It is important to 
notice that the storage capacity of the gas grid is large and that the storage can be used to cope with 
seasonal fluctuations as well.  
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Figure 61: Power-to-gas concept for bidirectional coupling of the electricity and gas grids. 
Three end states were defined. These end states require technological innovation. One innovation that is 
needed to accommodate the end states is the storage of excess renewable energy. Power-to-gas can 
provide this storage but the technology is facing hurdles. This chapter describes the factors that will 
determine if power-to-gas will be an important technology in the energy transition. 
8.2 Methodology – a system approach 
What will determine if power-to-gas will be an important technology in the energy transition over the 
next years? A technology does not develop in one place and it is not developed by one actor. One can 
look at the development of a technology as a process that takes place in a technological innovation 
system (TIS). The TIS includes all actors and institutions that are involved in the development, diffusion 
and utilization of a technology. 
The central idea of this analysis is that the analysis of technological change should focus on 
systematically mapping the activities that take place in innovation systems resulting in technological 
change. Since these activities have the function to contribute to the goal of the innovation system, which 
is the generation and diffusion of innovations, the activities are often called functions of innovation 
systems11 12. 
Many actors and institutions are involved in the development of power-to-gas. Since the actors and 
institutions do not act alone they are viewed as a system with multiple interdependencies.  
   Institutions 
 
Actors               Technology 
Actors are numerous, ranging from public to private and from innovator to end-user. Institutions are 
governments, agencies, law and others. A system approach is used to emphasize the dynamics between 
actors, institutions and technological factors13.  
The basic unit of the analysis is the event. Within the context of a TIS analysis, an event can be defined 
as an instance of rapid change with respect to actors, institutions and/or technology, which is the work 
of one or more actors and which carries some public importance with respect to in this case the Power to 
Wind
Sun
H2   CH4
  CO2
Gas 
storage
CO2‐Buffer
Power grid Gas grid
Industry
Trasportation
Electrolysis/H2‐
buffer
Methanation
Power station
  
 
Energy Delta Gas Research – The Big Picture  Page 117
 
Gas TIS. Examples of such events are studies carried out, conferences organized, plants constructed, 
policy measured issued, etc. 
A successful system should fulfil the following functions: 
1. Entrepreneurial activities 
2. Knowledge development 
3. Knowledge exchange 
4. Guidance of the search 
5. Market formation 
6. Resource mobilisation 
7. Support from advocacy coalitions 
This Technological Innovation System approach is based on Motors of sustainable innovation by Roald A. 
A. Suurs. 
The main research question is: In what way does the power-to-gas Technological Innovation Systems 
affect the energy technology trajectories leading to the end states? 
Using the Technological Innovation System approach the sub questions are: 
1. How does the power-to-gas Technological Innovation System perform on the defined functions? 
The answer to this question will provide insight in the strengths and weaknesses of the 
Technological Innovation System. Are there for example significant entrepreneurial activities, is 
there meaningful knowledge development and exchange, and so on. The progress will be 
recognized through so called events. An event can be a publication, a commercial initiative, a 
new subsidy or any other signal that can be considered as a contribution to the Technological 
Innovation System. 
2. What progress does the power-to-gas Technological Innovation System need to make to 
accommodate the different end states? 
This question will address the end states. The focus will be the contribution that power-to-gas 
can have related to the different end states. It is possible that power-to-gas will be more 
relevant for one end state compared to the other end states. 
The TIS approach has a technology as its starting point. The development of a technology is not place 
based. At different locations all over the world entrepreneurial activities can start and research can be 
initiated. On the other hand regulation and policies are most of the time not worldwide and technology 
often develops in a regional context. This study looks at the power-to-gas TIS from a European 
perspective and will put some emphasize on the Dutch situation. 
8.3 Entrepreneurial activities 
Entrepreneurs are at the core of any TIS. The classic role of the entrepreneur is to translate knowledge 
into business opportunities, and eventually innovations. The entrepreneur does this by performing 
market oriented experiments that establish change, both to the emerging technology and to the 
institutions that surround it. The entrepreneurial activities involve projects aimed to prove the usefulness 
of the emerging technology in a practical and/or commercial environment. Such projects typically take 
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the form of experiments and demonstrations14. Public actors can be entrepreneurs as well, as long as 
their actions are directed at conducting market-oriented experiments with an emerging technology. 
Over 30 power-to-gas demonstration plants are currently reported on the internet and in literature15,16,17. 
At this moment most projects are in the construction or planning phase. The largest existing plants will 
be discussed. 
In 2013 Audi opened a power-to-gas plant in Werlte (Germany) with a 6 MW capacity. It converts 
surplus renewable electricity in hydrogen and methane. The renewable synthetic methane, called Audi e-
gas, is provided for Audi customers of the A3-tron g, an Audi vehicle. Customers can order a quota of e-
gas when they purchase the car. This enables them to take part in an accounting process that ensures 
that the amount of gas that they put in their vehicle at the natural gas filling station is supplied to the 
grid by the Audi e-gas plant18. 
Also in 2013 E.ON inaugurated a power-to-gas (P2G) unit in Falkenhagen in eastern Germany. The unit 
uses wind power to run electrolysis equipment that transforms water into hydrogen which is injected into 
the regional gas transmission system. The hydrogen becomes part of the natural gas mix and can be 
used in a variety of applications, including space heating, industrial processes, mobility, and power 
generation. The unit, which has a capacity of two megawatts, can produce 360 cubic meters of hydrogen 
per hour19. 
In Grapzow (Germany) E.ON has installed in 2012 a 1 MW power-to-gas system connected to a 140 MW 
wind farm. The plant’s owners have the option to use the hydrogen in an internal combustion engine to 
produce electricity, or inject it directly into the local natural gas grid, depending on operational needs20. 
Enertrag installed in Prenzlau (Germany) three 2 MW wind turbines directly connected to an 
electrolyser21. The hydrogen that is produced is used in several ways. During low wind periods, the 
stored hydrogen, mixed with biogas, can be used to fuel two combined heat and power units, for 
additional electricity production. From the point of view of the grid operator, the hybrid power plant will 
then be operating as a base load power station. The hydrogen can also be used for fuelling cars. TOTAL 
Deutschland GmbH is a partner in de project. Total operates service stations where cars can be fuelled 
with wind-hydrogen produced in Prenzlau. The hydrogen is transported in tankers from Prenzlau to 
Berlin22. 
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Table 14: Operating power-to-gas plants in Germany (10) and the Netherlands (1). 
City Project name Operating since Application 
Hamburg  Wasserstofftankstelle 
HafenCity 
2012 Production of hydrogen 
Hydrogen used for transportation 
(busses) 
Werlte Audi e-gas Project 2013 Production of methane 
Injection in gas grid 
Certificates for Audi vehicles 
Frankfurt Am 
Mein 
P2G demo Thuga group 2013 Production of hydrogen 
Inject in gasgrid 
Herten H2Herten 2013 Production of hydrogen 
Hydrogen used for transportation and 
other fuel cells 
Niederaussem CO2rrect 2013 Production of methane and methanol 
Bad Hersfeld Metanisierung am Eichhof 2012 Production of methane 
Inject in gasgrid 
Stuttgart Verbundproject Power-to-
Gas 
2012 Production of methane 
Falkenhagen Pilotanlage Falkenhagen 2013 Production of hydrogen 
Inject in gasgrid 
Grapzow Windpark RH2-WKA 2012 Production of hydrogen 
Use hydrogen to produce electricity 
Inject in grid 
Prenzlau Hybridkraftwerk Prenzlau 2011 Production of hydrogen 
Use for electricity 
use for transportation 
Schwandorf Power to Gas in Eucolino 2012 Production of methane using 
Microorganisms. 
Injection in grid or storage. 
Rozenburg (NL) P2G in Rozenburg 2013 Production of methane 
Injection in local grid 
Analysing the existing projects it is obvious that they all use electrolysis to turn electricity into Hydrogen. 
After all, that is what makes them power-to-gas projects. There are some differences that stand out. 
First of all there is the option of methanation. Six of the existing projects produce methane and inject it 
into the gas grid. The methanation is realized using different technologies. The other five projects do not 
methanise the hydrogen. Three out of those five projects use the hydrogen in the transportation sector. 
The other two projects inject the hydrogen in the gas grid or convert it back into electricity. 
All those projects can count as entrepreneurial activities as defined in the TIS literature. They are market 
oriented experiments trying to prove the usefulness of the emerging technology. It is also important to 
notice that all projects have a recent date. Initial plans are of course made some years ago but the 
operating projects have gone into production over the last few years. For the power-to-gas TIS this 
means that entrepreneurial activities have taken off and have a positive effect on the emerging 
technology. 
8.4 Knowledge development 
The knowledge development function involves learning activities, mostly on the emerging technology but 
also on markets, networks, users and other factors. Learning activities can be laboratory experiments 
but also trial projects. Without knowledge development there will be no technological innovation23.  
Power to Gas uses electrolysis of water to produce hydrogen. The technology is not new; Zenobe 
Gramme invented the Gramme machine in 1869 to produce hydrogen using electrolysis of water. It is 
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therefore arbitrary to decide when power-to-gas started as a technology to be used to transform surplus 
electricity into gas. In this chapter, research over the last 10 years is considered to be part of the power-
to-gas TIS. The largest studies are categorized according to their main topic and will be discussed briefly. 
8.4.1 Studies on electrolysis and hydrogen 
The Fuel Cells and Hydrogen Joint Undertaking (FCH JU) is a public private partnership founded in 2008 
supporting research, technological development and demonstration activities in fuel cell and hydrogen 
energy technologies in Europe. Its aim is to accelerate the market introduction of these technologies, 
realizing their potential as an instrument in achieving a carbon-lean energy system24. The FCH JU helps 
to carry out the 7th framework programme for research and technological development (FP7). For 2013 
the FCH JU contributes €68 million to 27 projects25. The projects are categorized in five so-called 
application areas: 
 Transportation and refuelling infrastructure; 
 Hydrogen production and distribution; 
 Stationary power generation and CHP; 
 Early markets; 
 Cross cutting issues. 
Most FCH JU projects are relevant for the power-to-gas TIS. The programme is therefore a positive 
contribution to the TIS.  
8.4.2 Studies on power-to-gas and the gas network 
The Naturalhy project was funded by the European commission’s sixth framework program (2002 – 2006) 
for research, technological development and demonstration26. The project started in 2004 and the final 
report was published in 2010. The project studied the possibility to use the existing natural gas system 
for hydrogen. The possible impact of adding hydrogen to natural gas on the durability of the network 
was an important part of the project. Also measures to control and monitor the condition of the network 
were analysed. Safety aspects of adding hydrogen to the network were another subject. The end user 
aspects were studied as well. Research was also done on the possibility to separate hydrogen from a 
hydrogen/natural gas mixture by the use of membranes. 
The main goal of the Naturalhy project was to identify showstoppers. This also determined the scope of 
the project. Materials that are used in the natural gas system which can easily be replaced by another – 
hydrogen proof - material were for example not considered to be a potential threat to the durability of 
the network. The final report emphasizes that given the size and the complexity of the project it is 
important not to jump to simple conclusions. The general outcome of the project though was that no 
showstoppers were identified. For the power-to-gas TIS the Naturalhy project therefore was a positive 
impulse.  
In Germany the DVGW carried out an extensive study analysing the main power-to-gas issues27. In the 
first place the H2-tolerance of the German natural gas grid was researched. The main conclusion is that 
the existing gas infrastructure can handle a 10% volume addition of H2 in the gas grid. Furthermore four 
possible power-to-gas applications in Germany were studied. One of the subjects was the difference 
between injecting hydrogen into the local grid versus injecting into the interregional grid. Injecting in the 
local grid causes a significant limitation in the H2 volume that can be added. The DVGW also examined 
the economics of power-to-gas. The variables that are most important to decide on the financial 
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feasibility of power-to-gas are the utilization of the power-to-gas installation (in hours) and the price of 
electricity. 
The HyUnder project studies the possibilities for large scale and long term storage of renewable 
electricity by hydrogen underground storage in Europe. The project compares hydrogen underground 
storage with other storage options. Given de European energy policy goals the need for storage is 
explored. The conclusion is that, although a thorough quantification of the energy storage needs in the 
EU has not been undertaken yet, the necessity of energy storage to compensate the intermittency of 
renewable energy is obvious and that energy storage will play a key role in the future European energy 
structure, as it is described in the Energy 2020 program and the Energy Roadmap 2050 by the EU. The 
project also concludes that the only feasible option for large scale energy storage is to employ 
underground hydrogen / SNG storage in salt caverns. SNG provides the additional option to be stored in 
all kind of storages in the natural gas grid. Because of high investment costs systems with hydrogen 
underground tube storage or storage in pressure vessel bundles are not appropriate for long term 
storage of large volumes28. 
8.4.3 Studies on power-to-gas in the energy system 
In June 2013 DNV KEMA published “Systems analyses Power to Gas: a technology review”29. The study 
compares power-to-gas to other energy storage technologies. The technologies should fulfil several 
functions, in the DNV KEMA study so called service applications: 
 Frequency support: stabilizing the grid frequency almost instantly in case of very sudden large 
decreases in power generation 
 Uninterruptable power supply: providing emergency power when the input power source fails 
 Community energy storage: store energy at a local level 
 Home energy storage: storage dedicated for household applications 
 Forecast hedging: the use of stored energy to mitigate penalties when real-time generation falls 
short 
 Time shifting: the storage of energy generated during low demand periods and discharged during 
high demand periods 
 Transmission and distribution capacity management: possible avoidance of network upgrades 
The study concludes that the value of power-to-gas is in its able to deliver community energy storage 
services, time shifting and transmission and distribution capacity management. This outcome contributes 
in a positive way to the knowledge development function. 
8.4.4 Studies on the financial feasibility of power-to-gas 
In 2006 the Institute for Energy and Transport (IET) – part of the joint research centre (JRC) from the 
European commission- published “Bridging the European wind energy market and a future renewable 
hydrogen-inclusive economy”. The approach of this study is to determine, via life-cycle cost-benefit 
assessment, the long-term competitiveness and economic implications of power-to-gas. The study takes 
into account that the costs and benefits of power-to-gas are aggregated at different economic levels. The 
investment costs and product revenues for example are assumed to be the project owners. The benefits 
from improved network management are realized by the consumer of electricity in the price he pays for 
electricity. The benefits from local environmental conditions (avoided particulate emissions) are enjoyed 
by the local community of consumers. The benefits for global environmental conditions (reduced 
greenhouse gas emissions) are enjoyed by all members of society.  
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The function of knowledge development was definitely met by this study. It is hard to categorize the 
contribution as positive or negative. Four scenarios are outlined varying in the wind penetration in the 
energy mix and in the strength of the hydrogen and climate change push. The production costs of 
Hydrogen through power-to-gas are much higher than the Hydrogen market price. In other words, 
power-to-gas is an expensive way to produce Hydrogen. The additional benefits of power-to-gas, 
avoided CO2 emissions and avoided balance costs, are not compensating the high production costs. A 
scenario with high wind penetration, low electricity prices and high CO2 and hydrogen prices gives a 
positive cost-benefit outcome demonstrated in lower electricity prices. The study assumes that electricity 
companies will pass on benefits to the consumers through lower prices. 
In September 2008 ECN published “Conversion of excess wind energy into hydrogen for fuel cell 
applications”30. The study starts with estimating the excess wind energy in the Netherlands in 2020. The 
political ambition to have 6 GW offshore and 2-4 GW onshore wind power in 2020 is taken as a starting 
point. Using the electricity demand data and the wind speed data from 2004 the result for 8 GW installed 
wind power is an excess wind power of about 4.5 TWh. The minimum cost estimate for producing 
hydrogen using the excess wind power is 4.4 €/kg. The costs are high because the load factor for the 
electrolysers is low. Using all wind power to produce hydrogen results in production costs of 5 €/kg. Even 
though the use of the capacity of the electrolysers improves, the costs of electricity – using a mean 0f 
0.08 €/kWh- raises the costs of the hydrogen.  
DNV KEMA reports using different sources that the estimates of excess wind power differ from 0.5 TWh 
per year to 10 TWh per year in 2050. Another KEMA study from 2010 concludes that a 12 GW wind 
capacity in 2020 in the Netherlands will lead to no more than 0.5 TWh curtailment per year31. Different 
scenarios are considered. The relatively low curtailment implies less need for power-to-gas technology. 
The conclusion regarding the knowledge development function is that there have been many power-to-
gas research programs and publications over the last 10 years. The general outcome for the power-to-
gas TIS is positive. The knowledge base is growing and so far no showstoppers are identified. 
8.5 Knowledge exchange 
The function of knowledge exchange concerns the exchange of information through networks, 
publications, conferences and other means that are used to share information. Knowledge exchange is 
important in a strict R&D setting, but especially in a heterogeneous context where R&D meets 
government, competitors, and market. Here policy decisions (standards, long term targets) should be 
consistent with the latest technological insights and, at the same time, R&D agendas should be affected 
by changing norms and values32,33.  
For the Fuel Cells and Hydrogen Joint Undertaking (FCH JU), cooperation between government, 
businesses and research institutions is a main target. The three members of the FCH JU are the 
European Commission, the NEW Industry Grouping and the N.ERGHY Research Grouping. The NEW 
Industry grouping has 68 companies working in the field of fuel cells and hydrogen and they represent a 
major part of the sector34. The N.ERGHY Research Grouping represents the interests of European 
universities and research institutes in the FCH JU. Currently 58 international research institutions are a 
part of N.ERGHY35. As mentioned before the FCH JU has 27 projects carried out and they are all 
Hydrogen related. The projects themselves all have several organizations participating. 
The International Energy Agency (IEA) is an autonomous organization which works to ensure reliable, 
affordable and clean energy for its 28 member countries and beyond. The IEA's four main areas of focus 
are: energy security, economic development, environmental awareness, and engagement worldwide. 
The IEA has developed a Hydrogen Implementing Agreement. The strategy of the IEA's Hydrogen 
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Program is to facilitate, coordinate, and maintain innovative R&D activities through international 
cooperation and information exchange. Knowledge exchange is stimulated by the IEA because of its 
focus on international cooperation. Task 24 from the Hydrogen Implementing agreement provides an 
overview for technologies which have direct influence on development and implementation of systems 
integrating wind energy with hydrogen production. 
The Joint Research Centre Institute for Energy and Transport (JRC IET) provides support to European 
Union policies and technology innovation to ensure sustainable, safe, secure and efficient energy 
production, distribution and use and to foster sustainable and efficient transport in Europe. The SETIS 
program belongs to the key scientific activities of the JRC IET and provides information on 37 fuel cells 
and hydrogen projects and 45 wind energy projects36.  
The entrepreneurial activities that are a part of the power-to-gas TIS are also a clear example of the 
knowledge exchange function. Appendix B shows the partners per project. Almost all projects have 
multiple partners with different backgrounds such as research institutions, gas companies, electricity 
companies and suppliers of power-to-gas technology. 
The North Sea Power to Gas Platform is an example of a network of stakeholders that come together to 
share information and experiences. The platform was initiated in 2012 and has had five meetings since 
the start. 14 member organizations have joined the platform.  
The research that is seen as a part of the knowledge development function contributes to the knowledge 
exchange function in two ways. First of all, the research programs in general result in publications, 
presentations and conferences. In the second place, just like the entrepreneurial activities, most 
research programs have multiple partners participating in the projects. Appendix C shows the 
participating partners in the largest recent power-to-gas research programs. Since almost all research 
programs and entrepreneurial activities involve several participants the conclusion is that the knowledge 
exchange function in the power-to-gas TIS is fulfilled in a positive way. 
8.6 Guidance of the search 
The guidance of the search function refers to the activities within the TIS that shape the needs, 
requirements and expectations of actors with respect to their further support of the emerging technology. 
Usually, various technological options exist within an emerging technological field. The guidance of the 
search function represents the selection process that is needed to direct scarce resources to the most 
promising options37,38.	
For power-to-gas the growth of intermittent renewable energy is crucial. Only when there is significant 
excess renewable electricity it becomes urgent to have power-to-gas technology. The European 
Commission states in its Energy 2020 strategy that it will implement the SET plan without delay39.	One of 
the six initiatives in the SET plan is the European wind initiative. The key objective of this initiative is to 
double the power generation capacity of the largest wind turbines, with off-shore wind as the lead 
application40. The European wind initiative is now being implemented by EU institutions, member states, 
TPWind and the European Energy Research Alliance (EERA). The budget of the European wind initiative is 
€6 billion (public and private resources)41.  
In March 2013 the Dutch government published “Rijksstructuurvisie Windenergie op land”. It was 
decided that for onshore wind energy a number of areas were considered to be fit for wind projects of 
100 MW and more. These projects will have to answer to national regulation whereas smaller projects 
have to meet local (provincial) regulation. This way the Dutch government wishes to realize 6000 MW 
onshore wind energy by 2020. The vision includes subsidies for 2013 for a total of €3 billion for the 
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production of renewable energy (not just wind). For offshore projects the new national policy will appear 
in 2014.  
The guidance of the search function at a high level compares power-to-gas to other technologies to store 
intermittent renewable energy. Those other relevant large scale energy storage technologies are pumped 
hydro energy storage, compressed air energy storage and stationary batteries. Research shows that the 
strengths of power-to-gas technology are the possibility to offer storage on a large scale and to store 
energy in the range of hours to several weeks. On the other hand the power-to-gas energy efficiency is 
low compared to other storage options42,43,44,45. As far as guidance of the search is concerned the 
comparison with other storage technologies seems to encourage further power-to-gas development 
based on its strengths. Improving the energy efficiency is a priority. 
Within the power-to-gas TIS the guidance of the search function has several subjects. They can be 
analysed in a structured way using the power-to-gas process. The first step is the conversion of excess 
electricity into hydrogen using electrolysis. The electrolyser uses either Alkaline, Polymer Electrolyte 
Membrane (PEM) or Solid Oxide Electrolysis (SOE) technology. Alkaline electrolysis is a well-established 
technology but the efficiency of the process, the purity of the hydrogen and the performance at low loads 
should improve. PEM technology is more efficient but has higher costs. SOEC electrolysis is in a 
laboratory stage46,47. Currently several projects study Alkaline and/or PEM electrolysis48,49. On this 
subject the guidance of the search is ongoing. There are no recent breakthroughs that are decisive for 
the choice of electrolysis technology. 
After the conversion of excess electricity into hydrogen there are different ways to use the hydrogen. 
First of all the hydrogen can be used in transportation or in industry. The FCH JU reports 20 projects 
concerning transportation and refuelling infrastructure50. Some of the entrepreneurial activities also 
involve transportation. In more than 10 European cities hydrogen fuelling stations can be found51.  
The hydrogen can also be added to the gas grid. This option has three main advantages. The storage 
capacity of the gas grid is large, the existing infrastructure can be used and the transportation of gas is 
cost-effective. Two large studies suggest that adding hydrogen to the gas grid is probably feasible under 
certain conditions52,53. One of the conditions is the percentage of hydrogen that is added to the natural 
gas. Converting the hydrogen into methane is an alternative route. Methane behaves like natural gas 
and can be added to the gas grid without restrictions. On the other hand methanation makes the power-
to-gas process less energy efficient and CO2 is needed to produce the methane. Both methods are 
currently used in the entrepreneurial activities that are discussed54,55,56 and there is ongoing research on 
the injection of hydrogen and methane into the gas grid57. Again it is too early to say if hydrogen is 
going to be added to the gas grid on a large scale and if methanation is going to be used while doing this. 
If hydrogen is added to the gas grid it might be desirable to be able to separate the hydrogen from the 
gas mixture for other applications later on. Using a membrane system this separation is possible but has 
high capital costs58. The FCH JU has one project concerning separation59. It seems that the separation 
technology does not have the centre of attention in the power-to-gas TIS. 
In the power-to-gas TIS the guidance of the search function involves two main issues. In the first place 
power-to-gas has to become more energy efficient. Several electrolysis technologies are being studied 
but there is no best technology identified yet. In the second place it is not clear in what way the 
produced hydrogen should be used to get the highest benefits out of power-to-gas technology. If 
hydrogen transportation is going to be applied on a large scale it may not be necessary to inject 
hydrogen into the gas grid. On this subject the guidance of the search function is in progress and has not 
identified a preferred solution yet. 
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8.7 Market formation 
The market formation function involves activities that contribute to the creation of a demand for the 
emerging technology, for example by financially supporting the use of the emerging technology. In case 
of sustainable innovations, there is usually no commercial product unless the institutional framework is 
adjusted to account for external costs. Therefore, in this case, the system function is typically fulfilled by 
governments, through the setting up of formal institutions60.  
8.7.1 Regulation 
For power-to-gas the market formation is in the first place facing a lack of regulation. At this moment 
the responsibility concerning power-to-gas is unclear. Is power-to-gas the responsibility of the electricity 
producer, electricity distributor, gas producer, gas distributor or some other party? Despite all the 
power-to-gas demonstration projects it is unlikely that there will be large scale power-to-gas plants 
before the regulator has set up the regulatory framework. In the Energy agreement61 power-to-gas is 
mentioned when adaptations in the energy infrastructure are discussed. The Energy agreement states 
that energy storage is needed and that power-to-gas technology has to be examined. Responsibilities or 
the need for regulation are not discussed. Recent changes in the Gas law and the Electricity law have not 
provided a regulatory framework for power-to-gas. Still such a framework is necessary for market 
formation to develop. 
Regulation is also important to achieve economically viable P2G implementation. At present, the only 
value that can be gained from P2G technology is in the production of a gas with re-sale value – hydrogen 
or SNG. Much of the real value to the energy system comes from elsewhere - in the avoided capital cost 
of extra infrastructure, in the enabling of maximum utilization of renewable electricity, and in the 
increase in renewable content of the gas networks. All these need to be given value through appropriate 
regulation to give P2G developers the confidence that they can implement a market ready solution62. 
8.7.2 Regulatory risk 
There is a direct relation between market formation and the perceived risks. When the businesses 
consider the project risks too high then there will be no market. What risks do businesses face when 
they invest in power-to-gas technology? Two risk categories that can be identified (among others) are 
regulatory risk and market risk63. 
Regulatory or institutional risk concerns the risk of adverse changes in the policy context. Policies and 
measures might change during the project cycle which may have significant impacts on the profitability 
of a project. Examples are changes to or even ending of policy support schemes or changes to the 
market design. As most markets for renewables are being regulated under policy schemes, this risk is of 
particular importance to renewable energy technologies64. Once installed the regulation has to be reliable 
in the long run. Regulatory risk is caused by unexpected changes in the rules65.  
The policy context for power-to-gas includes the Energy 2020 strategy, the European wind initiatives and 
in the Netherlands the national plans for wind on land and wind at sea. It is important that the plans of 
the government are perceived as convincing. In response to the plans of the government Energie-
Nederland, a Dutch organization for the assembled Dutch energy producers, transporters and other 
parties, signals some problems. Some of the assigned areas are not chosen from a technical feasible 
point of view. In reality there might be not enough sufficient space for 6,000 MW in the plans. Another 
concern that Energie-Nederland has is the availability from the subsidies for wind projects. The 
regulation provides incentives to apply for subsidies with low cost projects. In the end those projects 
don’t turn out to be financial feasible. Bigger and more expensive wind projects miss out on the 
subsidies and will not be realized according to Energie-Nederland66. 
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The CPB (the Dutch agency for economic policy analysis) adviced negative on the Dutch onshore wind 
plans. A cost benefit analyses shows that the economic crisis and the large availability of coal due to the 
shale gas growth in the USA has caused excess electricity producing capacity. Expanding the capacity – 
with wind energy or otherwise – will not be profitable. The CPB advises to postpone the new wind 
projects for five years67. 
8.7.3 Gas quality and regulatory risk 
To store hydrogen in the gas grid is not only a matter of technological feasibility. It is also necessary that 
adding hydrogen is confirmed by the relevant regulation. In 2011 KEMA and Arcadis published 
“Gaskwaliteit voor de toekomst”, a study on the possible composition of gases in the system68,69. The 
study was ordered by the ministry of economic affairs, agriculture and innovation. First the study 
mentions the requirements that the policy on gas quality has to meet. For power-to-gas the most 
important requirement is that there is a need for a policy that offers certainty for investments. If power-
to-gas eventually means a gas grid containing 10% hydrogen then this has to be according to the future 
gas quality standards. As long as these standards are not clear investors will hesitate to invest in power-
to-gas. The most important conclusions of the report is that the gas quality for the future needs further 
specification to give investors in appliances and producers of gas the right information that they need for 
their decisions. This is also recognized by the topteam energy, a platform that is a part of the Dutch 
topsector policy. The need for (international) regulation is one of the problems that the team would like 
to solve70. 
8.7.4 Economic risk 
Important economic risks are demand risk (uncompetitive pricing policy of renewable projects) and price 
risk (changes in market prices of energy carriers and/or certificates for climate change abatement of 
renewable production)71. 
If the hydrogen or methane is too expensive due to the high costs of power-to-gas technology there will 
be a lack of demand. Power-to-gas installations are expensive and since they are only used when excess 
electricity is available the installation will not be operating all the time. This means that the high fixed 
costs have to be compensated in limited time. The revenue of power-to-gas will probably not cover the 
costs if the revenue is restricted to the price that is received for the gas. An additional benefit of power-
to-gas is the contribution to the balancing of the electricity network. The value of this contribution could 
be considered to be revenue as well.  
Because power-to-gas does not seem to be financially feasible different models are looked upon. In 
Germany there is a proposal to obligate the regional energy producers to buy the green gas at a price 
that covers the costs for the investor. The extra costs will be passed on to the consumers. Since the 
green gas is a small part of the total energy use the extra costs will be limited72.  
Compared to other options (batteries, pumped hydro systems and others) the large scale and long-time 
storage of excess electricity through power-to-gas looks promising. Large scale stationary storage of 
hydrogen enables synergies with both e-mobility by the application of hydrogen powered fuel cell electric 
vehicles and the direct utilisation of hydrogen in industry. Given the achievable prices for hydrogen in 
different applications, based on the assumption that hydrogen in the transport sector can be sold in a 
bandwidth between 6 €/kgH2 (hydrogen delivered to refuelling station) and 8 €/kgH2 (accepted hydrogen 
sales price at the refuelling station for end users), it is revealed that hydrogen as a fuel provides the 
most valuable sales pathway. The other utilisation pathways may, in fact, offer a larger potential in light 
of volume, but their potential with regard to economic opportunities is clearly below that of the 
transportation sector. Also a major disadvantage of the methane systems is their comparatively low 
overall efficiency73. 
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Another approach is taken by the CENER Centre74. Their model provides an economical assessment of a 
wind-hydrogen energy system. They emphasize the possibility to sell wind electricity at the best possible 
price. When prices are low, the energy should be stored as hydrogen. Selling at the best possible price 
might improve the overall rate of return. For a 42 MW wind farm using historical data it turns out that 
adding power-to-gas to the system results in a better price (€/kWh) but not in a higher rate of return. 
The investments needed for the power-to-gas equipment bring along higher costs that are not made up 
for by the extra revenues due to better trading. 
SEO Economic Research studied the costs and benefits of different measures to reduce CO2 emissions75. 
They qualify power-to-gas as a costly but necessary technology to meet the 2050 target of 80% 
reduction of emission. The most cost efficient technologies are energy savings, wind on land, CO2 
capture and nuclear energy. ECN and the Planbureau voor de leefomgeving published a roadmap for 
205076 where they also find that given the reduction of emission target a growth in renewable energy 
production should be expected. This growth creates a need for storage that power-to-gas can fulfil.  
8.7.5 Market formation 
The market formation function in the power-to-gas TIS identifies a number of barriers. In the first place 
there is a lack of regulation and it is therefore unclear who has the responsibility to balance the 
electricity network applying power-to-gas. Secondly it is unsure whether current regulations will result in 
a sufficient growth of intermittent renewable energy. There are European and national programs and 
plans to support this growth but they may not be sufficient and they are criticized for being unrealistic. A 
third barrier is the lack of long term regulation on the subject of gas quality. Finally power-to-gas does 
not seem financially feasible. The contribution of power-to-gas in balancing the network has to be taken 
into account because other costs may be avoided. The conclusion is that the market formation function 
identifies a number of problems for the power-to-gas TIS. 
8.8 Resource mobilization 
Resource mobilization refers to the allocation of financial, material and human capital. The access to 
such capital factors is necessary for the development of the power-to-gas TIS. Typical activities involved 
in this system function are investments and subsidies77. As discussed above, there is only a need for 
power-to-gas if there is a large amount of intermittent renewable energy. This means that the funds 
directed at stimulating renewable energy in an indirect way increase the need for power-to-gas. 
Therefore looking at the function of resource mobilization requires a broad perspective. Investments and 
subsidies for power-to-gas technology represent direct resource mobilization for the TIS but resources 
for intermittent renewable energy sources are relevant as well since they contribute to market formation. 
8.8.1 Subsidies 
Subsidies can be found at both European and national level. The Seventh Framework Programme from 
the European Union wants to make Europe the leading world forum for science and technology. The 
specific program Cooperation – a part of the Seventh Framework - aims to support cooperation between 
industries, research centres and public authorities. Energy is one of the nine themes of the Cooperation 
program. The budget allocated to the Energy theme is € 2,350 million for the period 2008 – 2013. A 
share of €467 million of this budget is earmarked for research on fuel cells and hydrogen and is 
implemented by the fuel cells and hydrogen joint undertaking (FCH-JU). The €467 million from the FCH-
JU is matched by €470 million from the industry78,79. 
Only a part of the Seventh framework programme budget for the Energy theme is spent on research 
related to hydrogen. The Energy Policy for Europe introduces a set of European energy measures that 
should realize the goals of the Energy theme. The measures and goals concern among others the 
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internal energy market, energy efficiency and renewable energy. The budget for the Energy theme is 
therefore not at all earmarked for power-to-gas technology. The funds directed at stimulating renewable 
energy in an indirect way increase the need for power-to-gas. An example is the more than €110 million 
that has been provided by the European Union since 2002 for wind energy research80,81. 
The Dutch government’s industrial policy is based on nine so called top sectors. Energy is one of the top 
sectors and is divided in seven Top consortia for Knowledge and Innovation (TKI). One of the TKI’s has 
gas as its subject. The TKI Gas has a €50 million budget in 2012 but only a small part is invested in 
power-to-gas related topics82,83. 
8.8.2 Investments 
It is important to realize that the European and national subsidies do not finance research and pilot 
projects by themselves. They are always matched by other funds that are also needed to have sufficient 
resources. Whether research or projects are financed through subsidies or private investments depends 
on the life cycle stage that the technology is in84. 
 
 
Figure 62: Global capital market for sustainable projects 2007. 
(Biemans, 2009) 
Figure 62 shows that a technology in its early stage –technology research and technology development - 
is financed through subsidies, businesses and venture capital. The entrepreneurial activities in the 
power-to-gas TIS (Table 14) confirm this. All activities have private and public parties involved.  
Using the broad perspective where the growth of intermittent renewable energy is a positive contribution 
for the power-to-gas TIS Figure 63 shows the installed capacity for electricity generation from 
renewables in the European Union. It is clear that there is a large growth of installed wind capacity that 
implicates a growth in mobilized resources as well. The solar energy is among the other sources of 
renewable energy and has grown as well.  
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Figure 63: Installed capacity for electricity generation from renewables, EU-2885 
Bloomberg86 reports rising new investments in renewable energy in Europe between 2004 and 2011. In 
2012 and 2013 new investments fall to a lower level. For the power-to-gas TIS the fall in new 
investments is negative. Looking at the need for a strong growth in intermittent energy sources a rise in 
new investments in renewable energy is needed. 
The conclusion concerning resource mobilization is that the large amount of entrepreneurial activities in 
recent years shows that resources have been available. On a European level subsidies exist and are 
matched by private capital. The growing installed capacity for electricity generation from renewables also 
contributes to the power-to-gas TIS in a positive way. 
8.9 Support from advocacy coalitions 
The rise of an emerging technology often leads to resistance from actors with interests in the incumbent 
energy system. In order for a TIS to develop, it is necessary to overcome this resistance. Lobbies and 
advice activities are used to create support from advocacy coalitions87,88. To analyse the support from 
advocacy function, the lobby groups that are related to power-to-gas have to be found. In the European 
transparency register 15 lobby groups are registered with hydrogen mentioned in the description of the 
goal of the organization. Over 50 lobby groups have wind in the description of their goal89. Some of the 
lobby groups have hydrogen or wind energy as their core business other lobby groups have other goals 
that come in the first place. For them the promotion of hydrogen or wind energy is a secondary goal. The 
largest lobby groups that focus on hydrogen or wind energy will be described briefly. 
The European gas research group (GERG) was founded in 1961 and promotes innovation in gas 
technology. GERG wants to strengthen the safe transport, distribution and use of natural and renewable 
gases. It is a major objective of GERG to maintain strong links with the European Union and to 
contribute to the discussion of policy on activities concerning natural gas R&D in Europe by making 
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available its expertise, advice and support90. GERG is therefore an important advocacy coalition with 28 
gas industry members from 14 countries. 
The European Hydrogen Association (EHA) represents 21 national hydrogen and fuel cell organisations 
and the main European companies active in the hydrogen infrastructure development. The EHA 
communicates on important issues regarding industrial and regulatory needs to key decision makers at 
EU level91.  
The NEW industry grouping (NEW-IG) has 68 companies working in the field of fuel cells and hydrogen 
and they represent a major part of the sector. Their objective is to promote the interests of the fuel cells 
and hydrogen industry at a European level by engaging with European decision-makers92. 
The N.ERGHY Research Grouping represents the interests of European universities and research 
institutes in the FCH JU. Currently 58 international research institutions are a part of E.NERGHY 
The European Wind Energy Association (EWEA) promotes the utilization of wind power in Europe and 
worldwide. It represents 700 members from almost 60 countries. The EWEA develops and communicates 
effective strategic policies and initiatives to influence the political process in a direction that maintains 
and creates stable markets and overcome barriers to the deployment of wind energy93. 
The support from advocacy coalitions function is met by the power-to-gas TIS as far as the existence 
and presence of lobby groups is concerned. Whether the lobby activities result in the desired actions is 
another matter. The entrepreneurial activities, the existing research programs and the available funds all 
suggest that the lobby activities do have the desired results. Examples of issues that are not realized so 
far are gas quality standards that allow hydrogen in the gas grid and the legal framework for power-to-
gas. 
8.10 System dynamics 
So far the different functions from the power-to-gas TIS have been discussed separately. This has given 
a valuable insight in the progress that has been made in each function. It also has been a static 
approach. In this section the system dynamics will be discussed.  
The power-to-gas TIS seems to start with entrepreneurial activities. The expected growth of renewable 
energy will cause more intermittent electricity and a balancing problem on the electricity grid. The 
guidance of the search function starts the entrepreneurial activities. Innovative research, including 
demonstration projects, is initiated. The businesses and research institutions then require resources to 
cover part of their costs and to compensate the financial risks they take. In the power-to-gas TIS funds 
have come available and projects have started. The outcome of the projects feeds back into the dynamic 
system and is an impulse for new projects. The entrepreneurial activities interact with knowledge 
development and knowledge exchange. This too has been observed in the power-to-gas TIS. 
Figure 64 shows an illustration of the dynamics between functions in the power-to-gas TIS. It is possible 
to place the events that have been discussed in this chapter in this dynamic system. The policy context 
for power-to-gas includes the Energy 2020 strategy, the European wind initiative and in the Netherlands 
the national plans for wind on land and wind at sea. The energy policy activates the guidance of the 
search. The expected growth in wind and solar energy causes a (potential) balancing problem on the 
electricity networks so a solution has to be found. Business and research institutions start projects and 
claim resources. The most important events concerning knowledge development are the FCH JU projects, 
the Naturalhy project, DVGW research and the HyUnder project. The entrepreneurial activities are a 
response to the guidance of the search impulse as well. Research centres and businesses build advocacy 
coalitions to lobby for resources to support research and entrepreneurial projects. 
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Figure 64: The power-to-gas TIS as a dynamic system. 
So far the general outcomes of the projects have resulted in positive feedback loops. Most research and 
demonstration projects support the feasibility of power-to-gas. The guidance of the search is continued 
at the same path and new projects are initiated. The seventh framework programme is followed by 
Horizon 2020 supporting new power-to-gas related projects. The fuel cells and hydrogen joint technology 
initiative (FCH JTI) resulted in the foundation of the fuel cells and hydrogen joint undertaking (FCH JU). 
The entrepreneurial activities have also resulted in new and more projects. In Stuttgart a ZSW pilot 
project from 2009 has been followed by a larger project in 2012. In Eichhof a Fraunhofer IWES power-
to-gas pilot has resulted in a second phase including methanation. 
Negative feedback loops are found looking at the market formation function. Appropriate regulation to 
achieve economically viable P2G implementation is missing94. The Energy 2020 strategy has to be 
carried out but are not perceived by all as convincing95,96. There is also a need for new regulation on gas 
quality standards97,98. So far the identified problems have not resulted in a drastic change in the 
guidance of the search. New research and pilot projects are still carried out even though the market 
formation is lagging behind. 
8.11 Conclusions 
The power-to-gas TIS shows a lot of progress on most functions. Over the last years a growing number 
of research projects and entrepreneurial activities have been developed. This has led to knowledge 
development and knowledge exchange. Funds to finance the projects have become available. An 
important matter now is if the need for power-to-gas solutions is urgent enough to keep the power-to-
gas TIS in an upward spiral. This urgency is in TIS terminology part of the guidance of the search 
function. 
The first conclusion has to be that a convincing European and national energy policy aimed at a 
substantial growth of wind and solar energy is the most important condition for power-to-gas to become 
a needed and applied technology. The European energy policy and plans as they are stated in Energy 
202099, Energy trends 2030100 and the Energy Roadmap 2050101 do show this commitment. The 
European wind initiative – part of the SET plan - wants to enable wind energy to supply 20% of Europe’s 
electricity in 2020, 33% in 2030 and 50% in 2050. It is clear that the European ambition is large enough 
to cause a need for power-to-gas technology. The implementation of the ambition has to be a driving 
force for power-to-gas to become widely applied. If the implementation of the European plans gets 
delayed or if the ambition is scaled down, this will obviously reduce the need for power-to-gas solutions. 
The need for a substantial growth of wind en solar energy asks for support from advocacy coalitions. The 
growth of wind and solar energy cannot be taken for granted based on the presence of an ambitious 
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formulated European energy policy. The large investments cause criticism and this could result in a 
turning point for renewable energy. A significant and continues effort to organize support for growth of 
wind and solar energy are a second condition for power-to-gas to play a part in the future energy system. 
Power-to-gas technology has to be improved to eliminate a number of technological and economic 
barriers. To add 10% hydrogen to the natural gas network measures have to be taken to ensure that the 
existing gas turbines, appliances, steel tanks and underground storages are ready for a changed gas 
mixture. Another pathway is methanation. Using hydrogen to produce methane offers the advantage 
that methane can be injected into the natural gas network without restrictions. In both cases an increase 
in energy efficiency of power-to-gas technology is needed to improve the power-to-gas business case. 
Entrepreneurial activities, knowledge development and knowledge exchange are needed to realize the 
requested progress. 
The regulatory framework for power-to-gas at the moment shows some deficiencies. Power-to-gas is the 
linking pin between the electricity grid and the natural gas network. Regulation is needed to determine if 
power-to-gas is the responsibility of the electricity producer, electricity distributor, gas producer, gas 
distributor or some other party. Despite all the power-to-gas demonstration projects it is unlikely that 
there will be large scale power-to-gas plants before the regulator has set up the regulatory framework. 
Another regulatory issue are the gas quality standards. To store hydrogen in the gas grid is not only a 
matter of technological feasibility. It is also necessary that adding hydrogen is conform the relevant 
regulation. The gas quality standards for the future need further specification to give investors in 
appliances and producers of gas the right information that they need for their decisions.  
Power-to-gas installations are expensive and since they are only used when excess electricity is available 
the installation will not be operating all the time. This means that the high fixed costs have to be 
compensated in limited time. The revenue of power-to-gas will probably not cover the costs if the 
revenue is restricted to the price that is received for the gas. Additional benefits of power-to-gas are the 
contribution to the balancing of the electricity network, the avoiding of capital costs of expanding the 
electricity network and the utilization of renewable electricity. The value of this contribution could be 
considered to be revenue as well. Regulation is needed so that the power-to-gas investor does not only 
carry the costs but also gets rewarded for the realized benefits. 
The legal framework, the gas quality standards and the regulation to support investments are all part of 
the market formation function. The power-to-gas advocacy coalition can contribute to the market 
formation function by lobbying for the needed regulation. 
Using a TIS approach to analyse power-to-gas development has been useful. The position that power-to-
gas will have in the future energy system will depend on the realization of wind and solar ambitions, the 
technological progress on power-to-gas energy efficiency and the making of a regulatory framework both 
for gas quality standards and for investment conditions. All TIS functions need to make progress but this 
is especially true for the market formation function. 
What will determine if power-to-gas will be an important technology in the energy transition over the 
next years? One can look at the development of a technology as a process that takes place in a 
technological innovation system (TIS). The TIS includes all actors and institutions that are involved in 
the development, diffusion and utilization of a technology. For a technology to develop successfully the 
TIS should fulfil several functions. For power-to-gas technology pilot projects are realized, studies are 
carried out and funds are available both for projects as for research. The functions called entrepreneurial 
activities, knowledge development, knowledge exchange and resource mobilization are all met. The 
function that faces the most problems is called market formation. There is not yet a regulatory 
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framework for power-to-gas. Investors in power-to-gas also need to be rewarded for the benefits that 
they realize such as the contribution to the balancing of the electricity network, the avoiding of capital 
costs of expanding the electricity network and the utilization of renewable electricity. Policy directed at 
market formation is therefore recommended. 
Key Findings: 
• Power-to-gas technology needs a substantial growth of wind and solar energy. 
• Research and entrepreneurial activities are contributing to power-to-gas technology. 
• A legal framework is needed to enable potential investors to take long term decisions. 
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9 CONTEXTUAL AND SYSTEMIC FORCES IN ENERGY VALLEY - 
THE NETHERLANDS 
Author: Anu Manickam – Hanze University of Applied Sciences Groningen 
9.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes how contextual factors and system reactions influence end state developments 
based on a systems approach. The chapter uses the case study of Energy Valley of the Netherlands to 
illustrate the influence of contextual factors on the regional energy system and how the system 
responded and developed. The illustration below captures system interactions with its context and 
eventually the resulting end state. 
 
 
Figure 65: Systems approach 
The illustration shows that energy systems respond to contextual factors and this in turn affect 
contextual factors. Decisions and behaviour in this energy system are influenced by contextual factors, 
which in turn result in energy developments. This continued loop of interactions would finally result in a 
particular ‘end state’ for such a system. The term ‘end states’ has been described in the introductory 
chapter and this chapter shows how such end states could be influenced by various contextual factors 
and systemic responses.  
When talking about ‘energy systems’ this analysis takes a broader perspective and looks at ‘energy’ as 
being embedded in social, economic, and political systems and that such a system could be a district, 
region, country, or a regional block such as the EU. The analysis looks at ‘energy’ as being located in a 
specific location with a defined boundary and it can be of different scales. In the research, Energy Valley 
was examined as an energy system embedded in a larger energy system, which is the national energy 
system and this in turn, is embedded in a European energy system. Each of these systems can be 
examined separately, but each of these next level systems is interconnected and contributed to other 
levels. EU decisions and developments influenced Dutch decisions and developments and therefore that 
of Energy Valley. At the same time, Energy Valley developments reflected national and EU developments. 
This analysis compares Energy Valley and national energy developments to that of EU developments for 
similarities and differences in their systems patterns and behaviour later in the chapter. 
Finally, it must be noted that this chapter builds on a previous chapter on ‘drivers of change’, which 
focuses on the macro level contexts in which energy developments take place, whilst this chapter looks 
at contextual factors influencing energy developments at the micro level, specifically from a systems 
perspective.  
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The rest of the chapter has 5 sections. Section 9.2 describes salient aspects on Energy Valley and the 
research to be able to frame the analysis presented in this chapter. Section 9.3 describes ‘contextual 
factors’ and how these framed Energy Valley’s energy system developments initially and then in Section 
9.4, the ‘system responses’ are described and again, Energy Valley’s energy system responses are 
illustrated to show what this means. In Section 9.5, a comparison of Energy Valley’s energy system 
development and that of the EU is discussed to understand how energy systems are embedded in larger 
regional systems and how these systems interact. In the final section, implications of the analysis [and 
of a systems approach] are discussed in the light of ‘end states’.  
9.2 Research on Energy Valley case study 
Energy Valley is an energy cluster covering the Northern part of the Netherlands and was established in 
2003 by stakeholders including local policymakers in response to EU and national energy liberalization 
policies. Energy Valley faced two major strands of development. The first, a gas driven national energy 
sector facing the transition to more sustainable, liberalised European energy market and the second, the 
economic development of a periphery region. Energy Valley cluster as a case study offered exploration 
into these two interconnected developments driven by changing EU and global contexts. 
Energy Valley was established in 2003 and has seen changes in its scope, visibility and developments as 
a result of changes in its context. In order to understand how energy systems develop, the research 
chose a complex adaptive systems approach, which offered a systems perspective on how systems 
change due to responses of its agents to changes in its environment. This approach offered both micro 
and macro level systems perspectives which meant that local micro interactions and behaviours of 
agents could be understood within broader macro level energy and contextual developments. The study 
looked at system developments at the local, national and EU levels and these examples will be used to 
illustrate how energy systems develop in their (local) contexts. The research on Energy Valley was a 
qualitative study based on stakeholder and expert inputs supported by secondary sources of information. 
9.3 Contextual factors 
Contextual factors in this analysis include drivers of change, history and geography of the system, 
stakeholders and collective definition and boundaries of the energy system.  
 
 
Figure 66: Contextual Factors in Energy Systems 
To illustrate, discovery of gas in the North NL and the development of the gas industry for NL and EU 
determined the key stakeholders, namely, gas corporations, the national government and regional 
governments. This led to an energy system built on gas as the key resource. This initial energy system 
dominated by gas with its stakeholders and definitions of the system responded to specific drivers of 
change. 
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9.3.1 Drivers of change 
Drivers of change in this analysis are understood to be drivers that change the system as a whole. It has 
been found in this study that drivers in energy systems can be external or internal drivers. The case 
study of Energy Valley illustrates which drivers of change were relevant to its system changes. There 
were nine significant external drivers and seven internal drivers. Below are some highlights of these 
drivers of change and their relevance to a gas dominated system of Energy Valley. 
External drivers of change in Energy Valley 
 Geo-political shifts 
Major geo-political shifts such as the emerging power shifts towards Asian economies and the 
renewed Russian political threats to Europe are examples of drivers that required strategic 
responses in Energy Valley.  
 Energy security threats 
Dependence on external energy sources (EU imports 53% of its energy needs and of this, 
imports for crude oil is 90%, natural gas is 66% and solid fuels 42%) and incidents such as the 
recent Russian threats to European gas supply (Russian gas contributes 39% of its gas imports) 
needed to be addressed. 
 Large scale power outage and blackouts in Europe 
The need for improved grid infrastructure across Europe to increase reliability is directly linked to 
energy security issues. Major outages and blackouts in Europe that had cascading effects in 
other parts were present in the recent past and therefore all regions had to comply with new EU 
directives and legislations to mitigate such effects, including major grid investments.  
 EU market liberalization 
EU liberalization of electricity and gas markets was introduced to support consumer choice and 
increased competition. Energy systems are directly affected. 
 EU legislations 
The legislations supported EU’s goal towards a more reliable and sustainable use of energy and 
more flexible markets led by demand-side focus. Specific legislations governed grid 
interconnections and efficiency of energy systems to support development of a European internal 
energy market. Energy Valley needed to comply. 
 Sustainability and climate change 
Long-term energy sustainability agendas that included climate change resulted in compliance of 
Member States to meet CO2 and renewable energy targets. The EU saw gas as a fossil fuel and 
this had implications for Energy Valley and the Netherlands. 
 New energy resources and balancing 
EU targets for renewable energy and energy efficiency (Policies: 2020, 2030, 2050 Energy 
Roadmaps) were directly relevant to developments in Energy Valley. The increased need for 
balancing as a result of large-scale introduction of renewable energies offered new opportunities 
for the gas sector in Energy Valley. 
 US cheap coal and shale 
  
 
Energy Delta Gas Research – The Big Picture  Page 144
 
The US shale revolution and its move towards increased renewable energy in their energy mix 
resulted in excess and cheap coal being dumped in European markets, including the Netherlands. 
This had a strong impact on energy demands by power plants and therefore affected climate 
change and sustainability agendas and developments locally.  
 Technology developments 
The shale revolution, cheaper solar and wind energy, viable smart grid technologies, bio-fuels, 
fuel cells and hydrogen fuels are examples of the impact of technological developments on 
market developments. Unpredictability was a major concern.  
Internal drivers of change in Energy Valley 
 Depletion of gas resources 
Depletion of the Groningen gas reserves has been estimated around 2030 at the current rate of 
extraction. Energy Valley’s gas contributes almost two-thirds of the energy needs of the 
Netherlands. Earnings in 2013 were more than 15 billion euros from gas revenues. The gas 
industry has direct implications for local and national economies.  
 New gas reserves and biogas 
Biomass gasification, production of syngas, creation of green gas hubs are examples of new 
developments in Energy Valley changing the local gas and energy sectors. 
 Increased earthquake risks 
Increased earthquakes and damage to property directly related to gas exploitation in the Energy 
Valley region were creating tensions between local population, local politicians and gas 
corporations and national government where conflicts in interests, roles and power relations 
played a role.  
 National policies  
As mentioned earlier, government economic interests in the gas revenues were conflicting with 
citizen safety and electoral pressures. Long-term gas contracts and legal obligations to trading 
partners outside of the country versus citizen and green movements were tensions in the system. 
National policies were leading and therefore relevant to Energy Valley’s energy system. 
 North Netherlands as economic lag region 
Energy Valley is a periphery region of the Netherlands that has lower economic growth than the 
national average (-3% vs. 0.75% in 2014). Regional development agendas were competing with 
energy transition developments and national economic priorities. 
 Citizen movements and developments 
As mentioned earlier, a growing distrust in energy corporations and government related to 
conflict of interests regarding gas exploration and earthquake risks, the rising energy prices and 
need for autonomy and self-sufficiency were some of the key motives of citizens and grassroots 
movements to initiate decentralized energy solutions. Parallel to this was also the ‘green’ 
sustainable movement. Citizens producing energy were dubbed ‘prosumer’, producing consumers.   
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 Role of local governments 
The urgency of local governments in the economic lag region of Energy Valley to create jobs and 
economic growth was prevalent. The depletion of gas resources was a major threat to further 
economic depression coupled with youth urban migration pulls. Earthquakes risked aggravating 
the attractiveness of the location. The regional development agenda was a strong driver in the 
region that included job creation, innovation boost and mitigating earthquake issues.  
9.3.2 History and geography 
Discovery of gas in the 1950s has and continued to have a major impact on the local energy system of 
Energy Valley. The region has built its infrastructure, energy mix and economic development policies 
based on the gas industry and revenues. The Dutch government has a dominant stake in the gas 
resources (50% state ownership) and are directly connected to national strategic interests. The local 
energy system of Energy Valley is therefore tightly connected to the national energy system. The trading 
history of the Netherlands and its current ‘BV NL’ (‘Netherlands Incorporated’) strategy framed economic 
interests as being leading. Gas is traded internationally and has larger implications beyond Energy Valley. 
The periphery and lag region positions of the region meant that economic and social structures needed 
to be addressed. The region is dominated by agriculture and rural economies on the one hand, and, 
large chemical and energy intensive manufacturing industries related to national policies of the past 
related to availability of cheap energy. Energy expertise and energy related industries were dominant. 
However, there were other economic sectors dominant in the Energy Valley region and regional 
differences were present, for example, water and recreation, food and agro-based industries (Friesland), 
horticulture (North Holland North), agriculture and dairy farming (all provinces), forestry and tourism 
(Drenthe) and heavy industry and harbour facilities (Groningen), etc. 
Lack of strong R&D investments and knowledge centres, public and private centres were also key feature 
of the system. The limited knowledge base was a key concern for Energy Valley. 
9.3.3 Stakeholders 
Energy Valley was initiated to address a serious threat of losing the local gas industry and expertise built 
up in 50 years as a result of EU liberalization policies and future gas depletion. The need to preserve 
existing gas expertise in the local economy was an important driver to Energy Valley. The key 
stakeholders developing Energy Valley were therefore regional governments, gas corporations and local 
educational institutes. However, gas dominance in Energy Valley’s energy landscape meant that gas 
industry stakeholders and the national government had strong positions in the current system. 
9.3.4 System definition - identity and scope 
Identity and scope of an energy system is directly related to its key stakeholders. In Energy Valley, 
stakeholders from policy, business, academics, and regional development agencies were present and 
‘policy’ included local and national policy makers and decision-makers. Dominant stakeholders in the 
energy system were identified as the national government, gas related stakeholders and provincial 
governments due to historical and geographical factors. This meant that the differences in stakeholders 
resulted in different definitions and boundaries for the system. Given the dominance of its particular 
stakeholders, three main frames, ‘economic’, ‘energy transition’ and ‘regional development’, were 
evident in Energy Valley. This in part led to complex and conflicting agendas as already mentioned in 
earlier sections. 
The regional development focus of local policy makers meant that initially a regional and internal focused 
strategy was present although the national and trading aspects of the gas business had strong national 
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and international scopes. The activities supported by Energy Valley’s strategic focus in the initial working 
programmes were very much on energy and regional developments. 
9.3.5 Interconnectedness of contextual factors 
Drivers of change, history and geography, stakeholders and system definition are all interconnected as 
captured in the previous sections. The illustration below captures this interconnectedness. 
 
 
Figure 67: Interconnected Contextual Factors 
Energy Valley’s gas dominated system determined its stakeholders, and therefore their conceived 
identity and scope of the energy system and both these factors were shaped to a large extent by its 
(perceived) history and geography of gas and socio-economic factors related to national and regional 
interests. Drivers of change are connected to an energy system’s definition, its identity and scope, as 
certain drivers influence decisions of scope, need new strategic focus, etc. In Energy Valley, the need to 
redefine gas dominance in its initial energy system was due to drivers of sustainability, pending 
depletion of local gas sources, etc.  
9.4 System reactions 
According to complexity approaches, systems change when agents in the system respond to changes in 
their environment. The total system change can be understood by exploring different aspects of a 
system that contribute to such a change. In this analysis, aspects contributing to system reactions 
include: ‘pulls’ of the system which is the direction in which a system tends to move; coping strategies of 
agents that include developing and gathering new knowledge, resources and skills; differences that 
matter for future strategies; transforming interactions and collaborations. Finally, these aspects add up 
to a macro level system change visible in emerging system patterns. 
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Figure 68: Contextual Factors and System Reactions in Energy Systems 
To illustrate system reactions in Energy Valley, there was a pull towards more sustainable and 
decentralized energy solutions, connections between gas, oil and renewables. In addition, a key coping 
strategy was the creation of Energy Academy Europe that would bring fragmented knowledge, research, 
education and stakeholders together. An example of transforming interactions and collaborations was 
found in EnTranCe, a multi-stakeholder open innovation environment close to market. Examples of 
emerging system patterns were the increased presence of bottom-up initiatives next to top-down policy 
directives interplay of gas and electricity, cross-sector collaborators such as bio-based economy. The 
following sections give more details on the system reactions of Energy Valley.  
9.4.1 ‘Pull’ of the system 
A system responds to changes in its environment and there is often an underlying direction towards 
which the system tends to move. In Energy Valley, the drivers of change and responses by individual 
agents in the system resulted in more complexity and increased unpredictability and a general 
movement towards the ‘outside’.  
The energy system was initially an internal and regional oriented system. But the changes in the context 
saw various shifts in this system. One example was the position of ‘gas’ in the energy mix. It was no 
longer secure due to the increase in new sustainable energy solutions. This meant that a pull to redefine 
and reposition gas in the new energy system. Related to this was the decentralization movement of 
citizens and grassroots organizations. This also meant a tendency towards more demand-side focus 
instead of the traditional supply-side dominance.  
The lack of R&D, innovation resources and facilities, talent, policy constraints, etc. resulted in a tendency 
to explore possibilities outside the local system. Pilots in the UK were carried out where regulations were 
less stringent for new innovations. The strong ‘pull’ to seek solutions outside Energy Valley was a serious 
threat of further depletion of capacities and attractiveness of the region if this resulted in a ‘cluster drain’. 
Programmes and mandates from the European Union supported internationalization tendencies, and 
provided additional resources to regional systems, enhancing the attractiveness of ‘the outside’. Being 
connected internationally was not in itself negative, but the ‘pull’ of the outside could be a threat if it did 
not contribute to strengthening the system’s capabilities.   
9.4.2 Coping strategies 
There was a need to deal with the changing landscape of Energy Valley’s energy system. Stakeholders 
identified different strategies for its future and these included creating new and different infrastructure to 
deal with the emerging (complex) energy system; including new stakeholders such as local 
intermediaries, citizen and grassroots organizations, Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SME), etc. in 
the search for broader system-wide changes; creating new cross-sector value chain collaborations; 
creating educational programmes with multi-disciplinary competences; creating new institutions and 
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innovation spaces, etc. All stakeholder groups underlined the urgency for different approaches and 
changes in the existing policy, business, education and innovation practice. There was also an 
acknowledgement of the need for both large-scale and decentralized solutions, and a more inclusive 
strategy. 
9.4.3 Differences that matter 
In order to meet the new challenges due to the changes in Energy Valley, the innovation potential of the 
system had to be analysed. Exploring ‘differences that matter’ in a system with new combinations of 
potential differences in a system could result in innovation. In Energy Valley, new and different 
competences and capacities needed to be explored to resolve the increasing complexity in the system 
through new combinations (German notion of ‘neue Kombination’). For example, innovative SME 
collaborating with large corporations and industry with their resources and market reach could result in 
accelerated commercialization of innovations, including access to international markets. Combining 
fragmented research and knowledge disciplines present in the different universities in Energy Valley 
could accelerate more focussed and collective solutions for energy development challenges. Regional 
differences in Energy Valley with differences in goals, ambitions, resources, market structures, networks, 
etc. could be used to forge new networks, new cross-sector solutions, new business model testing, etc. 
The regional and national interests were also significant and could offer different solutions to both 
systems. Energy Valley had physical space and large agricultural land and farms that offered biomass 
solutions as a sustainable energy source whilst national government needed to deal with CO2 targets and 
these two different goals could be achieved through the use of the differences of each system. Potential 
or ‘missing’ stakeholders in Energy Valley such as environmental groups, civil organizations, and 
‘prosumers’ had different values, goals and motives from the established stakeholder groups. Combining 
these differences could offer a broader reach to the energy sustainability agenda.  
9.4.4 Transforming interactions 
When interactions take place that come from new combinations, a change takes place that transforms 
the original interactions. An example in Energy Valley was the creation of EnTranCe which began in the 
skybox of the local football club where informal discussions of different local energy businesses and the 
energy research centre led to the creation of an open innovation multi-disciplinary centre where 
businesses, students and research could come together to solve energy transition challenges. The ‘gas’ 
stakeholders had a strong systems approach and this has been adopted in EnTranCe as a key 
competence. Energy Academy Europe is another example of a collective initiative that resulted in a 
special institution for energy to overcome fragmentation and lack of ‘energy’ in curricula.  
A different example of transforming interactions was the integration of energy – between electricity and 
gas, renewables and existing energy systems, micro-level energy system management for homes and 
neighbourhoods, meso-level energy hubs connecting businesses in transition parks, green gas hubs, and 
macro-level energy collaborations across regional boundaries such as in Hansa Energy Corridor and 
ENSEA (North Sea) projects.  
Another example of transforming interactions in Energy Valley were the development of integrated 
energy vision clustering strengths of the different Provinces in ‘De Plus van Noord Nederland’, of 
different sectors in the ‘Bio-based Economy’, and aligning to national agendas in the ‘Green Deal’ and 
‘Switch’ agreement and programmes.  
A more inclusive strategy of extending dialogues to consumer and grassroots movements on energy 
developments in Energy Valley region meant that the system was changing in terms of its relationship to 
these groups, from end users to participants and increasingly strategic partners. 
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Emerging  
System 
Patterns 
 
9.4.5 Emerging system patterns 
The transforming interactions of Energy Valley were visible indications of changes in the system. These 
changes were coming together due in part by the responses of agents in the system and their coping 
strategies, building on innovation potential of ‘differences’, and the underlying ‘pulls’ of the systems. On 
a systems level, new or emerging patterns could be discerned in Energy Valley. These patterns indicated 
that the energy system was becoming more complex, which is partly due to the system becoming more 
‘open’ as seen by the inclusion of new players, new sources of energy, more international orientation, 
new business models, etc.  
The scope of the system was changing to become both more local and more international and there was 
evidence for a more systemic approach that went beyond the traditional notion of energy systems. 
Following the systemic approach, a more emergent and organic development of the energy system was 
visible even as more policy and top-down coordination was taking place in Energy Valley. Included in this 
shift were more flexible and varying strategies that embraced both local and international developments, 
traditional and renewable energy solutions on small and large-scale as necessary, thematic and on-line 
community developments that were self-organizing as well as strategic projects focused on ‘gas and 
energy roundabout’ policies in line with national, trans-regional and EU developments. Collaborations on 
international and EU levels across Energy Valley’s system were another emergent pattern that reflected 
major shifts of the system from the once regional and locally oriented system. 
9.4.6 Interconnectedness of system developments 
 
 
 
Figure 69: Interconnectedness of System Reactions 
The system reactions are interconnected as shown above in the diagram and together these result in 
macro level system patterns as already described in the section above. When gas is re-positioned as a 
balancing power source in Energy Valley (‘pull’ of system), then realizing an integrated fossil, renewable 
and gas energy system (‘differences’) is more feasible. This allows other energy carriers to be seen as 
complementary rather than competitors (transforming interactions), which in turn facilitates open 
innovation and collective initiatives as ‘coping strategies’. More collaborative and integrated approaches 
become part of new system patterns. 
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9.5 System patterns in Energy Valley/NL and EU 
 
Figure 70: System in System interconnections of Energy Developments  
The analysis explored how Energy Valley and the Dutch national systems reflected system patterns at 
the EU level. Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS) approach explains how systems are embedded in larger 
systems and how systems interact and feed into each other. The diagram above captured the embedded 
nature of energy systems as understood by CAS. 
In the comparison of the three levels, Energy Valley, the Netherlands and the EU, the shifts in the 
contexts were similar, namely, the growing complexity and unpredictability of energy system 
developments as were the external drivers of change (geo-politics, financial and euro crises, new 
technological advances, energy market developments, etc.). Similarly, in all three levels, energy systems 
were embedded in larger socio-, political, economic and ecological systems. In all three levels, 
economics was leading and this framed energy developments in terms of enabling competitiveness. 
Common themes related to this are energy security, sustainable energy solutions, CO2 mitigations, 
innovation, and smarter grid connections. Regional social cohesion and job creation was a key issue to 
Energy Valley and the EU.  
On the other hand, whilst Energy Valley and the NL had a gas-dominated history similar to the UK, the 
EU had a wider diversity of energy sources and systems. The ‘pull’ of Energy Valley’s system was to keep 
gas in the energy mix whilst the EU was focussed on independence of external sources of fossil fuels plus 
its commitment to climate change resulted in a strong ‘pull’ towards renewables. At the same time, the 
EU had a diverse ‘energy system’ with 27 different Member States (MS) with their different 
infrastructures, energy sources and socio-economic structures stemming from their different history and 
geography. In Energy Valley on the other hand, whilst regional differences were present, national 
economic frame and policies were dominant.  
A common system development in all three levels was the acknowledgement of a need for collective 
commitments to build multi-disciplinary competences, cross-sector and new value chain innovations, 
new business and governance models, and more trans-regional and international collaborations to meet 
the new and complex challenges of energy. There were more visible coordination and connections in 
energy infrastructure and markets in all levels, more and different alliances and collaborations, new 
governance structures, more decentralization of energy movements, more trust and engagement to 
realize collective goals, more sustainability, technology and consumer push, etc. The system level 
patterns at all three levels had some differences but in general, there were many parallels in their 
system developments. 
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9.6 Implications for end states and energy futures 
The system of Energy Valley at the beginning of the analysis showed how gas was the dominant factor in 
the system and how the stakeholders, strategies and solutions were all related to the traditional gas 
sector. In the second part of the analysis, the system reactions, the role and definition of gas in the new 
Energy Valley system had changed. Gas was also bio-gas, sync gas, gas from different sources and 
players, gas was also connected to smart grids and had re-positioned itself as a balancing and storage 
carrier within a more diverse energy system. This meant new and different ‘coping strategies’ including 
new competences and expertise beyond gas. A different aspect of the system change was the 
earthquake risks brought about by gas exploitation. The position of gas in the larger socio-economic 
system was weakened by such developments. The future of gas in the energy mix in Energy Valley has 
become polarized between the local and national economic interests and therefore new ‘coping strategies’ 
needed to be considered where citizen acceptance and national interests needed to be balanced. 
9.6.1 Contextual factors, system behaviour and end states 
In this analysis, the role of contextual factors has been explored in the light of Energy Valley’s energy 
system and the resulting system reactions. The analysis also included an exploration of how Energy 
Valley was embedded in the national and EU systems. Based on this analysis, a number of conclusions 
can be drawn that have implications for end state developmental pathways. The following considerations 
play a role in these developments and can contribute or limit end state developments. The 
considerations have been categorized under their respective headings of contextual factors, system 
reactions and system in systems. 
Contextual factors and end states 
Role of contextual factors 
Energy systems are more than technological systems 
Each energy system is subject to local and global contextual factors and it is more than only 
drivers of change, it includes history and geography, stakeholders and system definition 
Interconnectedness and unpredictability of system interactions as a result of contextual factors 
 
Elaboration on role of contextual factors 
Energy transition is not only a technical challenge but economic, (geo) political, environmental, 
behavioural and (civil) societal aspects play an important role. Moreover, these aspects are 
interconnected and unpredictable and are therefore difficult to anticipate and know what impact they 
could have on chosen pathways. 
The future is not predictable (gas prices, earthquakes, technological advances) and therefore more 
attention is needed to ‘fitness’ of strategy to drivers of change where alertness and responsiveness to 
current trends and developments are important. Too much focus on long-term planning may miss 
current trends and opportunities elsewhere. 
Focus on one dominant energy system (e.g. gas dominance) could lead to lock-in effects inherent in 
contextual factors. External drivers of change, e.g. a major earthquake, could have major impacts on 
such future end states. A diverse energy mix offers flexibility and resilience. 
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System reactions and end states 
System reactions 
Due to unpredictability of energy future, planning strategies are limited in their value and 
therefore, more resilient strategies are needed. These could include 
 being open to broader developments 
 creating trust amongst a larger group of stakeholders and engaging with ‘new’ 
stakeholder 
 engaging in interdisciplinary solutions, innovations and knowledge sharing 
 supporting new businesses to reach critical mass, and to be part of the energy system 
 creating broader system definitions and approaches, e.g. energy as eco-system  
 acknowledging self-organizing processes next to coordinated policy 
  
Elaboration on system reactions 
Interconnectedness and unpredictability of ‘other’ factors increases the urgency to engage and include 
stakeholders outside of energy in developments to expand the perspective and scope of strategy 
frameworks of energy clusters.  
 Connections (especially to outside the ‘normal’) as opposed to fragmentation and ‘silos’ are vital 
to break down ‘lock-in’ risks and to make an energy system more resilient:  
 Including other stakeholders, for example, engaging politicians at all levels, connecting to 
consumers and consumer intermediaries especially since consumer and demand-side focus is 
becoming more influential 
 Connections to other disciplines instead of mono-disciplinary approaches  
 Connections in an enlarged scope, examples being gas to renewables, international 
connections, other sectors, value chain approach instead of product development in isolation 
 Building ecosystems to accelerate innovation and knowledge sharing: 
 Includes open innovation, international, interdisciplinary, inter-sectorial, consumer 
involvement, focus on variety, etc. 
 Government’s role in facilitating ecosystems including capacity building and knowledge 
development to support knowledge acceleration and excellence. 
 Major push needed to boost start-ups, large corporations and R&D centres to create critical 
mass to attract and keep expertise and talent in the region.  
 Attractiveness of the region is a major challenge that would influence future of the cluster. 
Energy Valley needs to deal with this to avoid ‘cluster drain’. 
 Centre and periphery issues where relevant such as a shift to include stakeholders in the margins 
(environmentalists, ‘prosumers’, consumers, innovators, funding partners), or a shift in system 
position from peripheral regions to more strategic positions as was the case in Energy Valley. 
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 Better alignment and connections between future scenarios and frames of key players need to be 
addressed. Balancing ‘frames’ of climate change, competiveness and economics, regional 
cohesion agendas and other local frames needed since this could result in affecting end state 
developments. Particularly, where 
 energy as a theme served different goals and agendas 
 major differences and misalignments in urgency and priorities were present 
 Systems, and particularly complex systems, are subject to self-organizing processes. 
Acknowledgement of such processes and facilitating decentralized initiatives as part of good 
governance is needed in addition to coordination through top-down policies and guidance 
 Building trust as a key aspect of energy system developments is important since this is strongly 
connected to how local energy systems react to new and planned development pathways. This 
includes 
 trust between different types of businesses, between government and businesses, citizens 
and governments and businesses  
 trust in large scale investments and projects especially when new technology is involved 
 trust in the ‘care-taker’s role’ of the government and the long term sustainability of societies 
System in system and end states  
System in systems 
Local and EU energy systems are interconnected 
 Lower level systems feed into higher-level systems and therefore various local energy systems’ 
developments and their respective energy end developments will contribute to a higher order 
system of end states 
  
Elaboration of system in system 
 Local energy systems are connected to EU systems and this offers opportunities to connect and 
tap into competences, resources, energy sources, to increase scope, scale and capabilities to 
accelerate energy system developments locally but it also works both ways and offers national 
and EU level systems opportunities to accelerate and influence their preferred energy 
developments. 
 On a systemic level, being aware and connecting to other systems’ developments is an 
opportunity for growth, visibility and influence and at the same time, it increases complexity and 
unpredictability of end state pathways. 
 Local energy systems tend to be ‘locked in’ to their contextual factors and system reactions as 
described in this analysis. Connecting to other local energy systems and to the EU could help 
temper lock-in pulls. At the same time, at the higher EU level, the diversity of the different local 
energy systems and their end state pathways and goals make the EU system more resilient. 
Diversity of the higher level system could act as a buffer for any lack of resilience of energy 
systems to external shocks (drivers of change) and therefore an issue to be considered for the 
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‘big picture’ is that there could be different end states in a larger EU system but that the higher 
level system of the EU needs to be diverse and resilient to future drivers of change. 
9.6.2 Complex energy systems 
 
Figure 71: Complex Systemic Energy Developments 
Based on the systems analysis as described in this chapter end states are determined by contextual 
factors of the (local) energy system and the energy system’s reactions to such changes. The 
configurations for a specific energy system are continuously being shaped by the interaction of 
contextual factors and system reactions. And end states of local systems feed into higher-level end 
states, which in turn are affected by contextual factors and system reactions that then determine energy 
end states of the whole system-in-system. For Europe, local and regional energy end states feed into the 
European end state developments and therefore a systemic analysis of local and European end state 
contextual factors and possible system reactions could provide a more specific picture of constraining 
and supporting factors towards end states. In addition, as mentioned in the system in system analysis, 
the notion of different end states in local energy systems is a plausible scenario, which in turn could 
support a more diverse and resilient energy system at the EU level. This last consideration, of systemic 
interconnectedness, could become a relevant agenda in the EU’s development of its Internal Energy 
Union and its end state pathways.  
9.6.3 Implications for Big Picture - 3 End states 
Potential limiting factors as ‘risks’ have been identified below for the end states, particularly from the EU 
perspective, to illustrate key contextual and systemic factors that could affect pathways to energy end 
state scenarios. 
 Risk of underestimation of ‘system reactions’ as energy systems are not technology 
systems but social systems 
 System reactions on unexpected incidents such as nuclear disasters, shale gas risks, offshore 
oil disasters, earthquakes, political crises have shown their impact on energy policies and 
practice. 
 System reactions on slow trends (boiled frogs), for example, climate change, and on sudden 
breakthroughs (game changers), for example, fracking technology. 
 Micro level system reactions on price developments, ecological damage, push for autonomy 
and self-sufficiency, etc., as seen in the ‘prosumer’ and green movements, decentralized 
energy systems and emergence of small innovative firms. 
End States: Larger risk in BAU, less risk in GAS, and least in RES. 
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 Risk of miscalculation of role of governments and regulations at European, national and 
regional levels 
 European Union’s drive to be independent from foreign supplies (energy security focus) and 
its transition to low carbon society. Captured in new ‘Resilient Energy Union’ vision of secure, 
sustainable, competitive, affordable energy for every European. 
 EU’s ambitions translate to national and regional regulations, for example, renewed focus on 
North Sea Grid to reduce Russian gas supply dependence.  
 European Union’s innovation policy and funding programmes focus on strengthening regions 
and clusters to increase competitiveness of small and medium businesses, particularly in new 
emerging industries. Energy efficiency, smart grid and decentralized innovations are energy 
related examples. This includes shifts to regional vs. national levels, strengthening the 
regional and local energy systems primacy. 
End States: BAU and GAS scenarios more vulnerable than RES.  
 Lock-in risk due to current dominance of fossil fuels 
 Assumption of abundant fossil fuels (gas in GAS scenario), power of fossil fuel corporations, 
short-term thinking and growth of energy needs results in more exploration, more 
infrastructure for fossil and non-fossil, more expertise, etc. (more of same = lock-in). 
 Underutilization of ‘other solutions’ (as in RES scenario), cross-sectoral, cross-disciplinary 
open innovation developments.  
End States: BAU and GAS have largest risk, RES least. 
The table below captures the risks with a brief explanation for EU end states. 
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Table 15: Implications of Risks for End States 
Key Risks Risk for BAU Risk for GAS Risk for RES 
Underestimation of 
‘system reactions’ 
++ + - - 
Short-term thinking particularly in BAU scenario makes it more vulnerable 
In RES, variety of stakeholders including demand-side innovative firms, NGOs and 
consumers reduce tunnel vision and increase flexibility of system. 
Miscalculation of 
role of 
governments and 
regulations 
++ + - - 
Current dominance, lobby and short-term thinking of fossil fuel industry feeds into 
optimism of continued influence and lack of alternatives for current scenarios on the 
short-run 
National sovereignty still dominant in EU and fossil fuel industry have powerful positions 
EU ambition to be low carbon and energy independent is a push for RES  
Lock-in risk 
++ + - 
Similar to ‘role of government’ risk 
Current dominance and power of fossil industry and a lack of alternatives strengthen 
search of solutions in ‘known’ RES are dependent on new innovation and therefore less 
risk of lock-in 
9.7 Key findings  
 
General 
 EU’s end states are unpredictable due to contextual factors and energy systems reactions 
 Local energy systems influence EU end states and v.v. 
 Local energy mix variations in end states (e.g. gas dominance in NL) contribute to EU’s diversity and 
less lock-in risk, and this increases EU energy system’s resilience. 
Risks 
 Underestimation of ‘system reactions’  
 Risk of miscalculation of influence of governments and regulations especially BAU 
 Risk of lock-in especially in BAU and GAS 
Opportunities 
EU’s combined drive for energy independence and low carbon economy ambitions create opportunities 
for leadership in innovation (push for RES) 
Note: The ‘Contextual and Systemic Forces in Energy Valley’ analysis was based on a PhD research 
project focussing on energy cluster dynamics that overlapped the study of ‘end states’ in the context of 
Energy Valley. Drs. Karel van Berkel was part of the research team contributing to the study. (Expected 
completion of PhD thesis, 2015; article on end state analysis will be submitted for publication, mid-2015). 
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10 CONCLUSION 
 
This report aimed to identify the structural changes and transition pathways with a particular focus on 
the role of gas. Furthermore it aimed to recognize the implications and possible limitations of these 
transition pathways to a future proof energy supply. The main research question of this report is as 
follows: “What are potential robust energy end states after the transition and what will be the role and 
share of both renewable energy and in particular natural gas in Europe?” 
 
Drivers impacting energy systems 
In order to understand the dynamics behind the forming of energy end states this research firstly 
introduced drivers of change impacting the energy environment. A plethora of drivers of change will 
shape energy systems of the future. This report discussed the relevant drivers of change and their 
possible influence on the future energy systems, according to the World Energy Council’s framework 
using five interlinked areas. The five areas are: Politics, Social factors, Economies, Resources and the 
environment, Energy systems and technology. A key finding is that the international political and 
economic order is becoming more multipolar than three decades ago, and that drivers of change can 
have a different effect in different parts of the world. 
The role of social and political actors on energy systems is likely to be more prominent. In Europe, this 
will be noticeable at the local, national and international level. At the local level, high-impact social ideas 
like green consumerism and limited acceptance of energy systems that result in major trade-offs, could 
be important drivers of change. Nationally, the empowerment of individuals and communities relative to 
the state and as producers of some forms of energy and the politicization of energy-related issues will be 
key drivers of change. Internationally, energy issues will at least remain important or become even more 
so in the foreign and security policies of countries and the geopolitics of non-state actors.  
 
Energy transition end states  
To derive at potential robust end states this report explored numerous energy scenarios to distil three 
energy transition end states. These end states were subsequently scrutinized by examining their 
implications and potential limitations. The end states that surfaced from the analysis are labelled as: 
4. Renewables (RES) - Somewhat stabilizing energy demand and strong increased share in 
renewable energy. 
5. Business as Usual (BAU) - Increasing energy demand supplied by a balanced mix of energy 
sources.  
6. High Gas (GAS) - More than doubling energy demand and satisfied by a large share of natural 
gas. 
Although the end states were derived using primarily quantitative analysis, they can be characterised by 
the principal factors of the PESTE framework as shown in Table 16. 
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Table 16: Characterisation of end states by PESTE framework 
Factor RES BAU GAS 
Political Most effective policies and 
measures to promote RES, 
long term perspective, 
stringent regulations and in 
increasing cost of CO2. 
Focus on short term national 
security, developed countries 
assume more responsibility 
for climate change, RES 
support continues, increased 
CO2 price. 
Focus on short term national 
security, RES support continues, 
increased CO2 price.  
    
Economic Global population and GDP 
increase, investment in 
infrastructure increases. 
Global population and GDP 
increase and drive energy 
demand (especially in 
developing countries); energy 
efficiency grows in developed 
countries. 
Global population and GDP 
increase, developing countries 
catch up in economic growth, 
high commodity prices.  
    
Social Climate change awareness 
shift, increasing tensions 
between rural and urban 
communities. 
Income redistribution affects 
energy efficiency in 
developing countries, 
increased environmental 
consciousness. 
Concerns about energy security. 
    
Technological Significant development and 
maturity of the existing 
technologies, efficiency 
increase, modal shift in 
transport, increased R&D 
expenditure and innovation. 
Increased energy efficiency, 
progress in CCS, hydrogen, 
and unconventional fossils. 
Progress in unconventional 
fossils’ recovery, energy 
efficiency, CCS, no dominant 
technology. 
    
Environmental Significant emissions 
reduction after 2020. 
Moderate emissions 
constraints. 
Global emissions increase, no 
significant international 
agreements to reduce 
emissions in place. 
Although the end states differ in their final energy mix and absolute amount of energy consumption, 
there are several similar factors. From an economic perspective, all three end states assume an increase 
in global population and GDP. Similarly, CO2 prices and energy efficiency are expected to increase as well 
and there’s a continued support for renewable energy sources under all three end states, albeit to 
various degrees.  
On the other side though, there are differences as well. While emissions are expected to decrease in the 
RES end state, they are set to moderately increase under BAU and GAS. Also, unconventional fossil fuels 
are projected to play an important part under BAU and GAS, whereas, unsurprisingly, renewable energy 
technologies are projected to mature under the RES end state. 
A more detailed look into the GAS end state shows that its actuality is connected to a large increase in 
energy consumption and CO2 emissions. Furthermore, in contrast to what is normally assumed, natural 
gas is projected to play a significant role primarily when climate awareness is lower on the agenda; in 
contrast to the RES and BAU end states. Also, natural gas seems to play an important role when policy 
makers are more concerned about energy security than climate change, when no clear choices are made 
regarding favourable technologies and when limited international coordination takes place.  
 
Implications for energy and particular gas system 
To describe the role and share of both renewable energy and in particular natural gas in Europe this 
report described the implications for each of the three end states, including possible investment 
requirements in gas and renewable infrastructure.  
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A model has been developed that allows for a translation of the final energy demand mix into primary 
energy requirements by adapting the underlying energy system. As may be expected, the RES end state 
has the largest implications, in terms of end-users requirements and land use. First of all, electrification, 
as a result of the choices made in this end state, is reflected mainly in the transportation sector as 
electric vehicles, as well as electric space heating in the residential and tertiary sectors become essential 
for the realization of this end state. Furthermore, energy use is shifted to land use which is a 
consequence of the implementation of large amounts of renewable sources. This is especially the case 
for biomass under the RES end state, in which about 50% of the agricultural land in the European Union 
is needed for growing energy crops. Furthermore it is noteworthy that in all three end state, the 
industrial sector does not change much. Therefore, there are no major changes in the production 
structure and activities. 
Specifically zooming in on the existing gas infrastructure, analysis showed that it is well equipped to 
support the realization of the RES and BAU end state. Evidently, this is directly related to the decline or 
stabilizing gas demand in Europe under these two end states. However, the gas infrastructure is also 
well-suited to support the increasing gas demand in the GAS end state. Although it would be required to 
build additional importing pipelines, the analysis shows that the internal gas network as presently 
available in Europe is capable to satisfy this increase in demand. From this respect, no considerable 
limitations are expected from the availability of the gas infrastructure.  
Focusing on the role of renewable energy technologies, analysis revealed that different decentralized 
renewable energy technologies have different grid implication dynamics relative to varying demand 
scales. Part of those differences can be explained through differences in weather dependency.  
‐ For power from solar-photovoltaic (solar-pv), inherent mismatch between typical supply patterns 
and typical power demand patterns imply that only a small share of the energy mix can be 
contributed by power from solar-pv without substantial grid implications. Conversely, larger 
shares of decentralized solar-pv power may be associated with more significant grid implications.  
‐ Power generated by wind turbines is more strongly affected by variation in weather patterns 
than power from solar-pv, but its daylight-independent supply patterns enables a larger demand-
supply matching potential. Therefore, the share of wind power that can be integrated into the 
energy mix without substantial grid implications is larger than for power from solar-pv. 
‐ Biogas-based decentralized power supply is fairly constant and predictable. As such, the no-grid-
implications share of biogas power is the largest of all three decentralized renewable power 
sources considered in this research. 
Energy futures involving large shares of decentralized renewable power in the energy mix are likely to 
involve substantial grid implications. However, part of the power generated on a decentralized platform 
is consumed locally. Only the part that is not consumed locally/directly accounts towards grid 
implications. Grid implications for larger shares of decentralized renewables may thus be less than what 
could be assumed from the gross total of generated power. 
 
Case studies on success factors and barriers for energy systems 
In order to fulfil the need for practical examples and analysis of applicable technologies this report 
discussed the case of power-to-gas, biomass and the local North Netherlands situation. These case 
studies tried to pin-point the specific needs for the gas industry for the three end states.  
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Innovation of technology trajectory: Power-to-gas 
The energy system has to adapt to intermittent energy sources, such as wind power and solar energy, 
which provide energy in a fluctuating manner. Energy storage is one of the possible solutions. In times 
of excess electricity production, excess energy has to be stored. Power-to-Gas is a technology that offers 
this storage option. The position of power-to-gas in the future energy system depends on the wind and 
solar ambitions, power-to-gas technological progress and the development of a regulatory framework for 
both gas quality standards and investment conditions.  
Technology developments can be analysed using the technological innovation system (TIS) framework. 
The TIS includes all actors and institutions involved in the development, diffusion and utilization of a 
technology. For a technology to develop successfully the TIS should fulfil several functions. Theory 
indicates that all TIS functions need to make progress in order for power-to-gas to become a feasible 
solution for balancing energy supply and demand. Currently power-to-gas technology pilot projects are 
realized, studies are carried out and funds are available for both projects and research. The functions 
called entrepreneurial activities, knowledge development, knowledge exchange, and resource 
mobilization are all met. Especially the market formation function requires substantial efforts, part of the 
problem in this function is the fact that there is not yet a regulatory framework for power-to-gas. 
Limitations of biomass availability 
Since it is expected that biomass technologies, especially biomass digestion, will contribute considerably 
to the required volume of renewables in the future energy mix, this report assessed the limitations of 
large scale biomass use in Europe. For a densely populated country (such as the Netherlands) it is 
impossible to produce the biomass fuels to supply their own system. This is further complicated by the 
competition between food and energy. Not only the food and fuel discussion, but also due to competition 
between feedstock for other applications (e.g. bio plastics). Looking at a possible business case for 
biomass, it is more obvious to work with economic cascading. This means that organic streams available 
for energetic purposes have a degraded quality compared to the use of dedicated energy crops. 
When looking at the BAU end state, which seems to be the most obvious when it comes to biomass 
consumption one needs 4.5% of land available in the EU in order to fully supply the transport sector with 
biogas. This could theoretically be accommodated within the BAU end state. However, this would be 
more complicated for the RES and Gas end state with higher demands. This is a clear limitation.  
Local energy system dynamics: Energy Valley 
When talking about ‘energy systems’ this analysis takes a broader perspective and looks at ‘energy’ as 
being embedded in social, economic, and political systems and that such a system could be a district, 
region, country, or a regional block such as the EU. The analysis looks at ‘energy’ as being located in a 
specific location with a defined boundary. In this research, Energy Valley was examined as an energy 
system embedded in a larger energy system, which is the national energy system and this in turn, is 
embedded in a European energy system. Each of these systems can be examined separately, but each of 
these next level systems is interconnected and contributes to other levels. EU decisions and 
developments influenced Dutch decisions and developments and therefore that of Energy Valley. The 
analysis showed that the future of gas in the energy mix in Energy Valley has become polarized between 
the local and national economic interests and therefore new ‘coping strategies’ needed to be considered 
where citizen acceptance and national interests needed to be balanced. 
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The Big Picture - the future role of gas 
What will be the role of natural gas in Europe in 2050? Based on the three main energy scenarios 
presented in this report, the gas volumes in the energy mix will range roughly between 300 bcm/yr to 
700 bcm/yr. Despite the possible shift to the lower volumes which are still substantial, capacity will 
become increasingly important. Gas is truly the preferred fuel to balance intermittent renewable energy 
supply. There will be a need for underground gas storages to balance the gas system and there will be a 
need for gas source diversification as domestic European gas production will decrease dramatically. The 
existing and planned gas infrastructure in Europe is sufficient in the lower (RES) and medium (BAU) 
scenarios with regard to natural gas. In case of a shift to the larger volumes of fossil gas (GAS), there is 
a need for extra gas infrastructure which is not planned yet in Europe.  
The energy and gas situation in Europe in 2050 is not exemplary for the rest of the world; even regional 
and local differences within Europe may persist or evolve in this multipolar energy world. A uniform EU 
policy on energy and gas (‘mature Energy Union’) will take a long journey which may be not be 
concluded in 2050. The RES scenario has strong implications for end-user markets and will need strong 
uniform regulation. It is highly questionable whether the shift to renewables may be realized in time. 
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Appendix A - The Big Picture energy flow model 
For the detailed quantification of the energy transition end states the University of Groningen made a 
model in which the energy flows and conversions between demand and supply are calculated. In this 
appendix a description of that model is provided. 
A.1 Calculation scheme 
In Figure 72 a scheme is presented in which the steps are shown that had to be taken from the 
qualitative scenario description to the implications for the gas infrastructure and the limitations in 
availability of resources. 
 
 
Figure 72: The calculation scheme as implemented in the Big Picture project 
Combined with renewable supply patterns (see Section A.5) results the matching of demand and supply 
in a demand for infrastructure. These demands were compared with the present infrastructure with the 
ENIGMA gas infrastructure model. 
 
Big Picture end states: 
Quantitative 
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Quantitative inputs for the  
BigP model 
For all EU countries (26) 
Intermittent patterns: 
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For all EU countries (26) 
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infrastructure model 
Node per EU country (26) 
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A.2 Description of the Big Picture energy flow model interface 
Figure 73 shows the dash board of the Big Picture model. Besides dash board, this figure also shows 
quantitative results in the form of coloured bars (in the centre and at the bottom of the named 
rectangles: panels). The arrows show the connection between sources, conversion technologies, carriers 
and sector demand. A mouse click on almost all panels leads to an input screen were data can be 
adjusted. 
 
Figure 73: Dashboard and results screen of the Big Picture Energy module. 
(In the model demand and supply are matched. The calculations run from right to left (from sector 
demand to sources).  
In Figure 74 the dash board is explained in more detail. In this figure the semi-quantitative information 
present in the dash board is explained. The calculations of the model start right with the sector demand 
for energy/feedstock for certain functions or subsectors as the starting point and ends left with the 
demand for resources. In between carriers are calculated from the demand and the carriers are 
produced from natural resources by means of several one or two steps conversions. By selecting one of 
the: source, conversion, carrier or sector panels, a new window is opened in which the user can change 
the input data. An example is given in Figure 75; here the energy demand for the residential sector can 
be changed as well as which type of technology will be used for space heating and hot water. 
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Figure 74: Dashboard and results screen of the Big Picture Energy module 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 75: Input form Household energy demand 
 
 
1. Fraction carriers 
~20% Electricity 
 
2. Sector fraction (~30%) of 
the total demand 
 
3. Fraction sources: 
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In most of the input windows the fractions of available technologies can be changed. For example in the 
electricity panel the user can decide which part of the consumed electricity should be produced with 
renewable sources and which part from thermal power plants. In the “non-fossil electricity” panel the 
user can decide how this electricity will be divided over the available non-fossil sources (Solar PV, wind 
offshore, hydro etc.). 
A.3 Calculation scheme 
As written above, the calculation is done from right to left in the model interface, which means from 
demand to source. Calculations are done on an hourly basis to do justice to the intermittent sources like 
wind and solar-PV in relation to the electricity demand. If no patterns are available the demand or 
production will be spread evenly over the year.  
 
Figure 76: Calculation sequence for the electricity and heat production 
Figure 76 shows the steps and their order of the production of electricity and heat as far as these are 
related. The heat demand generates a certain amount of electricity in CHP units with a heat demand 
driven pattern. This co-generated electricity is subtracted from the overall electricity demand. In the 
next step intermittent renewable sources are used to fulfil the demand. In case the production is higher 
than the demand, the surplus will go electricity storage units if available. When there is less production 
the stored electricity will be used. Since units can have certain amount of electricity stored at the 
beginning of the year, no more electricity can be subtracted from the storage units than will stored 
during the year. So at the end of the year the stored volumes are as large as they were in the beginning 
of the year. If all storage units are fully loaded and there is still an oversupply, this electricity can be 
used for other purposes which will be described below. After the intermittent source and storage is 
subtracted from the residual electricity demand the non-intermittent renewable sources (non-biomass) 
are the next in line. The remaining electricity will be produced by thermal units (fossil, nuclear and 
biomass). 
As written above it is possible that a certain amount of electricity is produced but could not be used 
directly or via storage of electricity. In this case several options are present in the model to handle this 
Total 
electricity 
demand 
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oversupply. Figure 77 shows these options and the order which can be selected by the user. If the user 
decided that the oversupply should be used it will go to the selected electrolysis units otherwise the 
oversupply will not be used and will be dumped. After the hydrogen production by electrolysis several 
options are possible. The produced hydrogen can be used directly in for example hydrogen cars, used as 
feedstock in the chemical industry, used in fuel cells for electricity production or it can be used to 
produce methane by methanation. In case the user wants more renewable produced hydrogen for one of 
the defined purposes than can be produced from the oversupply this is possible by specifying this. 
 
Figure 77: Calculation sequence of the use of renewable electricity surpluses and the optional 
production of additional hydrogen and/or methane. 
Figure 78 shows a week pattern of an example run. These patterns show the calculated results from the 
steps described above. The green line is the original electricity demand. The brown line shows what is 
left of this demand after subtraction of the electricity generated in CHP units. The red line shows the 
intermittent supply which is higher than remaining demand (brown line) for several hours. The orange 
line shows the remaining electricity after subtraction of the direct used intermittent sources. The black 
line shows the electricity stored each hour. This is limited by the storage load capacity of 4.5 GW in this 
example, the horizontal parts at 0.016 PJ. In times there is no surplus of renewable sources the stored 
electricity can be used. The remaining electricity after using the stored electricity is expressed by the 
grey line. The production of the stored electricity is limited by the unload capacity: 4.5 GW in this 
example. Finally the surplus after storage goes to the electrolysis units: the blue line. 
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Figure 78: Example output for a week (week 6) in an hourly pattern.  
The “After storage” line shows that part of the demand which should be filled with conventional (fossil) 
power to make the demand be matched by the production. 
A.4 Energy data structure 
To determine the energy demand in the base year 2010 IEA Energy balances were used1. The sectors 
used in the model are represented in these energy tables (See Table 17). Since renewable energy 
sources are aggregated in the IEA tables other sources were used to obtain more detailed data on wind 
energy, onshore and offshore2, Solar PV, Hydro and Pump Hydro Storage3, CSP, Geothermal electricity. 
Europe 2010 (ed2013)                 
CONSUMPTION coal&peat crudeoil oilproducts naturalgas nuclear hydro 
geothermal, 
solartc, 
Biofuels 
&waste electricity heat total 
Transfers 0.00 7.32 -4.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.20 
Statistical differences -0.40 0.80 -4.71 0.46 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.04 -0.10 -0.04 -4.05 
Electricity plants -142.22 0.00 -9.66 -75.10 -243.09 
-
46.49 -20.06 -23.22 244.20 -0.29 -315.93 
CHP plants -71.61 0.00 -12.10 -67.27 -2.78 0.00 0.00 -22.74 61.36 47.46 -67.73 
Heat plants -5.30 0.00 -1.46 -9.80 0.00 0.00 -0.15 -6.17 -0.23 18.28 -4.83 
Blast furnaces -17.04 0.00 -0.67 -0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -17.74 
Gas works -0.20 0.00 -0.18 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.30 
Coke/pat. fuel/BKB 
plants -3.06 0.00 -0.74 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -3.80 
Oil refineries 0.00 -697.33 691.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -5.89 
Petrochemical plants 0.00 15.20 -15.63 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.42 
Liquefaction plants -0.79 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.29 
Other transformation 0.02 0.23 0.00 -0.59 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.14 0.00 -0.39 -0.88 
Energy industry own 
use -5.64 0.00 -39.44 -18.49 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.16 -25.30 -5.24 -94.29 
Losses -1.01 -0.01 -0.06 -4.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.03 -20.31 -4.90 -30.60 
TFC 42.597 4.531 523.153 284.804 0 0 2.672 83.328 261.487 55.932 1258.47 
INDUSTRY 26.485 2.111 34.355 86.12 0 0 0.033 24.704 94.855 16.227 284.901 
Iron and steel 13.22 0.00 1.42 8.55 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 10.67 0.42 34.38 
Chemical and 
petrochem. 3.69 2.11 5.59 18.94 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.46 17.48 7.20 56.50 
-0,05
-0,03
-0,01
0,01
0,03
0,05
0,07
0,09
0,11
841 866 891 916 941 966 991
PJ
hours
Example, week 6, 60% ren. electr., Storage: 1 TWhe, 4.5 GW
Electricity demand
After CHP subtr.
Intermittants
After Intermit. subtr.
Into storage
After storage
Electrolysis
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Non-ferrous metals 0.41 0.00 0.76 2.99 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 7.33 0.26 11.82 
Non-metallic minerals 5.42 0.00 9.05 13.56 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.50 6.46 0.21 38.21 
Transport equipment 0.09 0.00 0.43 2.77 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 4.36 0.76 8.48 
Machinery 0.14 0.00 1.92 7.41 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 11.05 0.77 21.49 
Mining and quarrying 0.15 0.00 0.84 0.79 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 1.54 0.20 3.57 
Food and tobacco 1.49 0.00 2.98 13.45 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.21 10.18 0.98 30.31 
Paper, pulp and 
printing 1.13 0.00 1.32 8.36 0.00 0.00 0.00 12.47 11.69 2.24 37.20 
Wood and wood 
products 0.10 0.00 0.29 0.68 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.54 2.01 0.46 8.15 
Construction 0.01 0.00 3.27 1.36 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.15 1.71 0.06 6.62 
Textile and leather 0.09 0.00 0.51 2.31 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 2.11 0.22 5.36 
Non-specified 0.45 0.00 5.81 4.92 0.00 0.00 0.03 1.05 8.22 2.36 22.86 
TRANSPORT 0.01 0 312.16 2.909 0 0 0 13.445 6.218 0 334.771 
Domestic aviation 0.00 0.00 6.72 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.72 
Road 0.00 0.00 295.20 1.18 0.00 0.00 0.00 13.44 0.00 0.00 309.79 
Rail 0.01 0.00 3.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.92 0.00 8.15 
Pipeline transport 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.64 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.00 1.74 
Domestic navigation 0.00 0.00 6.98 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.04 
Non-specified 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.15 0.00 1.33 
OTHER 14.711 0 84.297 180.53 0 0 2.639 45.162 160.435 39.689 527.465 
Residential 11.27 0.00 45.95 122.66 0.00 0.00 1.96 41.02 79.18 23.98 326.03 
Comm. and public 
services 1.77 0.00 20.96 49.72 0.00 0.00 0.47 2.19 75.96 10.75 161.86 
Agriculture/forestry 1.39 0.00 14.16 3.90 0.00 0.00 0.08 1.75 4.40 0.30 26.02 
Fishing 0.00 0.00 1.34 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.05 0.00 1.42 
Non-specified 0.30 0.00 1.88 4.18 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.16 0.82 4.69 12.14 
NON-ENERGY USE 1.411 2.42 92.347 15.202 0 0 0 0 0 0 111.373 
in 
industry/transf./energy 1.22 2.42 89.81 15.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 108.64 
 of which: feedstocks 0.16 2.42 64.09 15.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 81.88 
in transport 0.00 -0.21 2.01 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.80 
in other 0.24 0.04 0.62 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.54 
Electricity and Heat Output                     
Elec. generated - TWh 889.90 0.00 79.92 769.10 942.95 540.55 183.99 145.45 0.00 1.19 3552.92 
Electricity plants 626.19 0.00 40.35 441.35 932.85 540.55 182.53 74.52 0.00 0.33 2838.62 
CHP plants 263.71 0.00 39.57 327.75 10.10 0.00 1.46 70.95 0.00 0.86 714.34 
Heat generated - PJ 824.71 0.00 197.46 1166.16 6.31 0.00 7.14 531.72 3.03 59.47 2796.01 
CHP plants 648.70 0.00 147.39 829.57 6.31 0.00 0.89 347.05 0.21 28.39 2008.48 
Heat plants 176.00 0.00 50.08 336.60 0.00 0.00 6.25 184.67 2.83 31.09 787.50 
Table 17: IEA Energy balances 2010 (summation of 29 European countries).  
The red values are used for calculations of the base year1. 
 
A.5 Intermittent sources 
A.5.1 Wind energy 
Wind data from onshore and offshore weather stations will be used. The hourly wind data of these 
weather stations were obtained for the year 2012, from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration4. 
The altitudes of weather stations are not always the same. Because of these height differences and due 
the fact that wind turbines operate at higher altitudes, a correction has to be performed. Onshore wind 
turbines are on average height of 70 metres and offshore wind turbines are assumed to be at about 90 
metres high. Wind speeds tend to increase with height; a correction for this effect is described by 
Wieringa and Rijkoort5, see Equation 1. 
  
 
Energy Delta Gas Research – The Big Picture  Page 172
 
 ݒଵ
ݒଶ ൌ
lnሺݖଵ ݖ଴⁄ ሻ
lnሺݖଶ ݖ଴⁄ ሻ 
(1)
The wind speed at hub height is calculated by using equation 1, where vଵ is the wind speed at hub height 
zଵ, vଶ is the wind speed at the altitude of the weather station zଶ, and z଴ the roughness length of the 
Earth's surface. The roughness length is a measure for the roughness of the Earth's surface surrounding 
the weather station. The roughness length at sea of 0.00025 m and onshore a value of 0.1 is used. To 
convert wind speed into power, a power curve is used. When wind turbines are placed in large wind 
parks, the energy output is less variable than the energy output of a single turbine. To correct for this, a 
multi turbine power curve is used6. 
This results in one or two wind production patterns per country: 1 offshore, 1 onshore. 
Each pattern is constructed from 2 to 5 wind speed time series. These series are converted to electricity 
production patterns as described above and then averaged. So assuming a spread but connected 
locations of wind turbines. The turbines are located in the windier region of the country, selected by 
making use of a wind speed map. 
A.5.2 Solar PV 
Solar radiation data are obtained from SoDa7. Free data are available for the year 2004 and 2005. For 
this year global radiation data are assuming in inclination of 30 degrees directed to the South. These 
hourly data were recalculated to a normalized pattern with a load factor. Only one pattern, located in the 
centre, per country was realised with the exception of France, Spain, Italy and Sweden, Norway and 
Finland. For the three Scandinavian countries the pattern was located in the south, assuming PV panel 
will be installed in the South. For the three southern countries two patterns were realised, one in the 
centre and the other in the south. The latter because of substantial differences of pattern and load factor 
between the two locations. For Germany the differences between North, the centre and South were 
negligible. 
A.5.3 CSP 
Solar direct radiation data are obtained from SoDa7. Free data are available for the year 2004 and 2005. 
For this year direct irradiation data. These hourly data were recalculated to a normalized pattern with a 
load factor. CSP is assumed to be possible in France, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. Only one pattern, 
located in the south, per country was realised.  
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Appendix B - Entrepreneurial activities, key features and participants 
Table 18: Entrepreneurial activities, key features and participants. 
City Project name Operating 
since 
Key features Participants 
Hamburg  Wasserstoff-
tankstelle 
HafenCity 
2012 Production of hydrogen 
Hydrogen used for transportation 
(public busses) 
Clean Energy Partnership (CEP) 
Werlte Audi e-gas 
Project 
2013 Production of methane 
Injection in gas grid 
Certificates for Audi vehicles 
SolarFuel GmbH 
Zentrum für Sonnenenergie und Wasserstoff-Forschung (ZSW) 
Fraunhofer Institut für Windenergie und Energiesystemtechnik 
(IWES) 
EWE Energie AG  
Frankfurt Am 
Mein 
P2G demo 
Thuga group 
2013 Production of hydrogen 
Inject in gasgrid 
Badenova AG & Co. KG  
Energieversorgung Mittelrhein GmbH  
Erdgas Mittelsachsen GmbH  
erdgas schwaben GmbH  
e-rp GmbH  
ESWE Versorgungs AG  
Gasversorgung Westerwald GmbH  
Mainova AG  
Stadtwerke Ansbach GmbH  
Stadtwerke Bad Hersfeld GmbH  
Thüga Aktiengesellschaft (Projektkoordinatorin)  
Thüga Energienetze GmbH  
WEMAG AG  
Herten H2Herten 2013 Production of hydrogen 
Hydrogen used for transportation 
and other fuel cells 
Evonik Industries 
Westfalische Hochschule 
Nieder-aussem CO2rrect 2013 Production of methane and 
methanol 
BayerMaterialScience AG 
RWE Power AG 
Siemens AG 
Invite GmbH 
CAT Catalytic Center 
RWTH Aachen 
Max-Planck Institut Magdeburg 
Fritz-Haber-Institut Berlin 
Leibniz Institut fur Katalyse 
Ruhr-Universitat Bochum 
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Technische Universitat Dortmund 
Technische Universitat Dressden 
Universitat Stuttgart 
Karlsruhe Institute of Technology 
Technische Universitat Darmstadt 
 
Bad Hersfeld Metanisierung 
am Eichhof 
2012 Production of methane using 
biogas 
Inject in gasgrid 
Fraunhoffer IWES 
Zentrum für Sonnenenergie- und Wasserstoff-Forschung Baden-
Württemberg  
SolarFuel 
Karlsruhe Research 
project 
2011 Production of methane 
Inject in gasgrid 
H-tec  
Fraunhofer ISE  
DVGW (project coordinator og three-stage methanation)  
IOLITEC  
Outotec  
Engler-Bunte-Institut  
EnBW Energie  
Stuttgart Verbundprojec
t Power-to-
Gas 
2012 Production of methane ZSW 
Fraunhofer IWES 
ETOGAS GmbH 
Falkenhagen Pilotanlage 
Falkenhagen 
2013 Production of hydrogen 
Inject in gasgrid 
E.ON  
ONTRAS-VNG Gastransport  
Hydrogenics  
Grapzow Windpark 
RH2-WKA 
2012 Production of hydrogen 
Use hydrogen to produce 
electricity 
Inject in grid 
NOW GmbH 
Haas Engineering 
Architekturburo Karsten Klunder 
Hydrogenics 
Senergie GmbH 
Prenzlau Hybridkraftwe
rk Prenzlau 
2011 Production of hydrogen 
Use for electricity 
use for transportation 
Enertrag 
Total 
Vattenfall 
Deutsche Bahn 
Schwandorf Power to Gas 
in Eucolino 
2012 Production of methane using 
Microorganisms. 
Injection in grid or storage. 
Microbenergy GmbH (a subsidiary of Viessmann) 
Rozenburg (NL) P2G in 
Rozenburg 
2013 Production of methane 
Injection in local grid 
 
Sources:  http://www.powertogas.info/power-to-gas/interaktive-projektkarte.html 
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  http://www.greenfacts-magazin.de/fileadmin/PDF/greenfacts_1_2012_Doppelseite-Infografik.pdf  
  Iskov, 2013 
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Appendix C - Research programs, description and partners 
Table 19: Research programs, description and partners 
Name Year Description Partners 
FCH JU 2008 – ongoing Public private partnership European commission 
New Energy World Industry Grouping (68 companies) 
N.ERGHY Research grouping (58 research institutions) 
International Energy 
Agency (IEA) 
2013 Hydrogen implementing 
agreement. 
28 member countries 
20 participants in Hydrogen Implementing Agreement Task 24 
Naturalhy 2010 Conversion of excess wind 
energy into hydrogen for fuel 
cell applications 
40 partners: 
19 companies 
10 universities 
5 research centers 
6 other 
 
Hyunder 
 
2012 - 2014 Assessing the potential, 
actors and business models of 
large scale underground 
hydrogen storage in Europe 
The Foundation for the Development of New Hydrogen Technologies 
Centre of Excellence of Low Carbon and Fuel Cell Technologies (CENEX) 
Commissariat à l'énergie atomique et aux énergies alternatives (CEA)  
DEEP Underground Engineering 
Energy Research Centre of the Netherlands (ECN) 
E.ON Gas Storage 
Hinicio 
LBST 
KBB Underground Technologies 
National Hydrogen and Fuel Cell Centre (Romania) 
Shell Global Solutions International B.V. 
Solvay	 
DVGW 
 
2013 Entwicklung von modularen 
Konzepten zur Erzeugung, 
Speicherung und Einspeisung 
von Wasserstoff und Methan 
ins Erdgasnetz 
DBI Gas- und Umwelttechnik GmbH 
DVGW 
Karlsruher Instituts fur Technologie 
E.ON New build & Technology GmbH 
Fraunhoffer IWES 
VNG Gasspeicher Gmbh 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
